1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | *
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4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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8 | */
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9 |
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10 | /* ====================================================================
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11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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12 | *
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13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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15 | *
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16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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17 | * license provided above.
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18 | *
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19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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21 | *
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22 | */
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23 | /* ====================================================================
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24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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25 | *
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26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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28 | * license.
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29 | *
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30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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33 | *
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34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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37 | *
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38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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41 | * to make use of the Contribution.
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42 | *
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43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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47 | * OTHERWISE.
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48 | */
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49 |
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50 | #include <stdio.h>
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51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h"
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52 | #include "statem_locl.h"
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53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
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54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h>
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55 | #include <openssl/rand.h>
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56 | #include <openssl/objects.h>
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57 | #include <openssl/evp.h>
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58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h>
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59 | #include <openssl/x509.h>
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60 | #include <openssl/dh.h>
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61 | #include <openssl/bn.h>
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62 | #include <openssl/md5.h>
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63 |
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64 | static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
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65 | PACKET *cipher_suites,
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66 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
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67 | **skp, int sslv2format,
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68 | int *al);
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69 |
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70 | /*
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71 | * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
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72 | * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
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73 | * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
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74 | * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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75 | *
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76 | * Valid return values are:
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77 | * 1: Success (transition allowed)
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78 | * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
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79 | */
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80 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
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81 | {
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82 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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83 |
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84 | switch (st->hand_state) {
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85 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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86 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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87 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
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88 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
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89 | return 1;
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90 | }
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91 | break;
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92 |
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93 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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94 | /*
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95 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
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96 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
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97 | * OR
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98 | * 2) If we did request one then
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99 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
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100 | * AND
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101 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
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102 | * list if we requested a certificate)
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103 | */
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104 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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105 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
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106 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
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107 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
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108 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
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109 | /*
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110 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
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111 | * not going to accept it because we require a client
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112 | * cert.
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113 | */
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114 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
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115 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
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116 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
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117 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
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118 | return 0;
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119 | }
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120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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121 | return 1;
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122 | }
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123 | } else {
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124 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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125 | return 1;
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126 | }
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127 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
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128 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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129 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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130 | return 1;
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131 | }
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132 | }
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133 | break;
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134 |
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135 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
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136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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138 | return 1;
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139 | }
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140 | break;
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141 |
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142 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
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143 | /*
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144 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
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145 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
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146 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
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147 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
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148 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
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149 | * set.
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150 | */
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151 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
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152 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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153 | /*
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154 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
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155 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
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156 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
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157 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
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158 | */
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159 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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160 | return 1;
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161 | }
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162 | } else {
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163 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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164 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
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165 | return 1;
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166 | }
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167 | }
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168 | break;
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169 |
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170 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
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171 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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172 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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173 | return 1;
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174 | }
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175 | break;
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176 |
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177 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
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178 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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179 | if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
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180 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
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181 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
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182 | return 1;
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183 | }
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184 | } else {
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185 | #endif
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186 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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187 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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188 | return 1;
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189 | }
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190 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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191 | }
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192 | #endif
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193 | break;
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194 |
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195 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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196 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
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197 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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198 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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199 | return 1;
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200 | }
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201 | break;
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202 | #endif
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203 |
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204 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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205 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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206 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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207 | return 1;
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208 | }
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209 | break;
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210 |
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211 | default:
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212 | break;
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213 | }
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214 |
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215 | /* No valid transition found */
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216 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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218 | return 0;
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219 | }
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220 |
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221 | /*
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222 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
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223 | *
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224 | * Valid return values are:
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225 | * 1: Yes
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226 | * 0: No
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227 | */
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228 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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229 | {
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230 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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231 |
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232 | /*
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233 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
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234 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
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235 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
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236 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
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237 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
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238 | * key exchange.
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239 | */
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240 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
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241 | /*
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242 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
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243 | * provided
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244 | */
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245 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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246 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
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247 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
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248 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
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249 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */
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250 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
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251 | #endif
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252 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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253 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
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254 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
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255 | #endif
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256 | ) {
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257 | return 1;
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258 | }
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259 |
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260 | return 0;
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261 | }
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262 |
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263 | /*
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264 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
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265 | *
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266 | * Valid return values are:
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267 | * 1: Yes
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268 | * 0: No
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269 | */
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270 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
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271 | {
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272 | if (
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273 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
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274 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
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275 | /*
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276 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
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277 | * during re-negotiation:
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278 | */
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279 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
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280 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
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281 | /*
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282 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
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283 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
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284 | * RFC 2246):
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285 | */
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286 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
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287 | /*
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288 | * ... except when the application insists on
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289 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
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290 | * this for SSL 3)
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291 | */
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292 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
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293 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
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294 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
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295 | /*
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296 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
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297 | * are omitted
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298 | */
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299 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
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300 | return 1;
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301 | }
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302 |
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303 | return 0;
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304 | }
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305 |
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306 | /*
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307 | * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
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308 | * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
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309 | */
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310 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
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311 | {
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312 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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313 |
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314 | switch (st->hand_state) {
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315 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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316 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
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317 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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318 |
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319 | case TLS_ST_OK:
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320 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
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321 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
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322 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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323 |
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324 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
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325 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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326 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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327 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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328 |
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329 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
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330 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
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331 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
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332 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
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333 | else
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334 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
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335 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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336 |
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337 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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338 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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339 |
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340 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
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341 | if (s->hit) {
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342 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
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343 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
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344 | else
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345 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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346 | } else {
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347 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
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348 | /* normal PSK or SRP */
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349 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
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350 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
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351 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
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352 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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353 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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354 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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355 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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356 | } else {
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357 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
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358 | }
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359 | }
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360 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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361 |
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362 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
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363 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
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364 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
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365 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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366 | }
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367 | /* Fall through */
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368 |
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369 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
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370 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
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371 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
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372 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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373 | }
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374 | /* Fall through */
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375 |
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376 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
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377 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
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378 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
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379 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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380 | }
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381 | /* Fall through */
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382 |
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383 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
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384 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
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385 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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386 |
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387 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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388 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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389 |
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390 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
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391 | if (s->hit) {
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392 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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393 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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394 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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395 | } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
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396 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
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397 | } else {
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398 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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399 | }
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400 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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401 |
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402 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
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403 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
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404 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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405 |
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406 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
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407 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
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408 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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409 |
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410 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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411 | if (s->hit) {
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412 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
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413 | }
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414 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
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415 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
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416 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
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417 |
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418 | default:
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419 | /* Shouldn't happen */
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420 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
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421 | }
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422 | }
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423 |
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424 | /*
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425 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
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426 | * the server to the client.
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427 | */
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428 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
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429 | {
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430 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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431 |
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432 | switch (st->hand_state) {
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433 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
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434 | s->shutdown = 0;
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435 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
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436 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
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437 | break;
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438 |
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439 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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440 | s->shutdown = 0;
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---|
441 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
442 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
---|
443 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
|
---|
444 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
445 | }
|
---|
446 | break;
|
---|
447 |
|
---|
448 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
449 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
450 | /*
|
---|
451 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
|
---|
452 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
|
---|
453 | */
|
---|
454 | st->use_timer = 1;
|
---|
455 | }
|
---|
456 | break;
|
---|
457 |
|
---|
458 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
459 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
460 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
|
---|
461 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
---|
462 | #endif
|
---|
463 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
464 |
|
---|
465 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
---|
466 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
467 | /*
|
---|
468 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
---|
469 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
|
---|
470 | */
|
---|
471 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
472 | }
|
---|
473 | break;
|
---|
474 |
|
---|
475 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
476 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
---|
477 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
---|
478 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
479 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
480 | }
|
---|
481 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
482 | /*
|
---|
483 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
---|
484 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
|
---|
485 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
|
---|
486 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
|
---|
487 | */
|
---|
488 | st->use_timer = 0;
|
---|
489 | }
|
---|
490 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
491 |
|
---|
492 | case TLS_ST_OK:
|
---|
493 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
|
---|
494 |
|
---|
495 | default:
|
---|
496 | /* No pre work to be done */
|
---|
497 | break;
|
---|
498 | }
|
---|
499 |
|
---|
500 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
501 | }
|
---|
502 |
|
---|
503 | /*
|
---|
504 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
---|
505 | * server to the client.
|
---|
506 | */
|
---|
507 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
508 | {
|
---|
509 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
510 |
|
---|
511 | s->init_num = 0;
|
---|
512 |
|
---|
513 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
514 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
---|
515 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
516 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
517 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
---|
518 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
519 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
520 | }
|
---|
521 | break;
|
---|
522 |
|
---|
523 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
---|
524 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
525 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
526 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
|
---|
527 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
---|
528 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
529 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
530 | }
|
---|
531 | /*
|
---|
532 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
|
---|
533 | * treat like it was the first packet
|
---|
534 | */
|
---|
535 | s->first_packet = 1;
|
---|
536 | break;
|
---|
537 |
|
---|
538 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
539 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
540 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
---|
541 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
---|
542 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
---|
543 |
|
---|
544 | /*
|
---|
545 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
|
---|
546 | * SCTP used.
