[331] | 1 | /*
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| 2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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| 3 | *
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| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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| 8 | */
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| 9 |
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| 10 | /* ====================================================================
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| 11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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| 12 | *
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| 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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| 14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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| 15 | *
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| 16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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| 17 | * license provided above.
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| 18 | *
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| 19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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| 20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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| 21 | *
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| 22 | */
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| 23 | /* ====================================================================
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| 24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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| 25 | *
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| 26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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| 27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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| 28 | * license.
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| 29 | *
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| 30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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| 31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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| 32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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| 33 | *
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| 34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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| 35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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| 36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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| 37 | *
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| 38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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| 39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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| 40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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| 41 | * to make use of the Contribution.
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| 42 | *
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| 43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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| 44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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| 45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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| 46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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| 47 | * OTHERWISE.
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| 48 | */
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| 49 |
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| 50 | #include <stdio.h>
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| 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h"
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| 52 | #include "statem_locl.h"
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| 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
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| 54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h>
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| 55 | #include <openssl/rand.h>
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| 56 | #include <openssl/objects.h>
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| 57 | #include <openssl/evp.h>
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| 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h>
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| 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h>
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| 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h>
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| 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h>
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| 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h>
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| 63 |
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| 64 | static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
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| 65 | PACKET *cipher_suites,
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| 66 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
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| 67 | **skp, int sslv2format,
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| 68 | int *al);
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| 69 |
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| 70 | /*
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| 71 | * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
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| 72 | * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
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| 73 | * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
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| 74 | * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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| 75 | *
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| 76 | * Valid return values are:
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| 77 | * 1: Success (transition allowed)
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| 78 | * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
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| 79 | */
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| 80 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
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| 81 | {
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| 82 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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| 83 |
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| 84 | switch (st->hand_state) {
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| 85 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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| 86 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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| 87 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
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| 88 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
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| 89 | return 1;
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| 90 | }
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| 91 | break;
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| 92 |
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| 93 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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| 94 | /*
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| 95 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
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| 96 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
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| 97 | * OR
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| 98 | * 2) If we did request one then
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| 99 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
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| 100 | * AND
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| 101 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
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| 102 | * list if we requested a certificate)
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| 103 | */
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| 104 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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| 105 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
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| 106 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
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| 107 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
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| 108 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
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| 109 | /*
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| 110 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
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| 111 | * not going to accept it because we require a client
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| 112 | * cert.
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| 113 | */
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| 114 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
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| 115 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
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| 116 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
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| 117 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
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| 118 | return 0;
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| 119 | }
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| 120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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| 121 | return 1;
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| 122 | }
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| 123 | } else {
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| 124 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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| 125 | return 1;
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| 126 | }
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| 127 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
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| 128 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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| 129 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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| 130 | return 1;
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| 131 | }
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| 132 | }
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| 133 | break;
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| 134 |
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| 135 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
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| 136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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| 137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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| 138 | return 1;
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| 139 | }
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| 140 | break;
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| 141 |
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| 142 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
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| 143 | /*
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| 144 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
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| 145 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
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| 146 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
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| 147 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
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| 148 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
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| 149 | * set.
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| 150 | */
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| 151 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
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| 152 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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| 153 | /*
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| 154 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
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| 155 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
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| 156 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
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| 157 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
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| 158 | */
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| 159 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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| 160 | return 1;
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| 161 | }
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| 162 | } else {
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| 163 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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| 164 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
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| 165 | return 1;
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| 166 | }
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| 167 | }
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| 168 | break;
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| 169 |
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| 170 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
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| 171 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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| 172 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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| 173 | return 1;
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| 174 | }
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| 175 | break;
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| 176 |
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| 177 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
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| 178 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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| 179 | if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
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| 180 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
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| 181 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
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| 182 | return 1;
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| 183 | }
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| 184 | } else {
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| 185 | #endif
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| 186 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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| 187 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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| 188 | return 1;
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| 189 | }
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| 190 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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| 191 | }
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| 192 | #endif
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| 193 | break;
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| 194 |
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| 195 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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| 196 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
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| 197 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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| 198 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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| 199 | return 1;
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| 200 | }
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| 201 | break;
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| 202 | #endif
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| 203 |
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| 204 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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| 205 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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| 206 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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| 207 | return 1;
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| 208 | }
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| 209 | break;
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| 210 |
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| 211 | default:
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| 212 | break;
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| 213 | }
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| 214 |
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| 215 | /* No valid transition found */
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| 216 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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| 217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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| 218 | return 0;
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| 219 | }
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| 220 |
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| 221 | /*
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| 222 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
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| 223 | *
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| 224 | * Valid return values are:
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| 225 | * 1: Yes
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| 226 | * 0: No
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| 227 | */
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| 228 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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| 229 | {
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| 230 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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| 231 |
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| 232 | /*
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| 233 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
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| 234 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
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| 235 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
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| 236 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
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| 237 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
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| 238 | * key exchange.
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| 239 | */
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| 240 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
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| 241 | /*
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| 242 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
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| 243 | * provided
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| 244 | */
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| 245 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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| 246 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
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| 247 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
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| 248 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
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| 249 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */
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| 250 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
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| 251 | #endif
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| 252 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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| 253 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
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| 254 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
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| 255 | #endif
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| 256 | ) {
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| 257 | return 1;
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| 258 | }
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| 259 |
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| 260 | return 0;
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| 261 | }
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| 262 |
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| 263 | /*
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| 264 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
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| 265 | *
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| 266 | * Valid return values are:
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| 267 | * 1: Yes
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| 268 | * 0: No
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| 269 | */
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| 270 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
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| 271 | {
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| 272 | if (
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| 273 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
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| 274 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
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| 275 | /*
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| 276 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
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| 277 | * during re-negotiation:
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| 278 | */
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| 279 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
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| 280 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
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| 281 | /*
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| 282 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
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| 283 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
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| 284 | * RFC 2246):
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| 285 | */
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| 286 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
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| 287 | /*
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| 288 | * ... except when the application insists on
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| 289 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
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| 290 | * this for SSL 3)
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| 291 | */
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| 292 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
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| 293 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
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| 294 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
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| 295 | /*
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| 296 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
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| 297 | * are omitted
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| 298 | */
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| 299 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
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| 300 | return 1;
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| 301 | }
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| 302 |
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| 303 | return 0;
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| 304 | }
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| 305 |
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| 306 | /*
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| 307 | * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
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| 308 | * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
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| 309 | */
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| 310 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
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| 311 | {
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| 312 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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| 313 |
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| 314 | switch (st->hand_state) {
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| 315 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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| 316 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
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| 317 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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| 318 |
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| 319 | case TLS_ST_OK:
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| 320 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
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| 321 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
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| 322 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 323 |
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| 324 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
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| 325 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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| 326 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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| 327 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 328 |
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| 329 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
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| 330 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
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| 331 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
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| 332 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
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| 333 | else
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| 334 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
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| 335 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 336 |
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| 337 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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| 338 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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| 339 |
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| 340 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
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| 341 | if (s->hit) {
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| 342 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
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| 343 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
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| 344 | else
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| 345 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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| 346 | } else {
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| 347 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
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| 348 | /* normal PSK or SRP */
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| 349 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
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| 350 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
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| 351 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
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| 352 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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| 353 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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| 354 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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| 355 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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| 356 | } else {
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| 357 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
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| 358 | }
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| 359 | }
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| 360 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 361 |
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| 362 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
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| 363 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
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| 364 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
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| 365 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 366 | }
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| 367 | /* Fall through */
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| 368 |
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| 369 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
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| 370 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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| 371 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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| 372 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 373 | }
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| 374 | /* Fall through */
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| 375 |
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| 376 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
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| 377 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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| 378 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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| 379 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 380 | }
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| 381 | /* Fall through */
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| 382 |
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| 383 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
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| 384 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
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| 385 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 386 |
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| 387 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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| 388 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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| 389 |
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| 390 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
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| 391 | if (s->hit) {
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| 392 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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| 393 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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| 394 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 395 | } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
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| 396 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
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| 397 | } else {
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| 398 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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| 399 | }
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| 400 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 401 |
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| 402 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
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| 403 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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| 404 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 405 |
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| 406 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
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| 407 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
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| 408 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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| 409 |
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| 410 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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| 411 | if (s->hit) {
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| 412 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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| 413 | }
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| 414 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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| 415 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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| 416 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
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| 417 |
|
---|
| 418 | default:
|
---|
| 419 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
| 420 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
---|
| 421 | }
|
---|
| 422 | }
|
---|
| 423 |
|
---|
| 424 | /*
|
---|
| 425 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
---|
| 426 | * the server to the client.
|
---|
| 427 | */
|
---|
| 428 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
| 429 | {
|
---|
| 430 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 431 |
|
---|
| 432 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 433 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
---|
| 434 | s->shutdown = 0;
|
---|
| 435 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
---|
| 436 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
---|
| 437 | break;
|
---|
| 438 |
|
---|
| 439 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
---|
| 440 | s->shutdown = 0;
|
---|
| 441 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 442 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
---|
| 443 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
|
---|
| 444 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
| 445 | }
|
---|
| 446 | break;
|
---|
| 447 |
|
---|
| 448 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
| 449 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 450 | /*
|
---|
| 451 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
|
---|
| 452 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
|
---|
| 453 | */
|
---|
| 454 | st->use_timer = 1;
|
---|
| 455 | }
|
---|
| 456 | break;
|
---|
| 457 |
|
---|
| 458 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
| 459 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 460 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
|
---|
| 461 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
---|
| 462 | #endif
|
---|
| 463 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 464 |
|
---|
| 465 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
---|
| 466 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 467 | /*
|
---|
| 468 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
---|
| 469 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
|
---|
| 470 | */
|
---|
| 471 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
| 472 | }
|
---|
| 473 | break;
|
---|
| 474 |
|
---|
| 475 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
| 476 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
---|
| 477 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
---|
| 478 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 479 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 480 | }
|
---|
| 481 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 482 | /*
|
---|
| 483 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
---|
| 484 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
|
---|
| 485 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
|
---|
| 486 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
|
---|
| 487 | */
|
---|
| 488 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
| 489 | }
|
---|
| 490 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 491 |
|
---|
| 492 | case TLS_ST_OK:
|
---|
| 493 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
---|
| 494 |
|
---|
| 495 | default:
|
---|
| 496 | /* No pre work to be done */
|
---|
| 497 | break;
|
---|
| 498 | }
|
---|
| 499 |
|
---|
| 500 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 501 | }
|
---|
| 502 |
|
---|
| 503 | /*
|
---|
| 504 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
---|
| 505 | * server to the client.
|
---|
| 506 | */
|
---|
| 507 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
| 508 | {
|
---|
| 509 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 510 |
|
---|
| 511 | s->init_num = 0;
|
---|
| 512 |
|
---|
| 513 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 514 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
---|
| 515 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
| 516 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 517 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
---|
| 518 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 519 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 520 | }
|
---|
| 521 | break;
|
---|
| 522 |
|
---|
| 523 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
---|
| 524 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
| 525 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 526 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
|
---|
| 527 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
---|
| 528 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 529 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 530 | }
|
---|
| 531 | /*
|
---|
| 532 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
|
---|
| 533 | * treat like it was the first packet
|
---|
| 534 | */
|
---|
| 535 | s->first_packet = 1;
|
---|
| 536 | break;
|
---|
| 537 |
|
---|
| 538 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
| 539 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 540 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
---|
| 541 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
---|
| 542 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
---|
| 543 |
|
---|
| 544 | /*
|
---|
| 545 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
|
---|
| 546 | * SCTP used.
|
---|
| 547 | */
|
---|
| 548 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
---|
| 549 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
---|
| 550 |
|
---|
| 551 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
---|
| 552 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
---|
| 553 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
|
---|
| 554 | 0) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 555 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 556 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 557 | }
|
---|
| 558 |
|
---|
| 559 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
| 560 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
---|
| 561 | }
|
---|
| 562 | #endif
|
---|
| 563 | break;
|
---|
| 564 |
|
---|
| 565 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
| 566 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 567 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
|
---|
| 568 | /*
|
---|
| 569 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
---|
| 570 | * no SCTP used.
|
---|
| 571 | */
|
---|
| 572 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
| 573 | 0, NULL);
|
---|
| 574 | }
|
---|
| 575 | #endif
|
---|
| 576 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
---|
| 577 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
---|
| 578 | {
|
---|
| 579 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 580 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 581 | }
|
---|
| 582 |
|
---|
| 583 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
---|
| 584 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
---|
| 585 | break;
|
---|
| 586 |
|
---|
| 587 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
| 588 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
| 589 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 590 | break;
|
---|
| 591 |
|
---|
| 592 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
---|
| 593 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
| 594 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 595 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 596 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
---|
| 597 | /*
|
---|
| 598 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
---|
| 599 | * no SCTP used.
|
---|
| 600 | */
|
---|
| 601 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
| 602 | 0, NULL);
|
---|
| 603 | }
|
---|
| 604 | #endif
|
---|
| 605 | break;
|
---|
| 606 |
|
---|
| 607 | default:
|
---|
| 608 | /* No post work to be done */
|
---|
| 609 | break;
|
---|
| 610 | }
|
---|
| 611 |
|
---|
| 612 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 613 | }
|
---|
| 614 |
|
---|
| 615 | /*
|
---|
| 616 | * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
|
---|
| 617 | *
|
---|
| 618 | * Valid return values are:
|
---|
| 619 | * 1: Success
|
---|
| 620 | * 0: Error
|
---|
| 621 | */
|
---|
| 622 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 623 | {
|
---|
| 624 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 625 |
|
---|
| 626 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 627 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
---|
| 628 | return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
|
---|
| 629 |
|
---|
| 630 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
---|
| 631 | return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
|
---|
| 632 |
|
---|
| 633 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
| 634 | return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
|
---|
| 635 |
|
---|
| 636 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
---|
| 637 | return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
|
---|
| 638 |
|
---|
| 639 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
| 640 | return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
|
---|
| 641 |
|
---|
| 642 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
---|
| 643 | return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
|
---|
| 644 |
|
---|
| 645 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
| 646 | return tls_construct_server_done(s);
|
---|
| 647 |
|
---|
| 648 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
---|
| 649 | return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
|
---|
| 650 |
|
---|
| 651 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
---|
| 652 | return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
|
---|
| 653 |
|
---|
| 654 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
| 655 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
---|
| 656 | return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
---|
| 657 | else
|
---|
| 658 | return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
---|
| 659 |
|
---|
| 660 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
---|
| 661 | return tls_construct_finished(s,
|
---|
| 662 | s->method->
|
---|
| 663 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
---|
| 664 | s->method->
|
---|
| 665 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
---|
| 666 |
|
---|
| 667 | default:
|
---|
| 668 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
| 669 | break;
|
---|
| 670 | }
|
---|
| 671 |
|
---|
| 672 | return 0;
|
---|
| 673 | }
|
---|
| 674 |
|
---|
| 675 | /*
|
---|
| 676 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
|
---|
| 677 | * calculated as follows:
|
---|
| 678 | *
|
---|
| 679 | * 2 + # client_version
|
---|
| 680 | * 32 + # only valid length for random
|
---|
| 681 | * 1 + # length of session_id
|
---|
| 682 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
|
---|
| 683 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites
|
---|
| 684 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
|
---|
| 685 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods
|
---|
| 686 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
|
---|
| 687 | * 2 + # length of extensions
|
---|
| 688 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
|
---|
| 689 | */
|
---|
| 690 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
|
---|
| 691 |
|
---|
| 692 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
|
---|
| 693 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
|
---|
| 694 |
|
---|
| 695 | /*
|
---|
| 696 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
---|
| 697 | * reading. Excludes the message header.
|
---|
| 698 | */
|
---|
| 699 | unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 700 | {
|
---|
| 701 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 702 |
|
---|
| 703 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 704 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
| 705 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 706 |
|
---|
| 707 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
---|
| 708 | return s->max_cert_list;
|
---|
| 709 |
|
---|
| 710 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
| 711 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 712 |
|
---|
| 713 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
| 714 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 715 |
|
---|
| 716 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
| 717 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
---|
| 718 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 719 | #endif
|
---|
| 720 |
|
---|
| 721 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
---|
| 722 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 723 |
|
---|
| 724 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
---|
| 725 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 726 |
|
---|
| 727 | default:
|
---|
| 728 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
| 729 | break;
|
---|
| 730 | }
|
---|
| 731 |
|
---|
| 732 | return 0;
|
---|
| 733 | }
|
---|
| 734 |
|
---|
| 735 | /*
|
---|
| 736 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
|
---|
| 737 | */
|
---|
| 738 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 739 | {
|
---|
| 740 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 741 |
|
---|
| 742 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 743 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
| 744 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 745 |
|
---|
| 746 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
---|
| 747 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 748 |
|
---|
| 749 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
| 750 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 751 |
|
---|
| 752 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
| 753 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 754 |
|
---|
| 755 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
| 756 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
---|
| 757 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 758 | #endif
|
---|
| 759 |
|
---|
| 760 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
---|
| 761 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 762 |
|
---|
| 763 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
---|
| 764 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
|
---|
| 765 |
|
---|
| 766 | default:
|
---|
| 767 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
| 768 | break;
|
---|
| 769 | }
|
---|
| 770 |
|
---|
| 771 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 772 | }
|
---|
| 773 |
|
---|
| 774 | /*
|
---|
| 775 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
---|
| 776 | * from the client
|
---|
| 777 | */
|
---|
| 778 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
| 779 | {
|
---|
| 780 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
| 781 |
|
---|
| 782 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
| 783 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
| 784 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
|
---|
| 785 |
|
---|
| 786 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
| 787 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
|
---|
| 788 |
|
---|
| 789 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
| 790 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 791 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
|
---|
| 792 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
---|
| 793 | /* Are we renegotiating? */
|
---|
| 794 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
---|
| 795 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
---|
| 796 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
---|
| 797 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
| 798 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
| 799 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
---|
| 800 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 801 | } else {
|
---|
| 802 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
---|
| 803 | }
|
---|
| 804 | #endif
|
---|
| 805 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 806 |
|
---|
| 807 | default:
|
---|
| 808 | break;
|
---|
| 809 | }
|
---|
| 810 |
|
---|
| 811 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
| 812 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 813 | }
|
---|
| 814 |
|
---|
| 815 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 816 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
|
---|
| 817 | {
|
---|
| 818 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
|
---|
| 819 |
|
---|
| 820 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
---|
| 821 |
|
---|
| 822 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
|
---|
| 823 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
|
---|
| 824 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
|
---|
| 825 | /*
|
---|
| 826 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
|
---|
| 827 | * login name
|
---|
| 828 | */
|
---|
| 829 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
---|
| 830 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
---|
| 831 | } else {
|
---|
| 832 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
|
---|
| 833 | }
|
---|
| 834 | }
|
---|
| 835 | return ret;
|
---|
| 836 | }
|
---|
| 837 | #endif
|
---|
| 838 |
|
---|
| 839 | int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 840 | {
|
---|
| 841 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
|
---|
| 842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 843 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 844 | return 0;
|
---|
| 845 | }
|
---|
| 846 |
|
---|
| 847 | return 1;
|
---|
| 848 | }
|
---|
| 849 |
|
---|
| 850 | unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
|
---|
| 851 | unsigned char *cookie,
|
---|
| 852 | unsigned char cookie_len)
|
---|
| 853 | {
|
---|
| 854 | unsigned int msg_len;
|
---|
| 855 | unsigned char *p;
|
---|
| 856 |
|
---|
| 857 | p = buf;
|
---|
| 858 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
|
---|
| 859 | *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
|
---|
| 860 | *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
|
---|
| 861 |
|
---|
| 862 | *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
|
---|
| 863 | memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
|
---|
| 864 | p += cookie_len;
|
---|
| 865 | msg_len = p - buf;
|
---|
| 866 |
|
---|
| 867 | return msg_len;
|
---|
| 868 | }
|
---|
| 869 |
|
---|
| 870 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 871 | {
|
---|
| 872 | unsigned int len;
|
---|
| 873 | unsigned char *buf;
|
---|
| 874 |
|
---|
| 875 | buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
---|
| 876 |
|
---|
| 877 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
|
---|
| 878 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
|
---|
| 879 | &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
|
---|
| 880 | s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
|
---|
| 881 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
|
---|
| 882 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 883 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 884 | return 0;
|
---|
| 885 | }
|
---|
| 886 |
|
---|
| 887 | len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
|
---|
| 888 | s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
|
---|
| 889 |
|
---|
| 890 | dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
|
---|
| 891 | len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 892 |
|
---|
| 893 | /* number of bytes to write */
|
---|
| 894 | s->init_num = len;
|
---|
| 895 | s->init_off = 0;
|
---|
| 896 |
|
---|
| 897 | return 1;
|
---|
| 898 | }
|
---|
| 899 |
|
---|
| 900 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 901 | {
|
---|
| 902 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 903 | unsigned int j, complen = 0;
|
---|
| 904 | unsigned long id;
|
---|
| 905 | const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
---|
| 906 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
| 907 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
|
---|
| 908 | #endif
|
---|
| 909 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
| 910 | int protverr;
|
---|
| 911 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
|
---|
| 912 | PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
|
---|
| 913 | int is_v2_record;
|
---|
| 914 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
|
---|
| 915 |
|
---|
| 916 | is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
|
---|
| 917 |
|
---|
| 918 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
|
---|
| 919 | /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
|
---|
| 920 | if (is_v2_record) {
|
---|
| 921 | unsigned int version;
|
---|
| 922 | unsigned int mt;
|
---|
| 923 | /*-
|
---|
| 924 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
|
---|
| 925 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
|
---|
| 926 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
|
---|
| 927 | * the rest right through. Its format is:
|
---|
| 928 | * Byte Content
|
---|
| 929 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
|
---|
| 930 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
|
---|
| 931 | * 3-4 version
|
---|
| 932 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
|
---|
| 933 | * 7-8 session_id_length
|
---|
| 934 | * 9-10 challenge_length
|
---|
| 935 | * ... ...