|
---|
547 | */
|
---|
548 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
---|
549 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
---|
550 |
|
---|
551 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
---|
552 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
---|
553 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
|
---|
554 | 0) <= 0) {
|
---|
555 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
556 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
557 | }
|
---|
558 |
|
---|
559 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
560 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
---|
561 | }
|
---|
562 | #endif
|
---|
563 | break;
|
---|
564 |
|
---|
565 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
566 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
567 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
|
---|
568 | /*
|
---|
569 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
---|
570 | * no SCTP used.
|
---|
571 | */
|
---|
572 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
573 | 0, NULL);
|
---|
574 | }
|
---|
575 | #endif
|
---|
576 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
---|
577 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
---|
578 | {
|
---|
579 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
580 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
581 | }
|
---|
582 |
|
---|
583 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
---|
584 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
|
---|
585 | break;
|
---|
586 |
|
---|
587 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
588 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
589 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
590 | break;
|
---|
591 |
|
---|
592 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
---|
593 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
---|
594 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
595 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
596 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
---|
597 | /*
|
---|
598 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
---|
599 | * no SCTP used.
|
---|
600 | */
|
---|
601 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
602 | 0, NULL);
|
---|
603 | }
|
---|
604 | #endif
|
---|
605 | break;
|
---|
606 |
|
---|
607 | default:
|
---|
608 | /* No post work to be done */
|
---|
609 | break;
|
---|
610 | }
|
---|
611 |
|
---|
612 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
613 | }
|
---|
614 |
|
---|
615 | /*
|
---|
616 | * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
|
---|
617 | *
|
---|
618 | * Valid return values are:
|
---|
619 | * 1: Success
|
---|
620 | * 0: Error
|
---|
621 | */
|
---|
622 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
|
---|
623 | {
|
---|
624 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
625 |
|
---|
626 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
627 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
---|
628 | return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
|
---|
629 |
|
---|
630 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
---|
631 | return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
|
---|
632 |
|
---|
633 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
---|
634 | return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
|
---|
635 |
|
---|
636 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
---|
637 | return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
|
---|
638 |
|
---|
639 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
640 | return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
|
---|
641 |
|
---|
642 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
---|
643 | return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
|
---|
644 |
|
---|
645 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
---|
646 | return tls_construct_server_done(s);
|
---|
647 |
|
---|
648 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
---|
649 | return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
|
---|
650 |
|
---|
651 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
---|
652 | return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
|
---|
653 |
|
---|
654 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
---|
655 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
|
---|
656 | return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
---|
657 | else
|
---|
658 | return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
|
---|
659 |
|
---|
660 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
---|
661 | return tls_construct_finished(s,
|
---|
662 | s->method->
|
---|
663 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
---|
664 | s->method->
|
---|
665 | ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
---|
666 |
|
---|
667 | default:
|
---|
668 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
669 | break;
|
---|
670 | }
|
---|
671 |
|
---|
672 | return 0;
|
---|
673 | }
|
---|
674 |
|
---|
675 | /*
|
---|
676 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
|
---|
677 | * calculated as follows:
|
---|
678 | *
|
---|
679 | * 2 + # client_version
|
---|
680 | * 32 + # only valid length for random
|
---|
681 | * 1 + # length of session_id
|
---|
682 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
|
---|
683 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites
|
---|
684 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
|
---|
685 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods
|
---|
686 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
|
---|
687 | * 2 + # length of extensions
|
---|
688 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
|
---|
689 | */
|
---|
690 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
|
---|
691 |
|
---|
692 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
|
---|
693 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
|
---|
694 |
|
---|
695 | /*
|
---|
696 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
---|
697 | * reading. Excludes the message header.
|
---|
698 | */
|
---|
699 | unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
|
---|
700 | {
|
---|
701 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
702 |
|
---|
703 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
704 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
705 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
706 |
|
---|
707 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
---|
708 | return s->max_cert_list;
|
---|
709 |
|
---|
710 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
711 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
712 |
|
---|
713 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
714 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
---|
715 |
|
---|
716 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
717 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
---|
718 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
719 | #endif
|
---|
720 |
|
---|
721 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
---|
722 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
723 |
|
---|
724 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
---|
725 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
---|
726 |
|
---|
727 | default:
|
---|
728 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
729 | break;
|
---|
730 | }
|
---|
731 |
|
---|
732 | return 0;
|
---|
733 | }
|
---|
734 |
|
---|
735 | /*
|
---|
736 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
|
---|
737 | */
|
---|
738 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
739 | {
|
---|
740 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
741 |
|
---|
742 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
743 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
744 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
|
---|
745 |
|
---|
746 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
---|
747 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
|
---|
748 |
|
---|
749 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
750 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
|
---|
751 |
|
---|
752 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
753 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
|
---|
754 |
|
---|
755 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
756 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
---|
757 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
|
---|
758 | #endif
|
---|
759 |
|
---|
760 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
---|
761 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
|
---|
762 |
|
---|
763 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
---|
764 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
|
---|
765 |
|
---|
766 | default:
|
---|
767 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
768 | break;
|
---|
769 | }
|
---|
770 |
|
---|
771 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
772 | }
|
---|
773 |
|
---|
774 | /*
|
---|
775 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
---|
776 | * from the client
|
---|
777 | */
|
---|
778 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
779 | {
|
---|
780 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
---|
781 |
|
---|
782 | switch (st->hand_state) {
|
---|
783 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
---|
784 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
|
---|
785 |
|
---|
786 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
---|
787 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
|
---|
788 |
|
---|
789 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
---|
790 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
791 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
|
---|
792 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
---|
793 | /* Are we renegotiating? */
|
---|
794 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
---|
795 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
---|
796 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
---|
797 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
798 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
799 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
---|
800 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
801 | } else {
|
---|
802 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
---|
803 | }
|
---|
804 | #endif
|
---|
805 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
806 |
|
---|
807 | default:
|
---|
808 | break;
|
---|
809 | }
|
---|
810 |
|
---|
811 | /* Shouldn't happen */
|
---|
812 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
813 | }
|
---|
814 |
|
---|
815 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
816 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
|
---|
817 | {
|
---|
818 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
|
---|
819 |
|
---|
820 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
---|
821 |
|
---|
822 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
|
---|
823 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
|
---|
824 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
|
---|
825 | /*
|
---|
826 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
|
---|
827 | * login name
|
---|
828 | */
|
---|
829 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
---|
830 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
---|
831 | } else {
|
---|
832 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
|
---|
833 | }
|
---|
834 | }
|
---|
835 | return ret;
|
---|
836 | }
|
---|
837 | #endif
|
---|
838 |
|
---|
839 | int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
840 | {
|
---|
841 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
|
---|
842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
843 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
844 | return 0;
|
---|
845 | }
|
---|
846 |
|
---|
847 | return 1;
|
---|
848 | }
|
---|
849 |
|
---|
850 | unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
|
---|
851 | unsigned char *cookie,
|
---|
852 | unsigned char cookie_len)
|
---|
853 | {
|
---|
854 | unsigned int msg_len;
|
---|
855 | unsigned char *p;
|
---|
856 |
|
---|
857 | p = buf;
|
---|
858 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
|
---|
859 | *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
|
---|
860 | *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
|
---|
861 |
|
---|
862 | *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
|
---|
863 | memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
|
---|
864 | p += cookie_len;
|
---|
865 | msg_len = p - buf;
|
---|
866 |
|
---|
867 | return msg_len;
|
---|
868 | }
|
---|
869 |
|
---|
870 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
871 | {
|
---|
872 | unsigned int len;
|
---|
873 | unsigned char *buf;
|
---|
874 |
|
---|
875 | buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
---|
876 |
|
---|
877 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
|
---|
878 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
|
---|
879 | &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
|
---|
880 | s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
|
---|
881 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
|
---|
882 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
|
---|
883 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
884 | return 0;
|
---|
885 | }
|
---|
886 |
|
---|
887 | len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
|
---|
888 | s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
|
---|
889 |
|
---|
890 | dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
|
---|
891 | len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
---|
892 |
|
---|
893 | /* number of bytes to write */
|
---|
894 | s->init_num = len;
|
---|
895 | s->init_off = 0;
|
---|
896 |
|
---|
897 | return 1;
|
---|
898 | }
|
---|
899 |
|
---|
900 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
901 | {
|
---|
902 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
903 | unsigned int j, complen = 0;
|
---|
904 | unsigned long id;
|
---|
905 | const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
---|
906 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
907 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
|
---|
908 | #endif
|
---|
909 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
910 | int protverr;
|
---|
911 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
|
---|
912 | PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
|
---|
913 | int is_v2_record;
|
---|
914 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
|
---|
915 |
|
---|
916 | is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
|
---|
917 |
|
---|
918 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
|
---|
919 | /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
|
---|
920 | if (is_v2_record) {
|
---|
921 | unsigned int version;
|
---|
922 | unsigned int mt;
|
---|
923 | /*-
|
---|
924 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
|
---|
925 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
|
---|
926 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
|
---|
927 | * the rest right through. Its format is:
|
---|
928 | * Byte Content
|
---|
929 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
|
---|
930 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
|
---|
931 | * 3-4 version
|
---|
932 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
|
---|
933 | * 7-8 session_id_length
|
---|
934 | * 9-10 challenge_length
|
---|
935 | * ... ...