|
---|
| 936 | */
|
---|
| 937 |
|
---|
| 938 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|
---|
| 939 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
---|
| 940 | /*
|
---|
| 941 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
|
---|
| 942 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
|
---|
| 943 | * in the first place
|
---|
| 944 | */
|
---|
| 945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 946 | goto err;
|
---|
| 947 | }
|
---|
| 948 |
|
---|
| 949 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
|
---|
| 950 | /* No protocol version supplied! */
|
---|
| 951 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
| 952 | goto err;
|
---|
| 953 | }
|
---|
| 954 | if (version == 0x0002) {
|
---|
| 955 | /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
|
---|
| 956 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
| 957 | goto err;
|
---|
| 958 | } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
|
---|
| 959 | /* SSLv3/TLS */
|
---|
| 960 | s->client_version = version;
|
---|
| 961 | } else {
|
---|
| 962 | /* No idea what protocol this is */
|
---|
| 963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
| 964 | goto err;
|
---|
| 965 | }
|
---|
| 966 | } else {
|
---|
| 967 | /*
|
---|
| 968 | * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
|
---|
| 969 | * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
|
---|
| 970 | */
|
---|
| 971 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
|
---|
| 972 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
---|
| 974 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 975 | }
|
---|
| 976 | }
|
---|
| 977 |
|
---|
| 978 | /*
|
---|
| 979 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
|
---|
| 980 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
|
---|
| 981 | */
|
---|
| 982 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 983 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
|
---|
| 984 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
|
---|
| 985 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
|
---|
| 986 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
|
---|
| 987 | } else {
|
---|
| 988 | protverr = 0;
|
---|
| 989 | }
|
---|
| 990 |
|
---|
| 991 | if (protverr) {
|
---|
| 992 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
|
---|
| 993 | if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
|
---|
| 994 | /*
|
---|
| 995 | * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
|
---|
| 996 | * number
|
---|
| 997 | */
|
---|
| 998 | s->version = s->client_version;
|
---|
| 999 | }
|
---|
| 1000 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
---|
| 1001 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1002 | }
|
---|
| 1003 |
|
---|
| 1004 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */
|
---|
| 1005 | if (is_v2_record) {
|
---|
| 1006 | /*
|
---|
| 1007 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
|
---|
| 1008 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
|
---|
| 1009 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
|
---|
| 1010 | */
|
---|
| 1011 | unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
|
---|
| 1012 | PACKET challenge;
|
---|
| 1013 |
|
---|
| 1014 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
|
---|
| 1015 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|
---|
| 1016 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
|
---|
| 1017 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1018 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1019 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1020 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1021 | }
|
---|
| 1022 |
|
---|
| 1023 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
---|
| 1024 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1025 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1026 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1027 | }
|
---|
| 1028 |
|
---|
| 1029 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
|
---|
| 1030 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
|
---|
| 1031 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
|
---|
| 1032 | /* No extensions. */
|
---|
| 1033 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
| 1034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1035 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1036 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1037 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1038 | }
|
---|
| 1039 |
|
---|
| 1040 | /* Load the client random and compression list. */
|
---|
| 1041 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
|
---|
| 1042 | challenge_len;
|
---|
| 1043 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
---|
| 1044 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
|
---|
| 1045 | s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
|
---|
| 1046 | challenge_len, challenge_len)
|
---|
| 1047 | /* Advertise only null compression. */
|
---|
| 1048 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
|
---|
| 1049 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1050 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1051 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1052 | }
|
---|
| 1053 |
|
---|
| 1054 | PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
|
---|
| 1055 | } else {
|
---|
| 1056 | /* Regular ClientHello. */
|
---|
| 1057 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|
---|
| 1058 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
|
---|
| 1059 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1061 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1062 | }
|
---|
| 1063 |
|
---|
| 1064 | if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
---|
| 1065 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1066 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1067 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1068 | }
|
---|
| 1069 |
|
---|
| 1070 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 1071 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
|
---|
| 1072 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1073 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1074 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1075 | }
|
---|
| 1076 | /*
|
---|
| 1077 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
|
---|
| 1078 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
|
---|
| 1079 | * So check cookie length...
|
---|
| 1080 | */
|
---|
| 1081 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
---|
| 1082 | if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
|
---|
| 1083 | return 1;
|
---|
| 1084 | }
|
---|
| 1085 | }
|
---|
| 1086 |
|
---|
| 1087 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
|
---|
| 1088 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
|
---|
| 1089 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1090 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1091 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1092 | }
|
---|
| 1093 | /* Could be empty. */
|
---|
| 1094 | extensions = *pkt;
|
---|
| 1095 | }
|
---|
| 1096 |
|
---|
| 1097 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 1098 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
|
---|
| 1099 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
---|
| 1100 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
|
---|
| 1101 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
|
---|
| 1102 | PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
|
---|
| 1103 | 0) {
|
---|
| 1104 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1106 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1107 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1108 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
---|
| 1109 | }
|
---|
| 1110 | /* default verification */
|
---|
| 1111 | } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
|
---|
| 1112 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1113 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 1114 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1115 | }
|
---|
| 1116 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
|
---|
| 1117 | }
|
---|
| 1118 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
---|
| 1119 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
|
---|
| 1120 | if (protverr != 0) {
|
---|
| 1121 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
|
---|
| 1122 | s->version = s->client_version;
|
---|
| 1123 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
---|
| 1124 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1125 | }
|
---|
| 1126 | }
|
---|
| 1127 | }
|
---|
| 1128 |
|
---|
| 1129 | s->hit = 0;
|
---|
| 1130 |
|
---|
| 1131 | /*
|
---|
| 1132 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
|
---|
| 1133 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
|
---|
| 1134 | *
|
---|
| 1135 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
|
---|
| 1136 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
|
---|
| 1137 | * ignore resumption requests with flag
|
---|
| 1138 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
|
---|
| 1139 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
|
---|
| 1140 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
|
---|
| 1141 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
|
---|
| 1142 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
|
---|
| 1143 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
|
---|
| 1144 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
|
---|
| 1145 | * ignored.
|
---|
| 1146 | */
|
---|
| 1147 | if (is_v2_record ||
|
---|
| 1148 | (s->new_session &&
|
---|
| 1149 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
|
---|
| 1150 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
---|
| 1151 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1152 | } else {
|
---|
| 1153 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
|
---|
| 1154 | /*
|
---|
| 1155 | * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
|
---|
| 1156 | * version.
|
---|
| 1157 | * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
|
---|
| 1158 | * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
|
---|
| 1159 | * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
|
---|
| 1160 | * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
|
---|
| 1161 | * will abort the handshake with an error.
|
---|
| 1162 | */
|
---|
| 1163 | if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
|
---|
| 1164 | /* previous session */
|
---|
| 1165 | s->hit = 1;
|
---|
| 1166 | } else if (i == -1) {
|
---|
| 1167 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1168 | } else {
|
---|
| 1169 | /* i == 0 */
|
---|
| 1170 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
---|
| 1171 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1172 | }
|
---|
| 1173 | }
|
---|
| 1174 |
|
---|
| 1175 | if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
|
---|
| 1176 | is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1177 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1178 | }
|
---|
| 1179 |
|
---|
| 1180 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
---|
| 1181 | if (s->hit) {
|
---|
| 1182 | j = 0;
|
---|
| 1183 | id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
---|
| 1184 |
|
---|
| 1185 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
---|
| 1186 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
|
---|
| 1187 | #endif
|
---|
| 1188 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
|
---|
| 1189 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
|
---|
| 1190 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
---|
| 1191 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
---|
| 1192 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
---|
| 1193 | #endif
|
---|
| 1194 | if (c->id == id) {
|
---|
| 1195 | j = 1;
|
---|
| 1196 | break;
|
---|
| 1197 | }
|
---|
| 1198 | }
|
---|
| 1199 | if (j == 0) {
|
---|
| 1200 | /*
|
---|
| 1201 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
|
---|
| 1202 | * to reuse it
|
---|
| 1203 | */
|
---|
| 1204 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1205 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1206 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
---|
| 1207 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1208 | }
|
---|
| 1209 | }
|
---|
| 1210 |
|
---|
| 1211 | complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
|
---|
| 1212 | for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
|
---|
| 1213 | if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
|
---|
| 1214 | break;
|
---|
| 1215 | }
|
---|
| 1216 |
|
---|
| 1217 | if (j >= complen) {
|
---|
| 1218 | /* no compress */
|
---|
| 1219 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1220 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
---|
| 1221 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1222 | }
|
---|
| 1223 |
|
---|
| 1224 | /* TLS extensions */
|
---|
| 1225 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
| 1226 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
|
---|
| 1227 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
---|
| 1228 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1229 | }
|
---|
| 1230 | }
|
---|
| 1231 |
|
---|
| 1232 | /*
|
---|
| 1233 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
|
---|
| 1234 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
|
---|
| 1235 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
|
---|
| 1236 | * processing to use it in key derivation.
|
---|
| 1237 | */
|
---|
| 1238 | {
|
---|
| 1239 | unsigned char *pos;
|
---|
| 1240 | pos = s->s3->server_random;
|
---|
| 1241 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 1242 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1243 | }
|
---|
| 1244 | }
|
---|
| 1245 |
|
---|
| 1246 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
|
---|
| 1247 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
---|
| 1248 |
|
---|
| 1249 | s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
---|
| 1250 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
---|
| 1251 | &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
|
---|
| 1252 | &pref_cipher,
|
---|
| 1253 | s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
|
---|
| 1254 | s->hit = 1;
|
---|
| 1255 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
---|
| 1256 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
---|
| 1257 |
|
---|
| 1258 | ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
| 1259 |
|
---|
| 1260 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
---|
| 1261 | pref_cipher =
|
---|
| 1262 | pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
|
---|
| 1263 | s->
|
---|
| 1264 | session->ciphers,
|
---|
| 1265 | SSL_get_ciphers
|
---|
| 1266 | (s));
|
---|
| 1267 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1268 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1269 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
---|
| 1270 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1271 | }
|
---|
| 1272 |
|
---|
| 1273 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
|
---|
| 1274 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
---|
| 1275 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
| 1276 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
---|
| 1277 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
| 1278 | }
|
---|
| 1279 | }
|
---|
| 1280 |
|
---|
| 1281 | /*
|
---|
| 1282 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
---|
| 1283 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
|
---|
| 1284 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
|
---|
| 1285 | */
|
---|
| 1286 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
|
---|
| 1287 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
| 1288 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
---|
| 1289 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
---|
| 1290 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
---|
| 1291 | unsigned int k;
|
---|
| 1292 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
---|
| 1293 | /* Can't disable compression */
|
---|
| 1294 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
|
---|
| 1295 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1296 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
---|
| 1297 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1298 | }
|
---|
| 1299 | /* Look for resumed compression method */
|
---|
| 1300 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
|
---|
| 1301 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
---|
| 1302 | if (comp_id == comp->id) {
|
---|
| 1303 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
---|
| 1304 | break;
|
---|
| 1305 | }
|
---|
| 1306 | }
|
---|
| 1307 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1308 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1309 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 1310 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1311 | }
|
---|
| 1312 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
---|
| 1313 | for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
|
---|
| 1314 | if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
|
---|
| 1315 | break;
|
---|
| 1316 | }
|
---|
| 1317 | if (k >= complen) {
|
---|
| 1318 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1319 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1320 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
---|
| 1321 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1322 | }
|
---|
| 1323 | } else if (s->hit)
|
---|
| 1324 | comp = NULL;
|
---|
| 1325 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
|
---|
| 1326 | /* See if we have a match */
|
---|
| 1327 | int m, nn, v, done = 0;
|
---|
| 1328 | unsigned int o;
|
---|
| 1329 |
|
---|
| 1330 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
---|
| 1331 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
|
---|
| 1332 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
---|
| 1333 | v = comp->id;
|
---|
| 1334 | for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
|
---|
| 1335 | if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
|
---|
| 1336 | done = 1;
|
---|
| 1337 | break;
|
---|
| 1338 | }
|
---|
| 1339 | }
|
---|
| 1340 | if (done)
|
---|
| 1341 | break;
|
---|
| 1342 | }
|
---|
| 1343 | if (done)
|
---|
| 1344 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
---|
| 1345 | else
|
---|
| 1346 | comp = NULL;
|
---|
| 1347 | }
|
---|
| 1348 | #else
|
---|
| 1349 | /*
|
---|
| 1350 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
---|
| 1351 | * using compression.