|
---|
936 | */
|
---|
937 |
|
---|
938 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|
---|
939 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
---|
940 | /*
|
---|
941 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
|
---|
942 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
|
---|
943 | * in the first place
|
---|
944 | */
|
---|
945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
946 | goto err;
|
---|
947 | }
|
---|
948 |
|
---|
949 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
|
---|
950 | /* No protocol version supplied! */
|
---|
951 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
952 | goto err;
|
---|
953 | }
|
---|
954 | if (version == 0x0002) {
|
---|
955 | /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
|
---|
956 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
957 | goto err;
|
---|
958 | } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
|
---|
959 | /* SSLv3/TLS */
|
---|
960 | s->client_version = version;
|
---|
961 | } else {
|
---|
962 | /* No idea what protocol this is */
|
---|
963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
---|
964 | goto err;
|
---|
965 | }
|
---|
966 | } else {
|
---|
967 | /*
|
---|
968 | * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
|
---|
969 | * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
|
---|
970 | */
|
---|
971 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
|
---|
972 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
---|
974 | goto f_err;
|
---|
975 | }
|
---|
976 | }
|
---|
977 |
|
---|
978 | /*
|
---|
979 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
|
---|
980 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
|
---|
981 | */
|
---|
982 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
983 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
|
---|
984 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
|
---|
985 | DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
|
---|
986 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
|
---|
987 | } else {
|
---|
988 | protverr = 0;
|
---|
989 | }
|
---|
990 |
|
---|
991 | if (protverr) {
|
---|
992 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
|
---|
993 | if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
|
---|
994 | /*
|
---|
995 | * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
|
---|
996 | * number
|
---|
997 | */
|
---|
998 | s->version = s->client_version;
|
---|
999 | }
|
---|
1000 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
---|
1001 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1002 | }
|
---|
1003 |
|
---|
1004 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */
|
---|
1005 | if (is_v2_record) {
|
---|
1006 | /*
|
---|
1007 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
|
---|
1008 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
|
---|
1009 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
|
---|
1010 | */
|
---|
1011 | unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
|
---|
1012 | PACKET challenge;
|
---|
1013 |
|
---|
1014 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
|
---|
1015 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|
---|
1016 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
|
---|
1017 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1018 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1019 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1020 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1021 | }
|
---|
1022 |
|
---|
1023 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
---|
1024 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1025 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1026 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1027 | }
|
---|
1028 |
|
---|
1029 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
|
---|
1030 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
|
---|
1031 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
|
---|
1032 | /* No extensions. */
|
---|
1033 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
1034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1035 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1036 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1037 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1038 | }
|
---|
1039 |
|
---|
1040 | /* Load the client random and compression list. */
|
---|
1041 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
|
---|
1042 | challenge_len;
|
---|
1043 | memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
---|
1044 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
|
---|
1045 | s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
|
---|
1046 | challenge_len, challenge_len)
|
---|
1047 | /* Advertise only null compression. */
|
---|
1048 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
|
---|
1049 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1050 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1051 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1052 | }
|
---|
1053 |
|
---|
1054 | PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
|
---|
1055 | } else {
|
---|
1056 | /* Regular ClientHello. */
|
---|
1057 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|
---|
1058 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
|
---|
1059 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1061 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1062 | }
|
---|
1063 |
|
---|
1064 | if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
---|
1065 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1066 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1067 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1068 | }
|
---|
1069 |
|
---|
1070 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
1071 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
|
---|
1072 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1073 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1074 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1075 | }
|
---|
1076 | /*
|
---|
1077 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
|
---|
1078 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
|
---|
1079 | * So check cookie length...
|
---|
1080 | */
|
---|
1081 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
---|
1082 | if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
|
---|
1083 | return 1;
|
---|
1084 | }
|
---|
1085 | }
|
---|
1086 |
|
---|
1087 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
|
---|
1088 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
|
---|
1089 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1090 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1091 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1092 | }
|
---|
1093 | /* Could be empty. */
|
---|
1094 | extensions = *pkt;
|
---|
1095 | }
|
---|
1096 |
|
---|
1097 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
1098 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
|
---|
1099 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
---|
1100 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
|
---|
1101 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
|
---|
1102 | PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
|
---|
1103 | 0) {
|
---|
1104 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1106 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1107 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1108 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
---|
1109 | }
|
---|
1110 | /* default verification */
|
---|
1111 | } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
|
---|
1112 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1113 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
---|
1114 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1115 | }
|
---|
1116 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
|
---|
1117 | }
|
---|
1118 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
|
---|
1119 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
|
---|
1120 | if (protverr != 0) {
|
---|
1121 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
|
---|
1122 | s->version = s->client_version;
|
---|
1123 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
---|
1124 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1125 | }
|
---|
1126 | }
|
---|
1127 | }
|
---|
1128 |
|
---|
1129 | s->hit = 0;
|
---|
1130 |
|
---|
1131 | /*
|
---|
1132 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
|
---|
1133 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
|
---|
1134 | *
|
---|
1135 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
|
---|
1136 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
|
---|
1137 | * ignore resumption requests with flag
|
---|
1138 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
|
---|
1139 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
|
---|
1140 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
|
---|
1141 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
|
---|
1142 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
|
---|
1143 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
|
---|
1144 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
|
---|
1145 | * ignored.
|
---|
1146 | */
|
---|
1147 | if (is_v2_record ||
|
---|
1148 | (s->new_session &&
|
---|
1149 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
|
---|
1150 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
---|
1151 | goto err;
|
---|
1152 | } else {
|
---|
1153 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
|
---|
1154 | /*
|
---|
1155 | * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
|
---|
1156 | * version.
|
---|
1157 | * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
|
---|
1158 | * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
|
---|
1159 | * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
|
---|
1160 | * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
|
---|
1161 | * will abort the handshake with an error.
|
---|
1162 | */
|
---|
1163 | if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
|
---|
1164 | /* previous session */
|
---|
1165 | s->hit = 1;
|
---|
1166 | } else if (i == -1) {
|
---|
1167 | goto err;
|
---|
1168 | } else {
|
---|
1169 | /* i == 0 */
|
---|
1170 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
|
---|
1171 | goto err;
|
---|
1172 | }
|
---|
1173 | }
|
---|
1174 |
|
---|
1175 | if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
|
---|
1176 | is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
|
---|
1177 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1178 | }
|
---|
1179 |
|
---|
1180 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
---|
1181 | if (s->hit) {
|
---|
1182 | j = 0;
|
---|
1183 | id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
---|
1184 |
|
---|
1185 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
---|
1186 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
|
---|
1187 | #endif
|
---|
1188 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
|
---|
1189 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
|
---|
1190 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
---|
1191 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
---|
1192 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
---|
1193 | #endif
|
---|
1194 | if (c->id == id) {
|
---|
1195 | j = 1;
|
---|
1196 | break;
|
---|
1197 | }
|
---|
1198 | }
|
---|
1199 | if (j == 0) {
|
---|
1200 | /*
|
---|
1201 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
|
---|
1202 | * to reuse it
|
---|
1203 | */
|
---|
1204 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
1205 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1206 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
---|
1207 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1208 | }
|
---|
1209 | }
|
---|
1210 |
|
---|
1211 | complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
|
---|
1212 | for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
|
---|
1213 | if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
|
---|
1214 | break;
|
---|
1215 | }
|
---|
1216 |
|
---|
1217 | if (j >= complen) {
|
---|
1218 | /* no compress */
|
---|
1219 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1220 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
---|
1221 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1222 | }
|
---|
1223 |
|
---|
1224 | /* TLS extensions */
|
---|
1225 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
1226 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
|
---|
1227 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
---|
1228 | goto err;
|
---|
1229 | }
|
---|
1230 | }
|
---|
1231 |
|
---|
1232 | /*
|
---|
1233 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
|
---|
1234 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
|
---|
1235 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
|
---|
1236 | * processing to use it in key derivation.
|
---|
1237 | */
|
---|
1238 | {
|
---|
1239 | unsigned char *pos;
|
---|
1240 | pos = s->s3->server_random;
|
---|
1241 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
|
---|
1242 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1243 | }
|
---|
1244 | }
|
---|
1245 |
|
---|
1246 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
|
---|
1247 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
---|
1248 |
|
---|
1249 | s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
---|
1250 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
---|
1251 | &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
|
---|
1252 | &pref_cipher,
|
---|
1253 | s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
|
---|
1254 | s->hit = 1;
|
---|
1255 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
---|
1256 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
---|
1257 |
|
---|
1258 | ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
1259 |
|
---|
1260 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
---|
1261 | pref_cipher =
|
---|
1262 | pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
|
---|
1263 | s->
|
---|
1264 | session->ciphers,
|
---|
1265 | SSL_get_ciphers
|
---|
1266 | (s));
|
---|
1267 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
|
---|
1268 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1269 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
---|
1270 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1271 | }
|
---|
1272 |
|
---|
1273 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
|
---|
1274 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
---|
1275 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
1276 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
---|
1277 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
1278 | }
|
---|
1279 | }
|
---|
1280 |
|
---|
1281 | /*
|
---|
1282 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
---|
1283 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
|
---|
1284 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
|
---|
1285 | */
|
---|
1286 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
|
---|
1287 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
1288 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
---|
1289 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
---|
1290 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
---|
1291 | unsigned int k;
|
---|
1292 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
---|
1293 | /* Can't disable compression */
|
---|
1294 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
|
---|
1295 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1296 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
---|
1297 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1298 | }
|
---|
1299 | /* Look for resumed compression method */
|
---|
1300 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
|
---|
1301 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
---|
1302 | if (comp_id == comp->id) {
|
---|
1303 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
---|
1304 | break;
|
---|
1305 | }
|
---|
1306 | }
|
---|
1307 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
|
---|
1308 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1309 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
1310 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1311 | }
|
---|
1312 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
---|
1313 | for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
|
---|
1314 | if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
|
---|
1315 | break;
|
---|
1316 | }
|
---|
1317 | if (k >= complen) {
|
---|
1318 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
1319 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1320 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
---|
1321 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1322 | }
|
---|
1323 | } else if (s->hit)
|
---|
1324 | comp = NULL;
|
---|
1325 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
|
---|
1326 | /* See if we have a match */
|
---|
1327 | int m, nn, v, done = 0;
|
---|
1328 | unsigned int o;
|
---|
1329 |
|
---|
1330 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
---|
1331 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
|
---|
1332 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
|
---|
1333 | v = comp->id;
|
---|
1334 | for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
|
---|
1335 | if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
|
---|
1336 | done = 1;
|
---|
1337 | break;
|
---|
1338 | }
|
---|
1339 | }
|
---|
1340 | if (done)
|
---|
1341 | break;
|
---|
1342 | }
|
---|
1343 | if (done)
|
---|
1344 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
---|
1345 | else
|
---|
1346 | comp = NULL;
|
---|
1347 | }
|
---|
1348 | #else
|
---|
1349 | /*
|
---|
1350 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
---|
1351 | * using compression.
|
---|
1352 | */
|
---|
1353 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
---|
1354 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
---|
1355 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1356 | }
|
---|
1357 | #endif
|
---|
1358 |
|
---|
1359 | /*
|
---|
1360 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
|
---|
1361 | */
|
---|
1362 |
|
---|
1363 | if (!s->hit) {
|
---|
1364 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
1365 | s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
---|
1366 | #else
|
---|
1367 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
|
---|
1368 | #endif
|
---|
1369 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
---|
1370 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
|
---|
1371 | if (ciphers == NULL) {
|
---|
1372 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1374 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1375 | }
|
---|
1376 | ciphers = NULL;
|
---|
1377 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
|
---|
1378 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
1379 | goto err;
|
---|
1380 | }
|
---|
1381 | }
|
---|
1382 |
|
---|
1383 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
---|
1384 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
1385 | f_err:
|
---|
1386 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
1387 | err:
|
---|
1388 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1389 |
|
---|
1390 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
---|
1391 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
1392 |
|
---|
1393 | }
|
---|
1394 |
|
---|
1395 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
1396 | {
|
---|
1397 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1398 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
---|
1399 |
|
---|
1400 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
---|
1401 | if (!s->hit) {
|
---|
1402 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
|
---|
1403 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
|
---|
1404 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
---|
1405 | if (rv == 0) {
|
---|
1406 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1408 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
|
---|
1409 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1410 | }
|
---|
1411 | if (rv < 0) {
|
---|
1412 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
---|
1413 | return WORK_MORE_A;
|
---|
1414 | }
|
---|
1415 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
---|
1416 | }
|
---|
1417 | cipher =
|
---|
1418 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
---|
1419 |
|
---|
1420 | if (cipher == NULL) {
|
---|
1421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1422 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
---|
1423 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1424 | }
|
---|
1425 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
|
---|
1426 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
|
---|
1427 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
|
---|
1428 | s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
|
---|
1429 | ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
|
---|
1430 | if (s->session->not_resumable)
|
---|
1431 | /* do not send a session ticket */
|
---|
1432 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
---|
1433 | } else {
|
---|
1434 | /* Session-id reuse */
|
---|
1435 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
---|
1436 | }
|
---|
1437 |
|
---|
1438 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
---|
1439 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
1440 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1441 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1442 | }
|
---|
1443 | }
|
---|
1444 |
|
---|
1445 | /*-
|
---|
1446 | * we now have the following setup.
|
---|
1447 | * client_random
|
---|
1448 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
|
---|
1449 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
|
---|
1450 | * compression - basically ignored right now
|
---|
1451 | * ssl version is set - sslv3
|
---|
1452 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
---|
1453 | * s->hit - session reuse flag
|
---|
1454 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
|
---|
1455 | */
|
---|
1456 |
|
---|
1457 | /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
|
---|
1458 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
1459 | if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
|
---|
1460 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1461 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
1462 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1463 | }
|
---|
1464 | }
|
---|
1465 |
|
---|
1466 | wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
1467 | }
|
---|
1468 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
1469 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
|
---|
1470 | int ret;
|
---|
1471 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
|
---|
1472 | /*
|
---|
1473 | * callback indicates further work to be done
|
---|
1474 | */
|
---|
1475 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
---|
1476 | return WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
1477 | }
|
---|
1478 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
|
---|
1479 | /*
|
---|
1480 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for
|
---|
1481 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
|
---|
1482 | */
|
---|
1483 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
|
---|
1484 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1485 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
1486 | else
|
---|
1487 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
---|
1488 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
---|
1489 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1490 | }
|
---|
1491 | }
|
---|
1492 | #endif
|
---|
1493 | s->renegotiate = 2;
|
---|
1494 |
|
---|
1495 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
---|
1496 | f_err:
|
---|
1497 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
1498 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1499 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
1500 | }
|
---|
1501 |
|
---|
1502 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
---|
1503 | {
|
---|
1504 | unsigned char *buf;
|
---|
1505 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
1506 | int i, sl;
|
---|
1507 | int al = 0;
|
---|
1508 | unsigned long l;
|
---|
1509 |
|
---|
1510 | buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
---|
1511 |
|
---|
1512 | /* Do the message type and length last */
|
---|
1513 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
1514 |
|
---|
1515 | *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
---|
1516 | *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
---|
1517 |
|
---|
1518 | /*
|
---|
1519 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
|
---|
1520 | * tls_process_client_hello()
|
---|
1521 | */
|
---|
1522 | memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
---|
1523 | p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
---|
1524 |
|
---|
1525 | /*-
|
---|
1526 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send
|
---|
1527 | * back in the server hello:
|
---|
1528 | * - For session reuse from the session cache,
|
---|
1529 | * we send back the old session ID.
|
---|
1530 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
|
---|
1531 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
|
---|
1532 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
|
---|
1533 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
|
---|
1534 | * session ID.
|
---|
1535 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
|
---|
1536 | * we send back a 0-length session ID.
|
---|
1537 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
|
---|
1538 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
|
---|
1539 | * to send back.