|
---|
| 1352 | */
|
---|
| 1353 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
---|
| 1354 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
---|
| 1355 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1356 | }
|
---|
| 1357 | #endif
|
---|
| 1358 |
|
---|
| 1359 | /*
|
---|
| 1360 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
|
---|
| 1361 | */
|
---|
| 1362 |
|
---|
| 1363 | if (!s->hit) {
|
---|
| 1364 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
| 1365 | s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
---|
| 1366 | #else
|
---|
| 1367 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
|
---|
| 1368 | #endif
|
---|
| 1369 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
| 1370 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
---|
| 1371 | if (ciphers == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1372 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1374 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1375 | }
|
---|
| 1376 | ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
| 1377 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
|
---|
| 1378 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
| 1379 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1380 | }
|
---|
| 1381 | }
|
---|
| 1382 |
|
---|
| 1383 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
---|
| 1384 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
| 1385 | f_err:
|
---|
| 1386 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 1387 | err:
|
---|
| 1388 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1389 |
|
---|
| 1390 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
---|
| 1391 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1392 |
|
---|
| 1393 | }
|
---|
| 1394 |
|
---|
| 1395 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
| 1396 | {
|
---|
| 1397 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1398 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
---|
| 1399 |
|
---|
| 1400 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
---|
| 1401 | if (!s->hit) {
|
---|
| 1402 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
|
---|
| 1403 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
|
---|
| 1404 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
---|
| 1405 | if (rv == 0) {
|
---|
| 1406 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1408 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1409 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1410 | }
|
---|
| 1411 | if (rv < 0) {
|
---|
| 1412 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
---|
| 1413 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
| 1414 | }
|
---|
| 1415 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
---|
| 1416 | }
|
---|
| 1417 | cipher =
|
---|
| 1418 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
---|
| 1419 |
|
---|
| 1420 | if (cipher == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1422 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
---|
| 1423 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1424 | }
|
---|
| 1425 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
|
---|
| 1426 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
|
---|
| 1427 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
|
---|
| 1428 | s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
|
---|
| 1429 | ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
|
---|
| 1430 | if (s->session->not_resumable)
|
---|
| 1431 | /* do not send a session ticket */
|
---|
| 1432 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
---|
| 1433 | } else {
|
---|
| 1434 | /* Session-id reuse */
|
---|
| 1435 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
---|
| 1436 | }
|
---|
| 1437 |
|
---|
| 1438 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
---|
| 1439 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
| 1440 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1441 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1442 | }
|
---|
| 1443 | }
|
---|
| 1444 |
|
---|
| 1445 | /*-
|
---|
| 1446 | * we now have the following setup.
|
---|
| 1447 | * client_random
|
---|
| 1448 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
|
---|
| 1449 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
|
---|
| 1450 | * compression - basically ignored right now
|
---|
| 1451 | * ssl version is set - sslv3
|
---|
| 1452 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
---|
| 1453 | * s->hit - session reuse flag
|
---|
| 1454 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
|
---|
| 1455 | */
|
---|
| 1456 |
|
---|
| 1457 | /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
|
---|
| 1458 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
| 1459 | if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
|
---|
| 1460 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1461 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
| 1462 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1463 | }
|
---|
| 1464 | }
|
---|
| 1465 |
|
---|
| 1466 | wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
| 1467 | }
|
---|
| 1468 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 1469 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
|
---|
| 1470 | int ret;
|
---|
| 1471 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
|
---|
| 1472 | /*
|
---|
| 1473 | * callback indicates further work to be done
|
---|
| 1474 | */
|
---|
| 1475 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
---|
| 1476 | return WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
| 1477 | }
|
---|
| 1478 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
|
---|
| 1479 | /*
|
---|
| 1480 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for
|
---|
| 1481 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
|
---|
| 1482 | */
|
---|
| 1483 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
|
---|
| 1484 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1485 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
| 1486 | else
|
---|
| 1487 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
| 1488 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
---|
| 1489 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1490 | }
|
---|
| 1491 | }
|
---|
| 1492 | #endif
|
---|
| 1493 | s->renegotiate = 2;
|
---|
| 1494 |
|
---|
| 1495 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
---|
| 1496 | f_err:
|
---|
| 1497 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 1498 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1499 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1500 | }
|
---|
| 1501 |
|
---|
| 1502 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 1503 | {
|
---|
| 1504 | unsigned char *buf;
|
---|
| 1505 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
| 1506 | int i, sl;
|
---|
| 1507 | int al = 0;
|
---|
| 1508 | unsigned long l;
|
---|
| 1509 |
|
---|
| 1510 | buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
---|
| 1511 |
|
---|
| 1512 | /* Do the message type and length last */
|
---|
| 1513 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 1514 |
|
---|
| 1515 | *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
---|
| 1516 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
---|
| 1517 |
|
---|
| 1518 | /*
|
---|
| 1519 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
|
---|
| 1520 | * tls_process_client_hello()
|
---|
| 1521 | */
|
---|
| 1522 | memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
---|
| 1523 | p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
---|
| 1524 |
|
---|
| 1525 | /*-
|
---|
| 1526 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send
|
---|
| 1527 | * back in the server hello:
|
---|
| 1528 | * - For session reuse from the session cache,
|
---|
| 1529 | * we send back the old session ID.
|
---|
| 1530 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
|
---|
| 1531 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
|
---|
| 1532 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
|
---|
| 1533 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
|
---|
| 1534 | * session ID.
|
---|
| 1535 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
|
---|
| 1536 | * we send back a 0-length session ID.
|
---|
| 1537 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
|
---|
| 1538 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
|
---|
| 1539 | * to send back.
|
---|
| 1540 | */
|
---|
| 1541 | if (s->session->not_resumable ||
|
---|
| 1542 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
---|
| 1543 | && !s->hit))
|
---|
| 1544 | s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
---|
| 1545 |
|
---|
| 1546 | sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
---|
| 1547 | if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
---|
| 1548 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1549 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1550 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1551 | }
|
---|
| 1552 | *(p++) = sl;
|
---|
| 1553 | memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
|
---|
| 1554 | p += sl;
|
---|
| 1555 |
|
---|
| 1556 | /* put the cipher */
|
---|
| 1557 | i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
|
---|
| 1558 | p += i;
|
---|
| 1559 |
|
---|
| 1560 | /* put the compression method */
|
---|
| 1561 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
| 1562 | *(p++) = 0;
|
---|
| 1563 | #else
|
---|
| 1564 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
---|
| 1565 | *(p++) = 0;
|
---|
| 1566 | else
|
---|
| 1567 | *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
---|
| 1568 | #endif
|
---|
| 1569 |
|
---|
| 1570 | if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 1571 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
| 1572 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1573 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1574 | }
|
---|
| 1575 | if ((p =
|
---|
| 1576 | ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
---|
| 1577 | &al)) == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1578 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 1579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1580 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1581 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1582 | }
|
---|
| 1583 |
|
---|
| 1584 | /* do the header */
|
---|
| 1585 | l = (p - d);
|
---|
| 1586 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
|
---|
| 1587 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1588 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1589 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1590 | }
|
---|
| 1591 |
|
---|
| 1592 | return 1;
|
---|
| 1593 | }
|
---|
| 1594 |
|
---|
| 1595 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 1596 | {
|
---|
| 1597 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
|
---|
| 1598 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1599 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1600 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1601 | }
|
---|
| 1602 |
|
---|
| 1603 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
---|
| 1604 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
| 1605 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1606 | }
|
---|
| 1607 | }
|
---|
| 1608 |
|
---|
| 1609 | return 1;
|
---|
| 1610 | }
|
---|
| 1611 |
|
---|
| 1612 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 1613 | {
|
---|
| 1614 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 1615 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
|
---|
| 1616 | int j;
|
---|
| 1617 | #endif
|
---|
| 1618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
| 1619 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
---|
| 1620 | int encodedlen = 0;
|
---|
| 1621 | int curve_id = 0;
|
---|
| 1622 | #endif
|
---|
| 1623 | EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
---|
| 1624 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
---|
| 1625 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
| 1626 | int al, i;
|
---|
| 1627 | unsigned long type;
|
---|
| 1628 | int n;
|
---|
| 1629 | const BIGNUM *r[4];
|
---|
| 1630 | int nr[4], kn;
|
---|
| 1631 | BUF_MEM *buf;
|
---|
| 1632 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
---|
| 1633 |
|
---|
| 1634 | if (md_ctx == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 1636 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1637 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1638 | }
|
---|
| 1639 |
|
---|
| 1640 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
---|
| 1641 |
|
---|
| 1642 | buf = s->init_buf;
|
---|
| 1643 |
|
---|
| 1644 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
---|
| 1645 | n = 0;
|
---|
| 1646 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
| 1647 | if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
---|
| 1648 | /*
|
---|
| 1649 | * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
|
---|
| 1650 | */
|
---|
| 1651 | n += 2;
|
---|
| 1652 | if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
|
---|
| 1653 | n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
---|
| 1654 | }
|
---|
| 1655 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
|
---|
| 1656 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
---|
| 1657 | } else
|
---|
| 1658 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
---|
| 1659 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 1660 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
| 1661 | CERT *cert = s->cert;
|
---|
| 1662 |
|
---|
| 1663 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
|
---|
| 1664 | DH *dh;
|
---|
| 1665 |
|
---|
| 1666 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
|
---|
| 1667 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
|
---|
| 1668 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
| 1669 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1670 | DH_free(dhp);
|
---|
| 1671 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1673 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1674 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1675 | }
|
---|
| 1676 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
|
---|
| 1677 | pkdhp = pkdh;
|
---|
| 1678 | } else {
|
---|
| 1679 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
---|
| 1680 | }
|
---|
| 1681 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
---|
| 1682 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
|
---|
| 1683 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
|
---|
| 1684 | if (pkdh == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1685 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1686 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1687 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1688 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1689 | }
|
---|
| 1690 | pkdhp = pkdh;
|
---|
| 1691 | }
|
---|
| 1692 | if (pkdhp == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1693 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1694 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1695 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
| 1696 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1697 | }
|
---|
| 1698 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
|
---|
| 1699 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
|
---|
| 1700 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1702 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
| 1703 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1704 | }
|
---|
| 1705 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
| 1706 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1707 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1708 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1709 | }
|
---|
| 1710 |
|
---|
| 1711 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
|
---|
| 1712 |
|
---|
| 1713 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1714 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
| 1715 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1716 | }
|
---|
| 1717 |
|
---|
| 1718 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
| 1719 |
|
---|
| 1720 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
---|
| 1721 | pkdh = NULL;
|
---|
| 1722 |
|
---|
| 1723 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
|
---|
| 1724 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
|
---|
| 1725 | } else
|
---|
| 1726 | #endif
|
---|
| 1727 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
| 1728 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
| 1729 | int nid;
|
---|
| 1730 |
|
---|
| 1731 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
| 1732 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1733 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1734 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1735 | }
|
---|
| 1736 |
|
---|
| 1737 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
|
---|
| 1738 | nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
|
---|
| 1739 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
|
---|
| 1740 | if (curve_id == 0) {
|
---|
| 1741 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1742 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
---|
| 1743 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1744 | }
|
---|
| 1745 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
|
---|
| 1746 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */
|
---|
| 1747 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1748 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1749 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
| 1750 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1751 | }
|
---|
| 1752 |
|
---|
| 1753 | /* Encode the public key. */
|
---|
| 1754 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
|
---|
| 1755 | &encodedPoint);
|
---|
| 1756 | if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
---|
| 1757 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
---|
| 1758 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1759 | }
|
---|
| 1760 |
|
---|
| 1761 | /*
|
---|
| 1762 | * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