|
---|
1540 | */
|
---|
1541 | if (s->session->not_resumable ||
|
---|
1542 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
---|
1543 | && !s->hit))
|
---|
1544 | s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
---|
1545 |
|
---|
1546 | sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
---|
1547 | if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
---|
1548 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1549 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1550 | return 0;
|
---|
1551 | }
|
---|
1552 | *(p++) = sl;
|
---|
1553 | memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
|
---|
1554 | p += sl;
|
---|
1555 |
|
---|
1556 | /* put the cipher */
|
---|
1557 | i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
|
---|
1558 | p += i;
|
---|
1559 |
|
---|
1560 | /* put the compression method */
|
---|
1561 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
---|
1562 | *(p++) = 0;
|
---|
1563 | #else
|
---|
1564 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
---|
1565 | *(p++) = 0;
|
---|
1566 | else
|
---|
1567 | *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
---|
1568 | #endif
|
---|
1569 |
|
---|
1570 | if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
---|
1571 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
---|
1572 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1573 | return 0;
|
---|
1574 | }
|
---|
1575 | if ((p =
|
---|
1576 | ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
---|
1577 | &al)) == NULL) {
|
---|
1578 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
1579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1580 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1581 | return 0;
|
---|
1582 | }
|
---|
1583 |
|
---|
1584 | /* do the header */
|
---|
1585 | l = (p - d);
|
---|
1586 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
|
---|
1587 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1588 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1589 | return 0;
|
---|
1590 | }
|
---|
1591 |
|
---|
1592 | return 1;
|
---|
1593 | }
|
---|
1594 |
|
---|
1595 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
|
---|
1596 | {
|
---|
1597 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
|
---|
1598 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1599 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1600 | return 0;
|
---|
1601 | }
|
---|
1602 |
|
---|
1603 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
|
---|
1604 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
1605 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1606 | }
|
---|
1607 | }
|
---|
1608 |
|
---|
1609 | return 1;
|
---|
1610 | }
|
---|
1611 |
|
---|
1612 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
---|
1613 | {
|
---|
1614 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
1615 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
|
---|
1616 | int j;
|
---|
1617 | #endif
|
---|
1618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
1619 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
---|
1620 | int encodedlen = 0;
|
---|
1621 | int curve_id = 0;
|
---|
1622 | #endif
|
---|
1623 | EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
---|
1624 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
---|
1625 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
1626 | int al, i;
|
---|
1627 | unsigned long type;
|
---|
1628 | int n;
|
---|
1629 | const BIGNUM *r[4];
|
---|
1630 | int nr[4], kn;
|
---|
1631 | BUF_MEM *buf;
|
---|
1632 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
---|
1633 |
|
---|
1634 | if (md_ctx == NULL) {
|
---|
1635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
1636 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1637 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1638 | }
|
---|
1639 |
|
---|
1640 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
---|
1641 |
|
---|
1642 | buf = s->init_buf;
|
---|
1643 |
|
---|
1644 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
---|
1645 | n = 0;
|
---|
1646 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
1647 | if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
---|
1648 | /*
|
---|
1649 | * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
|
---|
1650 | */
|
---|
1651 | n += 2;
|
---|
1652 | if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
|
---|
1653 | n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
---|
1654 | }
|
---|
1655 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
|
---|
1656 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
---|
1657 | } else
|
---|
1658 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
---|
1659 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
1660 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
1661 | CERT *cert = s->cert;
|
---|
1662 |
|
---|
1663 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
|
---|
1664 | DH *dh;
|
---|
1665 |
|
---|
1666 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
|
---|
1667 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
|
---|
1668 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
1669 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
|
---|
1670 | DH_free(dhp);
|
---|
1671 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1673 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1674 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1675 | }
|
---|
1676 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
|
---|
1677 | pkdhp = pkdh;
|
---|
1678 | } else {
|
---|
1679 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
---|
1680 | }
|
---|
1681 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
---|
1682 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
|
---|
1683 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
|
---|
1684 | if (pkdh == NULL) {
|
---|
1685 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1686 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1687 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1688 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1689 | }
|
---|
1690 | pkdhp = pkdh;
|
---|
1691 | }
|
---|
1692 | if (pkdhp == NULL) {
|
---|
1693 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1694 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1695 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
1696 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1697 | }
|
---|
1698 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
|
---|
1699 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
|
---|
1700 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1702 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
1703 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1704 | }
|
---|
1705 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
1706 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1707 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1708 | goto err;
|
---|
1709 | }
|
---|
1710 |
|
---|
1711 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
|
---|
1712 |
|
---|
1713 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
1714 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
1715 | goto err;
|
---|
1716 | }
|
---|
1717 |
|
---|
1718 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
1719 |
|
---|
1720 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
---|
1721 | pkdh = NULL;
|
---|
1722 |
|
---|
1723 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
|
---|
1724 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
|
---|
1725 | } else
|
---|
1726 | #endif
|
---|
1727 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
1728 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
1729 | int nid;
|
---|
1730 |
|
---|
1731 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
1732 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1733 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1734 | goto err;
|
---|
1735 | }
|
---|
1736 |
|
---|
1737 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
|
---|
1738 | nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
|
---|
1739 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
|
---|
1740 | if (curve_id == 0) {
|
---|
1741 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1742 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
---|
1743 | goto err;
|
---|
1744 | }
|
---|
1745 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
|
---|
1746 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */
|
---|
1747 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
1748 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1749 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
1750 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1751 | }
|
---|
1752 |
|
---|
1753 | /* Encode the public key. */
|
---|
1754 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
|
---|
1755 | &encodedPoint);
|
---|
1756 | if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
---|
1757 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
---|
1758 | goto err;
|
---|
1759 | }
|
---|
1760 |
|
---|
1761 | /*
|
---|
1762 | * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
|
---|
1763 | * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
|
---|
1764 | * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
|
---|
1765 | */
|
---|
1766 | n += 4 + encodedlen;
|
---|
1767 |
|
---|
1768 | /*
|
---|
1769 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
---|
1770 | * can set these to NULLs
|
---|
1771 | */
|
---|
1772 | r[0] = NULL;
|
---|
1773 | r[1] = NULL;
|
---|
1774 | r[2] = NULL;
|
---|
1775 | r[3] = NULL;
|
---|
1776 | } else
|
---|
1777 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
---|
1778 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
1779 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
|
---|
1780 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
|
---|
1781 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
|
---|
1782 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
|
---|
1783 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1784 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
|
---|
1785 | goto err;
|
---|
1786 | }
|
---|
1787 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
|
---|
1788 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
|
---|
1789 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
|
---|
1790 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
|
---|
1791 | } else
|
---|
1792 | #endif
|
---|
1793 | {
|
---|
1794 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1796 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
---|
1797 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1798 | }
|
---|
1799 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
---|
1800 | nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
---|
1801 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
1802 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
|
---|
1803 | n += 1 + nr[i];
|
---|
1804 | else
|
---|
1805 | #endif
|
---|
1806 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
1807 | /*-
|
---|
1808 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
|
---|
1809 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
|
---|
1810 | * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
|
---|
1811 | */
|
---|
1812 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
|
---|
1813 | n += 2 + nr[0];
|
---|
1814 | else
|
---|
1815 | #endif
|
---|
1816 | n += 2 + nr[i];
|
---|
1817 | }
|
---|
1818 |
|
---|
1819 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
|
---|
1820 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
|
---|
1821 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
|
---|
1822 | == NULL) {
|
---|
1823 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
1824 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1825 | }
|
---|
1826 | kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
---|
1827 | /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
|
---|
1828 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
---|
1829 | kn += 2;
|
---|
1830 | /* Allow space for signature length */
|
---|
1831 | kn += 2;
|
---|
1832 | } else {
|
---|
1833 | pkey = NULL;
|
---|
1834 | kn = 0;
|
---|
1835 | }
|
---|
1836 |
|
---|
1837 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
|
---|
1838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
---|
1839 | goto err;
|
---|
1840 | }
|
---|
1841 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
1842 |
|
---|
1843 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
1844 | if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
---|
1845 | /* copy PSK identity hint */
|
---|
1846 | if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
|
---|
1847 | size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
---|
1848 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
---|
1849 | /*
|
---|
1850 | * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
|
---|
1851 | * the identity hint
|
---|
1852 | */
|
---|
1853 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1854 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1855 | goto err;
|
---|
1856 | }
|
---|
1857 | s2n(len, p);
|
---|
1858 | memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
|
---|
1859 | p += len;
|
---|
1860 | } else {
|
---|
1861 | s2n(0, p);
|
---|
1862 | }
|
---|
1863 | }
|
---|
1864 | #endif
|
---|
1865 |
|
---|
1866 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
---|
1867 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
1868 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
---|
1869 | *p = nr[i];
|
---|
1870 | p++;
|
---|
1871 | } else
|
---|
1872 | #endif
|
---|
1873 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
1874 | /*-
|
---|
1875 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
|
---|
1876 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
|
---|
1877 | * as the prime
|
---|
1878 | */
|
---|
1879 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
|
---|
1880 | s2n(nr[0], p);
|
---|
1881 | for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
|
---|
1882 | *p = 0;
|
---|
1883 | ++p;
|
---|
1884 | }
|
---|
1885 | } else
|
---|
1886 | #endif
|
---|
1887 | s2n(nr[i], p);
|
---|
1888 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
|
---|
1889 | p += nr[i];
|
---|
1890 | }
|
---|
1891 |
|
---|
1892 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
1893 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
1894 | /*
|
---|
1895 | * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
|
---|
1896 | * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
|
---|
1897 | * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
|
---|
1898 | * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
|
---|
1899 | */
|
---|
1900 | *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
---|
1901 | p += 1;
|
---|
1902 | *p = 0;
|
---|
1903 | p += 1;
|
---|
1904 | *p = curve_id;
|
---|
1905 | p += 1;
|
---|
1906 | *p = encodedlen;
|
---|
1907 | p += 1;
|
---|
1908 | memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
|
---|
1909 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
---|
1910 | encodedPoint = NULL;
|
---|
1911 | p += encodedlen;
|
---|
1912 | }
|
---|
1913 | #endif
|
---|
1914 |
|
---|
1915 | /* not anonymous */
|
---|
1916 | if (pkey != NULL) {
|
---|
1917 | /*
|
---|
1918 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
|
---|
1919 | * points to the space at the end.
|
---|
1920 | */
|
---|
1921 | if (md) {
|
---|
1922 | /* send signature algorithm */
|
---|
1923 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
1924 | if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
|
---|
1925 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
1926 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1927 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1928 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1929 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1930 | }
|
---|
1931 | p += 2;
|
---|
1932 | }
|
---|
1933 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
1934 | fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
1935 | #endif
|
---|
1936 | if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
---|
1937 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
---|
1938 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
---|
1939 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
---|
1940 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|
---|
1941 | || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|
---|
1942 | || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
|
---|
1943 | (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
|
---|
1944 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
|
---|
1945 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
1946 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1947 | }
|
---|
1948 | s2n(i, p);
|
---|
1949 | n += i + 2;
|
---|
1950 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
---|
1951 | n += 2;
|
---|
1952 | } else {
|
---|
1953 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
---|
1954 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1955 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
1956 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
---|
1957 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1958 | }
|
---|
1959 | }
|
---|
1960 |
|
---|
1961 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
|
---|
1962 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
1963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
1964 | goto f_err;
|
---|
1965 | }
|
---|
1966 |
|
---|
1967 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
---|
1968 | return 1;
|
---|
1969 | f_err:
|
---|
1970 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
1971 | err:
|
---|
1972 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
1973 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
---|
1974 | #endif
|
---|
1975 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
1976 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
---|
1977 | #endif
|
---|
1978 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
---|
1979 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
1980 | return 0;
|
---|
1981 | }
|
---|
1982 |
|
---|
1983 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
---|
1984 | {
|
---|
1985 | unsigned char *p, *d;
|
---|
1986 | int i, j, nl, off, n;
|
---|
1987 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
|
---|
1988 | X509_NAME *name;
|
---|
1989 | BUF_MEM *buf;
|
---|
1990 |
|
---|
1991 | buf = s->init_buf;
|
---|
1992 |
|
---|
1993 | d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
1994 |
|
---|
1995 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
---|
1996 | p++;
|
---|
1997 | n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
|
---|
1998 | d[0] = n;
|
---|
1999 | p += n;
|
---|
2000 | n++;
|
---|
2001 |
|
---|
2002 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
2003 | const unsigned char *psigs;
|
---|
2004 | unsigned char *etmp = p;
|
---|
2005 | nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
|
---|
2006 | /* Skip over length for now */
|
---|
2007 | p += 2;
|
---|
2008 | nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
|
---|
2009 | /* Now fill in length */
|
---|
2010 | s2n(nl, etmp);
|
---|
2011 | p += nl;
|
---|
2012 | n += nl + 2;
|
---|
2013 | }
|
---|
2014 |
|
---|
2015 | off = n;
|
---|
2016 | p += 2;
|
---|
2017 | n += 2;
|
---|
2018 |
|
---|
2019 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
---|
2020 | nl = 0;
|
---|
2021 | if (sk != NULL) {
|
---|
2022 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
---|
2023 | name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
|
---|
2024 | j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
|
---|
2025 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
|
---|
2026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
---|
2027 | goto err;
|
---|
2028 | }
|
---|
2029 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
|
---|
2030 | s2n(j, p);
|
---|
2031 | i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
|
---|
2032 | n += 2 + j;
|
---|
2033 | nl += 2 + j;
|
---|
2034 | }
|
---|
2035 | }
|
---|
2036 | /* else no CA names */
|
---|
2037 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
|
---|
2038 | s2n(nl, p);
|
---|
2039 |
|
---|
2040 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
|
---|
2041 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2042 | goto err;
|
---|
2043 | }
|
---|
2044 |
|
---|
2045 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
---|
2046 |
|
---|
2047 | return 1;
|
---|
2048 | err:
|
---|
2049 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2050 | return 0;
|
---|
2051 | }
|
---|
2052 |
|
---|
2053 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2054 | {
|
---|
2055 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
2056 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
---|
2057 | size_t psklen;
|
---|
2058 | PACKET psk_identity;
|
---|
2059 |
|
---|
2060 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
|
---|
2061 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2062 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2063 | return 0;
|
---|
2064 | }
|
---|
2065 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
---|
2066 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
---|
2068 | return 0;
|
---|
2069 | }
|
---|
2070 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
|
---|
2071 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
---|
2073 | return 0;
|
---|
2074 | }
|
---|
2075 |
|
---|
2076 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
|
---|
2077 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2079 | return 0;
|
---|
2080 | }
|
---|
2081 |
|
---|
2082 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
|
---|
2083 | psk, sizeof(psk));
|
---|
2084 |
|
---|
2085 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
---|
2086 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2087 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2088 | return 0;
|
---|
2089 | } else if (psklen == 0) {
|
---|
2090 | /*
|
---|
2091 | * PSK related to the given identity not found
|
---|
2092 | */
|
---|
2093 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
---|
2094 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
|
---|
2095 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
---|
2096 | return 0;
|
---|
2097 | }
|
---|
2098 |
|
---|
2099 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
|
---|
2100 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
|
---|
2101 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
|
---|
2102 |
|
---|
2103 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
|
---|
2104 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2106 | return 0;
|
---|
2107 | }
|
---|
2108 |
|
---|
2109 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
|
---|
2110 |
|
---|
2111 | return 1;
|
---|
2112 | #else
|
---|
2113 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2114 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2115 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2116 | return 0;
|
---|
2117 | #endif
|
---|
2118 | }
|
---|
2119 |
|
---|
2120 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2121 | {
|
---|
2122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
---|
2123 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
---|
2124 | int decrypt_len;
|
---|
2125 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
|
---|
2126 | size_t j, padding_len;
|
---|
2127 | PACKET enc_premaster;
|
---|
2128 | RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
---|
2129 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
|
---|
2130 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
2131 |
|
---|
2132 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
|
---|
2133 | if (rsa == NULL) {
|
---|
2134 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2135 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
2136 | return 0;
|
---|
2137 | }
|
---|
2138 |
|
---|
2139 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
|
---|
2140 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
---|
2141 | enc_premaster = *pkt;
|
---|
2142 | } else {
|
---|
2143 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|
---|
2144 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
2145 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2146 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2147 | return 0;
|
---|
2148 | }
|
---|
2149 | }
|
---|
2150 |
|
---|
2151 | /*
|
---|
2152 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
|
---|
2153 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
|
---|
2154 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
|
---|
2155 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
|
---|
2156 | */
|
---|
2157 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
---|
2158 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2159 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
2160 | return 0;
|
---|
2161 | }
|
---|
2162 |
|
---|
2163 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
|
---|
2164 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
|
---|
2165 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2166 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2167 | return 0;
|
---|
2168 | }
|
---|
2169 |
|
---|
2170 | /*
|
---|
2171 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
---|
2172 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
---|
2173 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
|
---|
2174 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
|
---|
2175 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
---|
2176 | */
|
---|
2177 |
|
---|
2178 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
|
---|
2179 | goto err;
|
---|
2180 |
|
---|
2181 | /*
|
---|
2182 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
|
---|
2183 | * the timing-sensitive code below.
|
---|
2184 | */
|
---|
2185 | decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
|
---|
2186 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
|
---|
2187 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
---|
2188 | if (decrypt_len < 0)
|
---|
2189 | goto err;
|
---|
2190 |
|
---|
2191 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
|
---|
2192 |
|
---|
2193 | /*
|
---|
2194 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
|
---|
2195 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
|
---|
2196 | * PS is at least 8 bytes.
|
---|
2197 | */
|
---|
2198 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
---|
2199 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
---|
2200 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
2201 | goto err;
|
---|
2202 | }
|
---|
2203 |
|
---|
2204 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
---|
2205 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
|
---|
2206 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
|
---|
2207 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
|
---|
2208 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
|
---|
2209 | }
|
---|
2210 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
|
---|
2211 |
|
---|
2212 | /*
|
---|
2213 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
|
---|
2214 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
|
---|
2215 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
|
---|
2216 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
|
---|
2217 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
|
---|
2218 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
|
---|
2219 | */
|
---|
2220 | version_good =
|
---|
2221 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
|
---|
2222 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
|
---|
2223 | version_good &=
|
---|
2224 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
|
---|
2225 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
|
---|
2226 |
|
---|
2227 | /*
|
---|
2228 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
---|
2229 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
---|
2230 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
---|
2231 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
---|
2232 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
---|
2233 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
|
---|
2234 | * clients.