|
---|
| 1763 | * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
|
---|
| 1764 | * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
|
---|
| 1765 | */
|
---|
| 1766 | n += 4 + encodedlen;
|
---|
| 1767 |
|
---|
| 1768 | /*
|
---|
| 1769 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
---|
| 1770 | * can set these to NULLs
|
---|
| 1771 | */
|
---|
| 1772 | r[0] = NULL;
|
---|
| 1773 | r[1] = NULL;
|
---|
| 1774 | r[2] = NULL;
|
---|
| 1775 | r[3] = NULL;
|
---|
| 1776 | } else
|
---|
| 1777 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
---|
| 1778 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 1779 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
|
---|
| 1780 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
|
---|
| 1781 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
|
---|
| 1782 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
|
---|
| 1783 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1784 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
|
---|
| 1785 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1786 | }
|
---|
| 1787 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
|
---|
| 1788 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
|
---|
| 1789 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
|
---|
| 1790 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
|
---|
| 1791 | } else
|
---|
| 1792 | #endif
|
---|
| 1793 | {
|
---|
| 1794 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1796 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
---|
| 1797 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1798 | }
|
---|
| 1799 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
---|
| 1800 | nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
---|
| 1801 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 1802 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
|
---|
| 1803 | n += 1 + nr[i];
|
---|
| 1804 | else
|
---|
| 1805 | #endif
|
---|
| 1806 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 1807 | /*-
|
---|
| 1808 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
|
---|
| 1809 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
|
---|
| 1810 | * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
|
---|
| 1811 | */
|
---|
| 1812 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
|
---|
| 1813 | n += 2 + nr[0];
|
---|
| 1814 | else
|
---|
| 1815 | #endif
|
---|
| 1816 | n += 2 + nr[i];
|
---|
| 1817 | }
|
---|
| 1818 |
|
---|
| 1819 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
|
---|
| 1820 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
|
---|
| 1821 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
|
---|
| 1822 | == NULL) {
|
---|
| 1823 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1824 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1825 | }
|
---|
| 1826 | kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
---|
| 1827 | /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
|
---|
| 1828 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
---|
| 1829 | kn += 2;
|
---|
| 1830 | /* Allow space for signature length */
|
---|
| 1831 | kn += 2;
|
---|
| 1832 | } else {
|
---|
| 1833 | pkey = NULL;
|
---|
| 1834 | kn = 0;
|
---|
| 1835 | }
|
---|
| 1836 |
|
---|
| 1837 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
|
---|
| 1838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
---|
| 1839 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1840 | }
|
---|
| 1841 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 1842 |
|
---|
| 1843 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
| 1844 | if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
---|
| 1845 | /* copy PSK identity hint */
|
---|
| 1846 | if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
|
---|
| 1847 | size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
---|
| 1848 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
---|
| 1849 | /*
|
---|
| 1850 | * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
|
---|
| 1851 | * the identity hint
|
---|
| 1852 | */
|
---|
| 1853 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1854 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1855 | goto err;
|
---|
| 1856 | }
|
---|
| 1857 | s2n(len, p);
|
---|
| 1858 | memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
|
---|
| 1859 | p += len;
|
---|
| 1860 | } else {
|
---|
| 1861 | s2n(0, p);
|
---|
| 1862 | }
|
---|
| 1863 | }
|
---|
| 1864 | #endif
|
---|
| 1865 |
|
---|
| 1866 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
---|
| 1867 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 1868 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
---|
| 1869 | *p = nr[i];
|
---|
| 1870 | p++;
|
---|
| 1871 | } else
|
---|
| 1872 | #endif
|
---|
| 1873 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 1874 | /*-
|
---|
| 1875 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
|
---|
| 1876 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
|
---|
| 1877 | * as the prime
|
---|
| 1878 | */
|
---|
| 1879 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
|
---|
| 1880 | s2n(nr[0], p);
|
---|
| 1881 | for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
|
---|
| 1882 | *p = 0;
|
---|
| 1883 | ++p;
|
---|
| 1884 | }
|
---|
| 1885 | } else
|
---|
| 1886 | #endif
|
---|
| 1887 | s2n(nr[i], p);
|
---|
| 1888 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
|
---|
| 1889 | p += nr[i];
|
---|
| 1890 | }
|
---|
| 1891 |
|
---|
| 1892 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
| 1893 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
| 1894 | /*
|
---|
| 1895 | * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
|
---|
| 1896 | * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
|
---|
| 1897 | * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
|
---|
| 1898 | * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
|
---|
| 1899 | */
|
---|
| 1900 | *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
---|
| 1901 | p += 1;
|
---|
| 1902 | *p = 0;
|
---|
| 1903 | p += 1;
|
---|
| 1904 | *p = curve_id;
|
---|
| 1905 | p += 1;
|
---|
| 1906 | *p = encodedlen;
|
---|
| 1907 | p += 1;
|
---|
| 1908 | memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
|
---|
| 1909 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
---|
| 1910 | encodedPoint = NULL;
|
---|
| 1911 | p += encodedlen;
|
---|
| 1912 | }
|
---|
| 1913 | #endif
|
---|
| 1914 |
|
---|
| 1915 | /* not anonymous */
|
---|
| 1916 | if (pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
| 1917 | /*
|
---|
| 1918 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
|
---|
| 1919 | * points to the space at the end.
|
---|
| 1920 | */
|
---|
| 1921 | if (md) {
|
---|
| 1922 | /* send signature algorithm */
|
---|
| 1923 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
| 1924 | if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
|
---|
| 1925 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 1926 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1927 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1928 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1929 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1930 | }
|
---|
| 1931 | p += 2;
|
---|
| 1932 | }
|
---|
| 1933 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
| 1934 | fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
| 1935 | #endif
|
---|
| 1936 | if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
---|
| 1937 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
---|
| 1938 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
---|
| 1939 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
---|
| 1940 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
---|
| 1941 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|
---|
| 1942 | || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
---|
| 1943 | (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 1944 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
|
---|
| 1945 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 1946 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1947 | }
|
---|
| 1948 | s2n(i, p);
|
---|
| 1949 | n += i + 2;
|
---|
| 1950 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
---|
| 1951 | n += 2;
|
---|
| 1952 | } else {
|
---|
| 1953 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
---|
| 1954 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1955 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 1956 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
---|
| 1957 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1958 | }
|
---|
| 1959 | }
|
---|
| 1960 |
|
---|
| 1961 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
|
---|
| 1962 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 1963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 1964 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 1965 | }
|
---|
| 1966 |
|
---|
| 1967 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
---|
| 1968 | return 1;
|
---|
| 1969 | f_err:
|
---|
| 1970 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 1971 | err:
|
---|
| 1972 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 1973 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
---|
| 1974 | #endif
|
---|
| 1975 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
| 1976 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
---|
| 1977 | #endif
|
---|
| 1978 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
---|
| 1979 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 1980 | return 0;
|
---|
| 1981 | }
|
---|
| 1982 |
|
---|
| 1983 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 1984 | {
|
---|
| 1985 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
| 1986 | int i, j, nl, off, n;
|
---|
| 1987 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
|
---|
| 1988 | X509_NAME *name;
|
---|
| 1989 | BUF_MEM *buf;
|
---|
| 1990 |
|
---|
| 1991 | buf = s->init_buf;
|
---|
| 1992 |
|
---|
| 1993 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 1994 |
|
---|
| 1995 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
---|
| 1996 | p++;
|
---|
| 1997 | n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
|
---|
| 1998 | d[0] = n;
|
---|
| 1999 | p += n;
|
---|
| 2000 | n++;
|
---|
| 2001 |
|
---|
| 2002 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
| 2003 | const unsigned char *psigs;
|
---|
| 2004 | unsigned char *etmp = p;
|
---|
| 2005 | nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
|
---|
| 2006 | /* Skip over length for now */
|
---|
| 2007 | p += 2;
|
---|
| 2008 | nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
|
---|
| 2009 | /* Now fill in length */
|
---|
| 2010 | s2n(nl, etmp);
|
---|
| 2011 | p += nl;
|
---|
| 2012 | n += nl + 2;
|
---|
| 2013 | }
|
---|
| 2014 |
|
---|
| 2015 | off = n;
|
---|
| 2016 | p += 2;
|
---|
| 2017 | n += 2;
|
---|
| 2018 |
|
---|
| 2019 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
---|
| 2020 | nl = 0;
|
---|
| 2021 | if (sk != NULL) {
|
---|
| 2022 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
---|
| 2023 | name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
|
---|
| 2024 | j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
|
---|
| 2025 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
|
---|
| 2026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
---|
| 2027 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2028 | }
|
---|
| 2029 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
|
---|
| 2030 | s2n(j, p);
|
---|
| 2031 | i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
---|
| 2032 | n += 2 + j;
|
---|
| 2033 | nl += 2 + j;
|
---|
| 2034 | }
|
---|
| 2035 | }
|
---|
| 2036 | /* else no CA names */
|
---|
| 2037 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
|
---|
| 2038 | s2n(nl, p);
|
---|
| 2039 |
|
---|
| 2040 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
|
---|
| 2041 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2042 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2043 | }
|
---|
| 2044 |
|
---|
| 2045 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
---|
| 2046 |
|
---|
| 2047 | return 1;
|
---|
| 2048 | err:
|
---|
| 2049 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2050 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2051 | }
|
---|
| 2052 |
|
---|
| 2053 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2054 | {
|
---|
| 2055 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
| 2056 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
---|
| 2057 | size_t psklen;
|
---|
| 2058 | PACKET psk_identity;
|
---|
| 2059 |
|
---|
| 2060 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
|
---|
| 2061 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2062 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2063 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2064 | }
|
---|
| 2065 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
---|
| 2066 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
---|
| 2068 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2069 | }
|
---|
| 2070 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2071 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
---|
| 2073 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2074 | }
|
---|
| 2075 |
|
---|
| 2076 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
|
---|
| 2077 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2079 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2080 | }
|
---|
| 2081 |
|
---|
| 2082 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
|
---|
| 2083 | psk, sizeof(psk));
|
---|
| 2084 |
|
---|
| 2085 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
---|
| 2086 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2087 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2088 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2089 | } else if (psklen == 0) {
|
---|
| 2090 | /*
|
---|
| 2091 | * PSK related to the given identity not found
|
---|
| 2092 | */
|
---|
| 2093 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
---|
| 2094 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
|
---|
| 2095 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
---|
| 2096 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2097 | }
|
---|
| 2098 |
|
---|
| 2099 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
|
---|
| 2100 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
|
---|
| 2101 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
|
---|
| 2102 |
|
---|
| 2103 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2104 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2106 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2107 | }
|
---|
| 2108 |
|
---|
| 2109 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
|
---|
| 2110 |
|
---|
| 2111 | return 1;
|
---|
| 2112 | #else
|
---|
| 2113 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2114 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2115 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2116 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2117 | #endif
|
---|
| 2118 | }
|
---|
| 2119 |
|
---|
| 2120 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2121 | {
|
---|
| 2122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
---|
| 2123 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
---|
| 2124 | int decrypt_len;
|
---|
| 2125 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
|
---|
| 2126 | size_t j, padding_len;
|
---|
| 2127 | PACKET enc_premaster;
|
---|
| 2128 | RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
---|
| 2129 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
|
---|
| 2130 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
| 2131 |
|
---|
| 2132 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
|
---|
| 2133 | if (rsa == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2134 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2135 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
| 2136 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2137 | }
|
---|
| 2138 |
|
---|
| 2139 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
|
---|
| 2140 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
---|
| 2141 | enc_premaster = *pkt;
|
---|
| 2142 | } else {
|
---|
| 2143 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|
---|
| 2144 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
| 2145 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2146 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2147 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2148 | }
|
---|
| 2149 | }
|
---|
| 2150 |
|
---|
| 2151 | /*
|
---|
| 2152 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
|
---|
| 2153 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
|
---|
| 2154 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
|
---|
| 2155 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
|
---|
| 2156 | */
|
---|
| 2157 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
---|
| 2158 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2159 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
| 2160 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2161 | }
|
---|
| 2162 |
|
---|
| 2163 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
|
---|
| 2164 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2165 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2166 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2167 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2168 | }
|
---|
| 2169 |
|
---|
| 2170 | /*
|
---|
| 2171 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
---|
| 2172 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
---|
| 2173 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
|
---|
| 2174 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
|
---|
| 2175 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
---|
| 2176 | */
|
---|
| 2177 |
|
---|
| 2178 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
|
---|
| 2179 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2180 |
|
---|
| 2181 | /*
|
---|
| 2182 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
|
---|
| 2183 | * the timing-sensitive code below.