|
---|
2235 | */
|
---|
2236 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
|
---|
2237 | unsigned char workaround_good;
|
---|
2238 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
|
---|
2239 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
|
---|
2240 | workaround_good &=
|
---|
2241 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
|
---|
2242 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
|
---|
2243 | version_good |= workaround_good;
|
---|
2244 | }
|
---|
2245 |
|
---|
2246 | /*
|
---|
2247 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
|
---|
2248 | * remain non-zero (0xff).
|
---|
2249 | */
|
---|
2250 | decrypt_good &= version_good;
|
---|
2251 |
|
---|
2252 | /*
|
---|
2253 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
|
---|
2254 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
|
---|
2255 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
|
---|
2256 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
|
---|
2257 | */
|
---|
2258 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
|
---|
2259 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
|
---|
2260 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
|
---|
2261 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
|
---|
2262 | rand_premaster_secret[j]);
|
---|
2263 | }
|
---|
2264 |
|
---|
2265 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
|
---|
2266 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
---|
2267 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2269 | goto err;
|
---|
2270 | }
|
---|
2271 |
|
---|
2272 | ret = 1;
|
---|
2273 | err:
|
---|
2274 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
|
---|
2275 | return ret;
|
---|
2276 | #else
|
---|
2277 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2278 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2279 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2280 | return 0;
|
---|
2281 | #endif
|
---|
2282 | }
|
---|
2283 |
|
---|
2284 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2285 | {
|
---|
2286 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
---|
2287 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
|
---|
2288 | DH *cdh;
|
---|
2289 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
2290 | BIGNUM *pub_key;
|
---|
2291 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
2292 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
---|
2293 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
2294 |
|
---|
2295 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
|
---|
2296 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
|
---|
2298 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
---|
2299 | goto err;
|
---|
2300 | }
|
---|
2301 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
|
---|
2302 | if (skey == NULL) {
|
---|
2303 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2304 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
2305 | goto err;
|
---|
2306 | }
|
---|
2307 |
|
---|
2308 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
---|
2309 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2310 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
---|
2311 | goto err;
|
---|
2312 | }
|
---|
2313 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
---|
2314 | /* We already checked we have enough data */
|
---|
2315 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2316 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2317 | goto err;
|
---|
2318 | }
|
---|
2319 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
2320 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
|
---|
2321 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
---|
2322 | goto err;
|
---|
2323 | }
|
---|
2324 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
|
---|
2325 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
|
---|
2326 |
|
---|
2327 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
|
---|
2328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2329 | if (pub_key != NULL)
|
---|
2330 | BN_free(pub_key);
|
---|
2331 | goto err;
|
---|
2332 | }
|
---|
2333 |
|
---|
2334 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
|
---|
2335 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2336 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2337 | goto err;
|
---|
2338 | }
|
---|
2339 |
|
---|
2340 | ret = 1;
|
---|
2341 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
2342 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
---|
2343 | err:
|
---|
2344 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
---|
2345 | return ret;
|
---|
2346 | #else
|
---|
2347 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2348 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2349 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2350 | return 0;
|
---|
2351 | #endif
|
---|
2352 | }
|
---|
2353 |
|
---|
2354 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2355 | {
|
---|
2356 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
---|
2357 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
|
---|
2358 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
---|
2359 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
2360 |
|
---|
2361 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
---|
2362 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
|
---|
2363 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2364 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
---|
2365 | goto err;
|
---|
2366 | } else {
|
---|
2367 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
2368 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
2369 |
|
---|
2370 | /*
|
---|
2371 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
|
---|
2372 | * ClientKeyExchange message.
|
---|
2373 | */
|
---|
2374 |
|
---|
2375 | /* Get encoded point length */
|
---|
2376 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|
---|
2377 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
2378 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2379 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2380 | goto err;
|
---|
2381 | }
|
---|
2382 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
---|
2383 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
|
---|
2384 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
2385 | goto err;
|
---|
2386 | }
|
---|
2387 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
|
---|
2388 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2389 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
---|
2390 | goto err;
|
---|
2391 | }
|
---|
2392 | }
|
---|
2393 |
|
---|
2394 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
|
---|
2395 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2397 | goto err;
|
---|
2398 | }
|
---|
2399 |
|
---|
2400 | ret = 1;
|
---|
2401 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
|
---|
2402 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
---|
2403 | err:
|
---|
2404 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
---|
2405 |
|
---|
2406 | return ret;
|
---|
2407 | #else
|
---|
2408 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2409 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2410 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2411 | return 0;
|
---|
2412 | #endif
|
---|
2413 | }
|
---|
2414 |
|
---|
2415 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2416 | {
|
---|
2417 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
---|
2418 | unsigned int i;
|
---|
2419 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
2420 |
|
---|
2421 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|
---|
2422 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
---|
2423 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2424 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
|
---|
2425 | return 0;
|
---|
2426 | }
|
---|
2427 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
|
---|
2428 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
---|
2429 | return 0;
|
---|
2430 | }
|
---|
2431 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
|
---|
2432 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
2433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
---|
2434 | return 0;
|
---|
2435 | }
|
---|
2436 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
---|
2437 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
---|
2438 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
---|
2439 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2440 | return 0;
|
---|
2441 | }
|
---|
2442 |
|
---|
2443 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
|
---|
2444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2445 | return 0;
|
---|
2446 | }
|
---|
2447 |
|
---|
2448 | return 1;
|
---|
2449 | #else
|
---|
2450 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2451 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2452 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2453 | return 0;
|
---|
2454 | #endif
|
---|
2455 | }
|
---|
2456 |
|
---|
2457 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
---|
2458 | {
|
---|
2459 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
2460 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
---|
2461 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
---|
2462 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
|
---|
2463 | const unsigned char *start;
|
---|
2464 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
|
---|
2465 | unsigned long alg_a;
|
---|
2466 | int Ttag, Tclass;
|
---|
2467 | long Tlen;
|
---|
2468 | long sess_key_len;
|
---|
2469 | const unsigned char *data;
|
---|
2470 | int ret = 0;
|
---|
2471 |
|
---|
2472 | /* Get our certificate private key */
|
---|
2473 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
---|
2474 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
|
---|
2475 | /*
|
---|
2476 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
|
---|
2477 | */
|
---|
2478 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
|
---|
2479 | if (pk == NULL) {
|
---|
2480 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
|
---|
2481 | }
|
---|
2482 | if (pk == NULL) {
|
---|
2483 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
---|
2484 | }
|
---|
2485 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
|
---|
2486 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
---|
2487 | }
|
---|
2488 |
|
---|
2489 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
|
---|
2490 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
---|
2491 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2493 | return 0;
|
---|
2494 | }
|
---|
2495 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
|
---|
2496 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2497 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2498 | return 0;
|
---|
2499 | }
|
---|
2500 | /*
|
---|
2501 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
---|
2502 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
---|
2503 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
|
---|
2504 | * client certificate for authorization only.
|
---|
2505 | */
|
---|
2506 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
---|
2507 | if (client_pub_pkey) {
|
---|
2508 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
---|
2509 | ERR_clear_error();
|
---|
2510 | }
|
---|
2511 | /* Decrypt session key */
|
---|
2512 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
---|
2513 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
|
---|
2514 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2516 | goto err;
|
---|
2517 | }
|
---|
2518 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
|
---|
2519 | &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|
---|
2520 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
|
---|
2521 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2522 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
2523 | goto err;
|
---|
2524 | }
|
---|
2525 | start = data;
|
---|
2526 | inlen = Tlen;
|
---|
2527 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
|
---|
2528 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
|
---|
2529 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
---|
2531 | goto err;
|
---|
2532 | }
|
---|
2533 | /* Generate master secret */
|
---|
2534 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
|
---|
2535 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
|
---|
2536 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2537 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2538 | goto err;
|
---|
2539 | }
|
---|
2540 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
---|
2541 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
---|
2542 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
---|
2543 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
---|
2544 |
|
---|
2545 | ret = 1;
|
---|
2546 | err:
|
---|
2547 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
---|
2548 | return ret;
|
---|
2549 | #else
|
---|
2550 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
2551 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2552 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2553 | return 0;
|
---|
2554 | #endif
|
---|
2555 | }
|
---|
2556 |
|
---|
2557 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
2558 | {
|
---|
2559 | int al = -1;
|
---|
2560 | unsigned long alg_k;
|
---|
2561 |
|
---|
2562 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
---|
2563 |
|
---|
2564 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
|
---|
2565 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2566 | goto err;
|
---|
2567 |
|
---|
2568 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
---|
2569 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
|
---|
2570 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
2571 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2572 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
2573 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2574 | goto err;
|
---|
2575 | }
|
---|
2576 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
|
---|
2577 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
|
---|
2578 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2580 | goto err;
|
---|
2581 | }
|
---|
2582 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
---|
2583 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2584 | goto err;
|
---|
2585 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
2586 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2587 | goto err;
|
---|
2588 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
---|
2589 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2590 | goto err;
|
---|
2591 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
---|
2592 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2593 | goto err;
|
---|
2594 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
---|
2595 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
|
---|
2596 | goto err;
|
---|
2597 | } else {
|
---|
2598 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2599 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
2600 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
---|
2601 | goto err;
|
---|
2602 | }
|
---|
2603 |
|
---|
2604 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
2605 | err:
|
---|
2606 | if (al != -1)
|
---|
2607 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
2608 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
---|
2609 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
|
---|
2610 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
|
---|
2611 | #endif
|
---|
2612 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2613 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
2614 | }
|
---|
2615 |
|
---|
2616 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
---|
2617 | {
|
---|
2618 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
---|
2619 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
---|
2620 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
---|
2621 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
---|
2622 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
---|
2623 | /*
|
---|
2624 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
---|
2625 | * used.