|
---|
| 2184 | */
|
---|
| 2185 | decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
|
---|
| 2186 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
|
---|
| 2187 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
---|
| 2188 | if (decrypt_len < 0)
|
---|
| 2189 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2190 |
|
---|
| 2191 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
|
---|
| 2192 |
|
---|
| 2193 | /*
|
---|
| 2194 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
|
---|
| 2195 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
|
---|
| 2196 | * PS is at least 8 bytes.
|
---|
| 2197 | */
|
---|
| 2198 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
---|
| 2199 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2200 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
| 2201 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2202 | }
|
---|
| 2203 |
|
---|
| 2204 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
---|
| 2205 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
|
---|
| 2206 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
|
---|
| 2207 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
|
---|
| 2208 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
|
---|
| 2209 | }
|
---|
| 2210 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
|
---|
| 2211 |
|
---|
| 2212 | /*
|
---|
| 2213 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
|
---|
| 2214 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
|
---|
| 2215 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
|
---|
| 2216 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
|
---|
| 2217 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
|
---|
| 2218 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
|
---|
| 2219 | */
|
---|
| 2220 | version_good =
|
---|
| 2221 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
|
---|
| 2222 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
|
---|
| 2223 | version_good &=
|
---|
| 2224 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
|
---|
| 2225 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
|
---|
| 2226 |
|
---|
| 2227 | /*
|
---|
| 2228 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
---|
| 2229 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
---|
| 2230 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
---|
| 2231 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
---|
| 2232 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
---|
| 2233 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
|
---|
| 2234 | * clients.
|
---|
| 2235 | */
|
---|
| 2236 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
|
---|
| 2237 | unsigned char workaround_good;
|
---|
| 2238 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
|
---|
| 2239 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
|
---|
| 2240 | workaround_good &=
|
---|
| 2241 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
|
---|
| 2242 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
|
---|
| 2243 | version_good |= workaround_good;
|
---|
| 2244 | }
|
---|
| 2245 |
|
---|
| 2246 | /*
|
---|
| 2247 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
|
---|
| 2248 | * remain non-zero (0xff).
|
---|
| 2249 | */
|
---|
| 2250 | decrypt_good &= version_good;
|
---|
| 2251 |
|
---|
| 2252 | /*
|
---|
| 2253 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
|
---|
| 2254 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
|
---|
| 2255 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
|
---|
| 2256 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
|
---|
| 2257 | */
|
---|
| 2258 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
|
---|
| 2259 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
|
---|
| 2260 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
|
---|
| 2261 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
|
---|
| 2262 | rand_premaster_secret[j]);
|
---|
| 2263 | }
|
---|
| 2264 |
|
---|
| 2265 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
|
---|
| 2266 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
---|
| 2267 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2269 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2270 | }
|
---|
| 2271 |
|
---|
| 2272 | ret = 1;
|
---|
| 2273 | err:
|
---|
| 2274 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
|
---|
| 2275 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2276 | #else
|
---|
| 2277 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2278 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2279 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2280 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2281 | #endif
|
---|
| 2282 | }
|
---|
| 2283 |
|
---|
| 2284 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2285 | {
|
---|
| 2286 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
| 2287 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2288 | DH *cdh;
|
---|
| 2289 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
| 2290 | BIGNUM *pub_key;
|
---|
| 2291 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
| 2292 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2293 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
| 2294 |
|
---|
| 2295 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
|
---|
| 2296 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
|
---|
| 2298 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
---|
| 2299 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2300 | }
|
---|
| 2301 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
|
---|
| 2302 | if (skey == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2303 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2304 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
| 2305 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2306 | }
|
---|
| 2307 |
|
---|
| 2308 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
---|
| 2309 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2310 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
| 2311 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2312 | }
|
---|
| 2313 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
---|
| 2314 | /* We already checked we have enough data */
|
---|
| 2315 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2316 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2317 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2318 | }
|
---|
| 2319 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
| 2320 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
|
---|
| 2321 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
---|
| 2322 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2323 | }
|
---|
| 2324 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
|
---|
| 2325 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
|
---|
| 2326 |
|
---|
| 2327 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
|
---|
| 2328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2329 | if (pub_key != NULL)
|
---|
| 2330 | BN_free(pub_key);
|
---|
| 2331 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2332 | }
|
---|
| 2333 |
|
---|
| 2334 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
|
---|
| 2335 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2336 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2337 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2338 | }
|
---|
| 2339 |
|
---|
| 2340 | ret = 1;
|
---|
| 2341 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
| 2342 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2343 | err:
|
---|
| 2344 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
---|
| 2345 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2346 | #else
|
---|
| 2347 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2348 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2349 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2350 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2351 | #endif
|
---|
| 2352 | }
|
---|
| 2353 |
|
---|
| 2354 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2355 | {
|
---|
| 2356 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
| 2357 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
|
---|
| 2358 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2359 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
| 2360 |
|
---|
| 2361 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
---|
| 2362 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
|
---|
| 2363 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2364 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
---|
| 2365 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2366 | } else {
|
---|
| 2367 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
| 2368 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
| 2369 |
|
---|
| 2370 | /*
|
---|
| 2371 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
|
---|
| 2372 | * ClientKeyExchange message.
|
---|
| 2373 | */
|
---|
| 2374 |
|
---|
| 2375 | /* Get encoded point length */
|
---|
| 2376 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|
---|
| 2377 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
| 2378 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2379 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2380 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2381 | }
|
---|
| 2382 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
| 2383 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2384 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
| 2385 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2386 | }
|
---|
| 2387 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
|
---|
| 2388 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2389 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
---|
| 2390 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2391 | }
|
---|
| 2392 | }
|
---|
| 2393 |
|
---|
| 2394 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
|
---|
| 2395 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2397 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2398 | }
|
---|
| 2399 |
|
---|
| 2400 | ret = 1;
|
---|
| 2401 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
| 2402 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2403 | err:
|
---|
| 2404 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
---|
| 2405 |
|
---|
| 2406 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2407 | #else
|
---|
| 2408 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2409 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2411 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2412 | #endif
|
---|
| 2413 | }
|
---|
| 2414 |
|
---|
| 2415 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2416 | {
|
---|
| 2417 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
| 2418 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
| 2419 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
| 2420 |
|
---|
| 2421 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|
---|
| 2422 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
---|
| 2423 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2424 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
|
---|
| 2425 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2426 | }
|
---|
| 2427 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2428 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
---|
| 2429 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2430 | }
|
---|
| 2431 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
|
---|
| 2432 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 2433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
---|
| 2434 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2435 | }
|
---|
| 2436 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
---|
| 2437 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
---|
| 2438 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2439 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2440 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2441 | }
|
---|
| 2442 |
|
---|
| 2443 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
|
---|
| 2444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2445 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2446 | }
|
---|
| 2447 |
|
---|
| 2448 | return 1;
|
---|
| 2449 | #else
|
---|
| 2450 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2451 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2452 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2453 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2454 | #endif
|
---|
| 2455 | }
|
---|
| 2456 |
|
---|
| 2457 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
| 2458 | {
|
---|
| 2459 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
| 2460 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
---|
| 2461 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
---|
| 2462 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
|
---|
| 2463 | const unsigned char *start;
|
---|
| 2464 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
|
---|
| 2465 | unsigned long alg_a;
|
---|
| 2466 | int Ttag, Tclass;
|
---|
| 2467 | long Tlen;
|
---|
| 2468 | long sess_key_len;
|
---|
| 2469 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
| 2470 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
| 2471 |
|
---|
| 2472 | /* Get our certificate private key */
|
---|
| 2473 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
---|
| 2474 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
|
---|
| 2475 | /*
|
---|
| 2476 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
|
---|
| 2477 | */
|
---|
| 2478 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
|
---|
| 2479 | if (pk == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2480 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
|
---|
| 2481 | }
|
---|
| 2482 | if (pk == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2483 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
---|
| 2484 | }
|
---|
| 2485 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
|
---|
| 2486 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
---|
| 2487 | }
|
---|
| 2488 |
|
---|
| 2489 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
---|
| 2490 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2491 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2493 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2494 | }
|
---|
| 2495 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2496 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2497 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2498 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2499 | }
|
---|
| 2500 | /*
|
---|
| 2501 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
---|
| 2502 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
---|
| 2503 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
|
---|
| 2504 | * client certificate for authorization only.
|
---|
| 2505 | */
|
---|
| 2506 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
---|
| 2507 | if (client_pub_pkey) {
|
---|
| 2508 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
---|
| 2509 | ERR_clear_error();
|
---|
| 2510 | }
|
---|
| 2511 | /* Decrypt session key */
|
---|
| 2512 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
---|
| 2513 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
|
---|
| 2514 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2516 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2517 | }
|
---|
| 2518 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
|
---|
| 2519 | &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|
---|
| 2520 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
|
---|
| 2521 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2522 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
| 2523 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2524 | }
|
---|
| 2525 | start = data;
|
---|
| 2526 | inlen = Tlen;
|
---|
| 2527 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
|
---|
| 2528 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2529 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
| 2531 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2532 | }
|
---|
| 2533 | /* Generate master secret */
|
---|
| 2534 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
|
---|
| 2535 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
---|
| 2536 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2537 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2538 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2539 | }
|
---|
| 2540 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
---|
| 2541 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
---|
| 2542 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
---|
| 2543 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
---|
| 2544 |
|
---|
| 2545 | ret = 1;
|
---|
| 2546 | err:
|
---|
| 2547 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
---|
| 2548 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2549 | #else
|
---|
| 2550 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
| 2551 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2553 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2554 | #endif
|
---|
| 2555 | }
|
---|
| 2556 |
|
---|
| 2557 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 2558 | {
|
---|
| 2559 | int al = -1;
|
---|
| 2560 | unsigned long alg_k;
|
---|
| 2561 |
|
---|
| 2562 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
---|
| 2563 |
|
---|
| 2564 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
|
---|
| 2565 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2566 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2567 |
|
---|
| 2568 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
---|
| 2569 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
|
---|
| 2570 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
| 2571 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2572 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 2573 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2574 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2575 | }
|
---|
| 2576 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
|
---|
| 2577 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
|
---|
| 2578 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2580 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2581 | }
|
---|
| 2582 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
---|
| 2583 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2584 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2585 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
| 2586 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2587 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2588 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
| 2589 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2590 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2591 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
---|
| 2592 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2593 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2594 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
---|
| 2595 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
| 2596 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2597 | } else {
|
---|
| 2598 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2599 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 2600 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
---|
| 2601 | goto err;
|
---|
| 2602 | }
|
---|
| 2603 |
|
---|
| 2604 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
| 2605 | err:
|
---|
| 2606 | if (al != -1)
|
---|
| 2607 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 2608 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
| 2609 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
|
---|
| 2610 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
|
---|
| 2611 | #endif
|
---|
| 2612 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2613 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2614 | }
|
---|
| 2615 |
|
---|
| 2616 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
| 2617 | {
|
---|
| 2618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
| 2619 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
---|
| 2620 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
| 2621 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
---|
| 2622 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
---|
| 2623 | /*
|
---|
| 2624 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
---|
| 2625 | * used.
|
---|
| 2626 | */
|
---|
| 2627 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
---|
| 2628 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
---|
| 2629 |
|
---|
| 2630 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
---|
| 2631 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
---|
| 2632 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
|
---|
| 2633 | 0) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2634 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2635 | return WORK_ERROR;;
|
---|
| 2636 | }
|
---|
| 2637 |
|
---|
| 2638 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
| 2639 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
---|
| 2640 | }
|
---|
| 2641 | wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
| 2642 | }
|
---|
| 2643 |
|
---|
| 2644 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
|
---|
| 2645 | /* Is this SCTP? */
|
---|
| 2646 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
---|
| 2647 | /* Are we renegotiating? */
|
---|
| 2648 | && s->renegotiate
|
---|
| 2649 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
|
---|
| 2650 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
|
---|
| 2651 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
---|
| 2652 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
---|
| 2653 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
---|
| 2654 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
| 2655 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
| 2656 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
---|
| 2657 | return WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
| 2658 | } else {
|
---|
| 2659 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
---|
| 2660 | }
|
---|
| 2661 | #endif
|
---|
| 2662 |
|
---|
| 2663 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
|
---|
| 2664 | /*
|
---|
| 2665 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
|
---|
| 2666 | * the handshake_buffer
|
---|
| 2667 | */
|
---|
| 2668 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
| 2669 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2670 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2671 | }
|
---|
| 2672 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 2673 | } else {
|
---|
| 2674 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
---|
| 2675 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
| 2676 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2677 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2678 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2679 | }
|
---|
| 2680 | /*
|
---|
| 2681 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
|
---|
| 2682 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
|
---|
| 2683 | */
|
---|
| 2684 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
|
---|
| 2685 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2686 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2687 | }
|
---|
| 2688 | }
|
---|
| 2689 |
|
---|
| 2690 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
| 2691 | }
|
---|
| 2692 |
|
---|
| 2693 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 2694 | {
|
---|
| 2695 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
---|
| 2696 | const unsigned char *sig, *data;
|
---|
| 2697 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
| 2698 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
|
---|
| 2699 | #endif
|
---|
| 2700 | int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2701 | int type = 0, j;
|
---|
| 2702 | unsigned int len;
|
---|
| 2703 | X509 *peer;
|
---|
| 2704 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
---|
| 2705 | long hdatalen = 0;
|
---|
| 2706 | void *hdata;
|
---|
| 2707 |
|
---|
| 2708 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
---|
| 2709 |
|
---|
| 2710 | if (mctx == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2711 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2712 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2713 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2714 | }
|
---|
| 2715 |
|
---|
| 2716 | peer = s->session->peer;
|
---|
| 2717 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
|
---|
| 2718 | if (pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2719 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2720 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2721 | }
|
---|
| 2722 |
|
---|
| 2723 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
|
---|
| 2724 |
|
---|
| 2725 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
---|
| 2726 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
|
---|
| 2727 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
| 2728 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 2729 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2730 | }
|
---|
| 2731 |
|
---|
| 2732 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
|
---|
| 2733 | /*
|
---|
| 2734 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
|
---|
| 2735 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
|
---|
| 2736 | */
|
---|
| 2737 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
| 2738 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
|
---|
| 2739 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
|
---|
| 2740 | len = 64;
|
---|
| 2741 | } else
|
---|
| 2742 | #endif
|
---|
| 2743 | {
|
---|
| 2744 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
| 2745 | int rv;
|
---|
| 2746 |
|
---|
| 2747 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
|
---|
| 2748 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2749 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2750 | }
|
---|
| 2751 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
|
---|
| 2752 | if (rv == -1) {
|
---|
| 2753 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2754 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2755 | } else if (rv == 0) {
|
---|
| 2756 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2757 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2758 | }
|
---|
| 2759 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
| 2760 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
| 2761 | #endif
|
---|
| 2762 | } else {
|
---|
| 2763 | /* Use default digest for this key type */
|
---|
| 2764 | int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
|
---|
| 2765 | if (idx >= 0)
|
---|
| 2766 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
|
---|
| 2767 | if (md == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2768 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2769 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2770 | }
|
---|
| 2771 | }
|
---|
| 2772 |
|
---|
| 2773 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
|
---|
| 2774 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2775 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2776 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2777 | }
|
---|
| 2778 | }
|
---|
| 2779 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
---|
| 2780 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|
---|
| 2781 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
|
---|
| 2782 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
---|
| 2783 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2784 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2785 | }
|
---|
| 2786 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
|
---|
| 2787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2788 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2789 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2790 | }
|
---|
| 2791 |
|
---|
| 2792 | hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
---|
| 2793 | if (hdatalen <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2794 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2795 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2796 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2797 | }
|
---|
| 2798 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
| 2799 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
| 2800 | #endif
|
---|
| 2801 | if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
|
---|
| 2802 | || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
|
---|
| 2803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
| 2804 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2805 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2806 | }
|
---|
| 2807 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
| 2808 | {
|
---|
| 2809 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
|
---|
| 2810 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|
---|
| 2811 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|
---|
| 2812 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
|
---|
| 2813 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2814 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2815 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2816 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2817 | }
|
---|
| 2818 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
|
---|
| 2819 | data = gost_data;
|
---|
| 2820 | }
|
---|
| 2821 | }
|
---|
| 2822 | #endif
|
---|
| 2823 |
|
---|
| 2824 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
|
---|
| 2825 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
|
---|
| 2826 | s->session->master_key_length,
|
---|
| 2827 | s->session->master_key)) {
|
---|
| 2828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
| 2829 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2830 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2831 | }
|
---|
| 2832 |
|
---|
| 2833 | if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2834 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2835 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
---|
| 2836 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2837 | }
|
---|
| 2838 |
|
---|
| 2839 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
| 2840 | if (0) {
|
---|
| 2841 | f_err:
|
---|
| 2842 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 2843 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2844 | }
|
---|
| 2845 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
---|
| 2846 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
|
---|
| 2847 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
|
---|
| 2848 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
| 2849 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
|
---|
| 2850 | #endif
|
---|
| 2851 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2852 | }
|
---|
| 2853 |
|
---|
| 2854 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 2855 | {
|
---|
| 2856 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2857 | X509 *x = NULL;
|
---|
| 2858 | unsigned long l, llen;
|
---|
| 2859 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
|
---|
| 2860 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
---|
| 2861 | PACKET spkt;
|
---|
| 2862 |
|
---|
| 2863 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2864 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2865 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2866 | }
|
---|
| 2867 |
|
---|
| 2868 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
|
---|
| 2869 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
|
---|
| 2870 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
| 2871 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2872 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2873 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2874 | }
|
---|
| 2875 |
|
---|
| 2876 | while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
|
---|
| 2877 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|
---|
| 2878 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
|
---|
| 2879 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2880 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2881 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2882 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2883 | }
|
---|
| 2884 |
|
---|
| 2885 | certstart = certbytes;
|
---|
| 2886 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
|
---|
| 2887 | if (x == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2888 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
---|
| 2889 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2890 | }
|
---|
| 2891 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
|
---|
| 2892 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 2893 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2894 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 2895 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2896 | }
|
---|
| 2897 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
---|
| 2898 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 2899 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2900 | }
|
---|
| 2901 | x = NULL;
|
---|
| 2902 | }
|
---|
| 2903 |
|
---|
| 2904 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2905 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
---|
| 2906 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
| 2907 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2908 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2909 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
---|
| 2910 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2911 | }
|
---|
| 2912 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
---|
| 2913 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
---|
| 2914 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
---|
| 2915 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2916 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
| 2917 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2918 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2919 | }
|
---|
| 2920 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
|
---|
| 2921 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
| 2922 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2923 | }
|
---|
| 2924 | } else {
|
---|
| 2925 | EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
---|
| 2926 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
---|
| 2927 | if (i <= 0) {
|
---|
| 2928 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
---|
| 2929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2930 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
---|
| 2931 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2932 | }
|
---|
| 2933 | if (i > 1) {
|
---|
| 2934 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
---|
| 2935 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2936 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2937 | }
|
---|
| 2938 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
|
---|
| 2939 | if (pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2940 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 2941 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
| 2942 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
---|
| 2943 | goto f_err;
|
---|
| 2944 | }
|
---|
| 2945 | }
|
---|
| 2946 |
|
---|
| 2947 | X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
---|
| 2948 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
---|
| 2949 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
---|
| 2950 |
|
---|
| 2951 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
|
---|
| 2952 | s->session->peer_chain = sk;
|
---|
| 2953 | /*
|
---|
| 2954 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
|
---|
| 2955 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
|
---|
| 2956 | */
|
---|
| 2957 | sk = NULL;
|
---|
| 2958 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
---|
| 2959 | goto done;
|
---|
| 2960 |
|
---|
| 2961 | f_err:
|
---|
| 2962 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
| 2963 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2964 | done:
|
---|
| 2965 | X509_free(x);
|
---|
| 2966 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
---|
| 2967 | return ret;
|
---|
| 2968 | }
|
---|
| 2969 |
|
---|
| 2970 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 2971 | {
|
---|
| 2972 | CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
---|
| 2973 |
|
---|
| 2974 | cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
---|
| 2975 | if (cpk == NULL) {
|
---|
| 2976 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2977 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2978 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2979 | }
|
---|
| 2980 |
|
---|
| 2981 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
|
---|
| 2982 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 2983 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 2984 | return 0;
|
---|
| 2985 | }
|
---|
| 2986 |
|
---|
| 2987 | return 1;
|
---|
| 2988 | }
|
---|
| 2989 |
|
---|
| 2990 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 2991 | {
|
---|
| 2992 | unsigned char *senc = NULL;
|
---|
| 2993 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
---|
| 2994 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
|
---|
| 2995 | unsigned char *p, *macstart;
|
---|
| 2996 | const unsigned char *const_p;
|
---|
| 2997 | int len, slen_full, slen;
|
---|
| 2998 | SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
---|
| 2999 | unsigned int hlen;
|
---|
| 3000 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
|
---|
| 3001 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
---|
| 3002 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
|
---|
| 3003 | int iv_len;
|
---|
| 3004 |
|
---|
| 3005 | /* get session encoding length */
|
---|
| 3006 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
---|
| 3007 | /*
|
---|
| 3008 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
---|
| 3009 | * long
|
---|
| 3010 | */
|
---|
| 3011 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
|
---|
| 3012 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 3013 | return 0;
|
---|
| 3014 | }
|
---|
| 3015 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
|
---|
| 3016 | if (senc == NULL) {
|
---|
| 3017 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 3018 | return 0;
|
---|
| 3019 | }
|
---|
| 3020 |
|
---|
| 3021 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
---|
| 3022 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
---|
| 3023 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
|
---|
| 3024 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 3025 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3026 | }
|
---|
| 3027 |
|
---|
| 3028 | p = senc;
|
---|
| 3029 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
|
---|
| 3030 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3031 |
|
---|
| 3032 | /*
|
---|
| 3033 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
|
---|
| 3034 | */
|
---|
| 3035 | const_p = senc;
|
---|
| 3036 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
|
---|
| 3037 | if (sess == NULL)
|
---|
| 3038 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3039 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
|
---|
| 3040 |
|
---|
| 3041 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
---|
| 3042 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
|
---|
| 3043 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
| 3044 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3045 | }
|
---|
| 3046 | p = senc;
|
---|
| 3047 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
|
---|
| 3048 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
| 3049 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3050 | }
|
---|
| 3051 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
| 3052 |
|
---|
| 3053 | /*-
|
---|
| 3054 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
---|
| 3055 | * follows handshake_header_length +
|
---|
| 3056 | * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
|
---|
| 3057 | * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
---|
| 3058 | * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
|
---|
| 3059 | * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
|
---|
| 3060 | */
|
---|
| 3061 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
---|
| 3062 | SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
|
---|
| 3063 | EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
|
---|
| 3064 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
---|
| 3065 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3066 |
|
---|
| 3067 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 3068 | /*
|
---|
| 3069 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
---|
| 3070 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
---|
| 3071 | */
|
---|
| 3072 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
---|
| 3073 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
|
---|
| 3074 | int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
|
---|
| 3075 | hctx, 1);
|
---|
| 3076 |
|
---|
| 3077 | if (ret == 0) {
|
---|
| 3078 | l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
|
---|
| 3079 | s2n(0, p); /* length */
|
---|
| 3080 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
|
---|
| 3081 | (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
|
---|
| 3082 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3083 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
| 3084 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
| 3085 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
| 3086 | return 1;
|
---|
| 3087 | }
|
---|
| 3088 | if (ret < 0)
|
---|
| 3089 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3090 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
|
---|
| 3091 | } else {
|
---|
| 3092 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
|
---|
| 3093 |
|
---|
| 3094 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
|
---|
| 3095 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
|
---|
| 3096 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3097 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
|
---|
| 3098 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
|
---|
| 3099 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3100 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
|
---|
| 3101 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
|
---|
| 3102 | EVP_sha256(), NULL))
|
---|
| 3103 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3104 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
|
---|
| 3105 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
|
---|
| 3106 | }
|
---|
| 3107 |
|
---|
| 3108 | /*
|
---|
| 3109 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
|
---|
| 3110 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
|
---|
| 3111 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
|
---|
| 3112 | */
|
---|
| 3113 | l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
|
---|
| 3114 |
|
---|
| 3115 | /* Skip ticket length for now */
|
---|
| 3116 | p += 2;
|
---|
| 3117 | /* Output key name */
|
---|
| 3118 | macstart = p;
|
---|
| 3119 | memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
|
---|
| 3120 | p += sizeof(key_name);
|
---|
| 3121 | /* output IV */
|
---|
| 3122 | memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
|
---|
| 3123 | p += iv_len;
|
---|
| 3124 | /* Encrypt session data */
|
---|
| 3125 | if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
|
---|
| 3126 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3127 | p += len;
|
---|
| 3128 | if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
|
---|
| 3129 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3130 | p += len;
|
---|
| 3131 |
|
---|
| 3132 | if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
|
---|
| 3133 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3134 | if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
|
---|
| 3135 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3136 |
|
---|
| 3137 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
| 3138 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
| 3139 | ctx = NULL;
|
---|
| 3140 | hctx = NULL;
|
---|
| 3141 |
|
---|
| 3142 | p += hlen;
|
---|
| 3143 | /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
---|
| 3144 | /* Total length */
|
---|
| 3145 | len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 3146 | /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
|
---|
| 3147 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
|
---|
| 3148 | s2n(len - 6, p);
|
---|
| 3149 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
|
---|
| 3150 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3151 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
| 3152 |
|
---|
| 3153 | return 1;
|
---|
| 3154 | err:
|
---|
| 3155 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
| 3156 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
| 3157 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
| 3158 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 3159 | return 0;
|
---|
| 3160 | }
|
---|
| 3161 |
|
---|
| 3162 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
---|
| 3163 | {
|
---|
| 3164 | unsigned char *p;
|
---|
| 3165 | size_t msglen;
|
---|
| 3166 |
|
---|
| 3167 | /*-
|
---|
| 3168 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
---|
| 3169 | * follows handshake_header_length +
|
---|
| 3170 | * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
|
---|
| 3171 | * + (ocsp response)
|
---|
| 3172 | */
|
---|
| 3173 | msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
|
---|
| 3174 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
|
---|
| 3175 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3176 |
|
---|
| 3177 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
| 3178 |
|
---|
| 3179 | /* status type */
|
---|
| 3180 | *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
|
---|
| 3181 | /* length of OCSP response */
|
---|
| 3182 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
|
---|
| 3183 | /* actual response */
|
---|
| 3184 | memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
|
---|
| 3185 |
|
---|
| 3186 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
|
---|
| 3187 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3188 |
|
---|
| 3189 | return 1;
|
---|
| 3190 |
|
---|
| 3191 | err:
|
---|
| 3192 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 3193 | return 0;
|
---|
| 3194 | }
|
---|
| 3195 |
|
---|
| 3196 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
| 3197 | /*
|
---|
| 3198 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
|
---|
| 3199 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
|
---|
| 3200 | */
|
---|
| 3201 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
| 3202 | {
|
---|
| 3203 | PACKET next_proto, padding;
|
---|
| 3204 | size_t next_proto_len;
|
---|
| 3205 |
|
---|
| 3206 | /*-
|
---|
| 3207 | * The payload looks like:
|
---|
| 3208 | * uint8 proto_len;
|
---|
| 3209 | * uint8 proto[proto_len];
|
---|
| 3210 | * uint8 padding_len;
|
---|
| 3211 | * uint8 padding[padding_len];
|
---|
| 3212 | */
|
---|
| 3213 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|
---|
| 3214 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|
---|
| 3215 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
---|
| 3216 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
| 3217 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3218 | }
|
---|
| 3219 |
|
---|
| 3220 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
|
---|
| 3221 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
|
---|
| 3222 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3223 | }
|
---|
| 3224 |
|
---|
| 3225 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
|
---|
| 3226 |
|
---|
| 3227 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
---|
| 3228 | err:
|
---|
| 3229 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
| 3230 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3231 | }
|
---|
| 3232 | #endif
|
---|
| 3233 |
|
---|
| 3234 | #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
|
---|
| 3235 |
|
---|
| 3236 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
|
---|
| 3237 | PACKET *cipher_suites,
|
---|
| 3238 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
|
---|
| 3239 | int sslv2format, int *al)
|
---|
| 3240 | {
|
---|
| 3241 | const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
---|
| 3242 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
---|
| 3243 | int n;
|
---|
| 3244 | /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
|
---|
| 3245 | unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
|
---|
| 3246 |
|
---|
| 3247 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
|
---|
| 3248 |
|
---|
| 3249 | n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
|
---|
| 3250 |
|
---|
| 3251 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
|
---|
| 3252 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
---|
| 3253 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 3254 | return NULL;
|
---|
| 3255 | }
|
---|
| 3256 |
|
---|
| 3257 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
|
---|
| 3258 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
| 3259 | SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
---|
| 3260 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3261 | return NULL;
|
---|
| 3262 | }
|
---|
| 3263 |
|
---|
| 3264 | sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
---|
| 3265 | if (sk == NULL) {
|
---|
| 3266 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 3267 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3268 | return NULL;
|
---|
| 3269 | }
|
---|
| 3270 |
|
---|
| 3271 | if (sslv2format) {
|
---|
| 3272 | size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
|
---|
| 3273 | PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
|
---|
| 3274 | unsigned int leadbyte;
|
---|
| 3275 | unsigned char *raw;
|
---|
| 3276 |
|
---|
| 3277 | /*
|
---|
| 3278 | * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
|
---|
| 3279 | * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
|
---|
| 3280 | * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
|
---|
| 3281 | * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
|
---|
| 3282 | * problem.
|
---|
| 3283 | */
|
---|
| 3284 | raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
|
---|
| 3285 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
|
---|
| 3286 | if (raw == NULL) {
|
---|
| 3287 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3288 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3289 | }
|
---|
| 3290 | for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
|
---|
| 3291 | PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
|
---|
| 3292 | raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
|
---|
| 3293 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
|
---|
| 3294 | || (leadbyte == 0
|
---|
| 3295 | && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
|
---|
| 3296 | TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
|
---|
| 3297 | || (leadbyte != 0
|
---|
| 3298 | && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
|
---|
| 3299 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3300 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
|
---|
| 3301 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
|
---|
| 3302 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
|
---|
| 3303 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3304 | }
|
---|
| 3305 | if (leadbyte == 0)
|
---|
| 3306 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
|
---|
| 3307 | }
|
---|
| 3308 | } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
|
---|
| 3309 | &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
|
---|
| 3310 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3311 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3312 | }
|
---|
| 3313 |
|
---|
| 3314 | while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
|
---|
| 3315 | /*
|
---|
| 3316 | * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
|
---|
| 3317 | * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
|
---|
| 3318 | * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
|
---|
| 3319 | */
|
---|
| 3320 | if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
|
---|
| 3321 | continue;
|
---|
| 3322 |
|
---|
| 3323 | /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
|
---|
| 3324 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
---|
| 3325 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
---|
| 3326 | /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
|
---|
| 3327 | if (s->renegotiate) {
|
---|
| 3328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
| 3329 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
---|
| 3330 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
| 3331 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3332 | }
|
---|
| 3333 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
---|
| 3334 | continue;
|
---|
| 3335 | }
|
---|
| 3336 |
|
---|
| 3337 | /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
|
---|
| 3338 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
---|
| 3339 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
---|
| 3340 | /*
|
---|
| 3341 | * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
|
---|
| 3342 | * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
|
---|
| 3343 | * downgrade.
|
---|
| 3344 | */
|
---|
| 3345 | if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
|
---|
| 3346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
| 3347 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
---|
| 3348 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
|
---|
| 3349 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3350 | }
|
---|
| 3351 | continue;
|
---|
| 3352 | }
|
---|
| 3353 |
|
---|
| 3354 | /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
|
---|
| 3355 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
|
---|
| 3356 | if (c != NULL) {
|
---|
| 3357 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
|
---|
| 3358 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
| 3359 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3360 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3361 | }
|
---|
| 3362 | }
|
---|
| 3363 | }
|
---|
| 3364 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
|
---|
| 3365 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
| 3366 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
| 3367 | goto err;
|
---|
| 3368 | }
|
---|
| 3369 |
|
---|
| 3370 | *skp = sk;
|
---|
| 3371 | return sk;
|
---|
| 3372 | err:
|
---|
| 3373 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
---|
| 3374 | return NULL;
|
---|
| 3375 | }
|
---|