|
---|
2626 | */
|
---|
2627 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
---|
2628 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
---|
2629 |
|
---|
2630 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
|
---|
2631 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
---|
2632 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
|
---|
2633 | 0) <= 0) {
|
---|
2634 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2635 | return WORK_ERROR;;
|
---|
2636 | }
|
---|
2637 |
|
---|
2638 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
---|
2639 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
---|
2640 | }
|
---|
2641 | wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
2642 | }
|
---|
2643 |
|
---|
2644 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
|
---|
2645 | /* Is this SCTP? */
|
---|
2646 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
|
---|
2647 | /* Are we renegotiating? */
|
---|
2648 | && s->renegotiate
|
---|
2649 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
|
---|
2650 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
|
---|
2651 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
|
---|
2652 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
---|
2653 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
---|
2654 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
2655 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
---|
2656 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
|
---|
2657 | return WORK_MORE_B;
|
---|
2658 | } else {
|
---|
2659 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
|
---|
2660 | }
|
---|
2661 | #endif
|
---|
2662 |
|
---|
2663 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
|
---|
2664 | /*
|
---|
2665 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
|
---|
2666 | * the handshake_buffer
|
---|
2667 | */
|
---|
2668 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
2669 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2670 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
2671 | }
|
---|
2672 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
2673 | } else {
|
---|
2674 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
---|
2675 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
---|
2676 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2677 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2678 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
2679 | }
|
---|
2680 | /*
|
---|
2681 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
|
---|
2682 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
|
---|
2683 | */
|
---|
2684 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
|
---|
2685 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2686 | return WORK_ERROR;
|
---|
2687 | }
|
---|
2688 | }
|
---|
2689 |
|
---|
2690 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
---|
2691 | }
|
---|
2692 |
|
---|
2693 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
2694 | {
|
---|
2695 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
---|
2696 | const unsigned char *sig, *data;
|
---|
2697 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
2698 | unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
|
---|
2699 | #endif
|
---|
2700 | int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
2701 | int type = 0, j;
|
---|
2702 | unsigned int len;
|
---|
2703 | X509 *peer;
|
---|
2704 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
---|
2705 | long hdatalen = 0;
|
---|
2706 | void *hdata;
|
---|
2707 |
|
---|
2708 | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
---|
2709 |
|
---|
2710 | if (mctx == NULL) {
|
---|
2711 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2712 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2713 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2714 | }
|
---|
2715 |
|
---|
2716 | peer = s->session->peer;
|
---|
2717 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
|
---|
2718 | if (pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
2719 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2720 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2721 | }
|
---|
2722 |
|
---|
2723 | type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
|
---|
2724 |
|
---|
2725 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
---|
2726 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
|
---|
2727 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
2728 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
2729 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2730 | }
|
---|
2731 |
|
---|
2732 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
|
---|
2733 | /*
|
---|
2734 | * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
|
---|
2735 | * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
|
---|
2736 | */
|
---|
2737 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
2738 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
|
---|
2739 | && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
|
---|
2740 | len = 64;
|
---|
2741 | } else
|
---|
2742 | #endif
|
---|
2743 | {
|
---|
2744 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
---|
2745 | int rv;
|
---|
2746 |
|
---|
2747 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
|
---|
2748 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2749 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2750 | }
|
---|
2751 | rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
|
---|
2752 | if (rv == -1) {
|
---|
2753 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2754 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2755 | } else if (rv == 0) {
|
---|
2756 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2757 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2758 | }
|
---|
2759 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
2760 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
2761 | #endif
|
---|
2762 | } else {
|
---|
2763 | /* Use default digest for this key type */
|
---|
2764 | int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
|
---|
2765 | if (idx >= 0)
|
---|
2766 | md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
|
---|
2767 | if (md == NULL) {
|
---|
2768 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2769 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2770 | }
|
---|
2771 | }
|
---|
2772 |
|
---|
2773 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
|
---|
2774 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2775 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2776 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2777 | }
|
---|
2778 | }
|
---|
2779 | j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
---|
2780 | if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|
---|
2781 | || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
|
---|
2782 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
---|
2783 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2784 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2785 | }
|
---|
2786 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
|
---|
2787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2788 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2789 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2790 | }
|
---|
2791 |
|
---|
2792 | hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
---|
2793 | if (hdatalen <= 0) {
|
---|
2794 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2795 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2796 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2797 | }
|
---|
2798 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
---|
2799 | fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
---|
2800 | #endif
|
---|
2801 | if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
|
---|
2802 | || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
|
---|
2803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
2804 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2805 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2806 | }
|
---|
2807 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
2808 | {
|
---|
2809 | int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
|
---|
2810 | if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|
---|
2811 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|
---|
2812 | || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
|
---|
2813 | if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
|
---|
2814 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2815 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2816 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2817 | }
|
---|
2818 | BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
|
---|
2819 | data = gost_data;
|
---|
2820 | }
|
---|
2821 | }
|
---|
2822 | #endif
|
---|
2823 |
|
---|
2824 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
|
---|
2825 | && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
|
---|
2826 | s->session->master_key_length,
|
---|
2827 | s->session->master_key)) {
|
---|
2828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
---|
2829 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
2830 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2831 | }
|
---|
2832 |
|
---|
2833 | if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
|
---|
2834 | al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
---|
2835 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
---|
2836 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2837 | }
|
---|
2838 |
|
---|
2839 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
---|
2840 | if (0) {
|
---|
2841 | f_err:
|
---|
2842 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
2843 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2844 | }
|
---|
2845 | BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
|
---|
2846 | s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
|
---|
2847 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
|
---|
2848 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
---|
2849 | OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
|
---|
2850 | #endif
|
---|
2851 | return ret;
|
---|
2852 | }
|
---|
2853 |
|
---|
2854 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
2855 | {
|
---|
2856 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
2857 | X509 *x = NULL;
|
---|
2858 | unsigned long l, llen;
|
---|
2859 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
|
---|
2860 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
---|
2861 | PACKET spkt;
|
---|
2862 |
|
---|
2863 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
---|
2864 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2865 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2866 | }
|
---|
2867 |
|
---|
2868 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
|
---|
2869 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
|
---|
2870 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
---|
2871 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2872 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2873 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2874 | }
|
---|
2875 |
|
---|
2876 | while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
|
---|
2877 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|
---|
2878 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
|
---|
2879 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2880 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2881 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2882 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2883 | }
|
---|
2884 |
|
---|
2885 | certstart = certbytes;
|
---|
2886 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
|
---|
2887 | if (x == NULL) {
|
---|
2888 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
---|
2889 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2890 | }
|
---|
2891 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
|
---|
2892 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
2893 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2894 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
2895 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2896 | }
|
---|
2897 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
---|
2898 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
2899 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2900 | }
|
---|
2901 | x = NULL;
|
---|
2902 | }
|
---|
2903 |
|
---|
2904 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
|
---|
2905 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
---|
2906 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
---|
2907 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2908 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2909 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
---|
2910 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2911 | }
|
---|
2912 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
---|
2913 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
---|
2914 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
---|
2915 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2916 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
---|
2917 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2918 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2919 | }
|
---|
2920 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
|
---|
2921 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
---|
2922 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2923 | }
|
---|
2924 | } else {
|
---|
2925 | EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
---|
2926 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
---|
2927 | if (i <= 0) {
|
---|
2928 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
---|
2929 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2930 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
---|
2931 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2932 | }
|
---|
2933 | if (i > 1) {
|
---|
2934 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
|
---|
2935 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2936 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2937 | }
|
---|
2938 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
|
---|
2939 | if (pkey == NULL) {
|
---|
2940 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
2941 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
---|
2942 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
---|
2943 | goto f_err;
|
---|
2944 | }
|
---|
2945 | }
|
---|
2946 |
|
---|
2947 | X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
---|
2948 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
---|
2949 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
---|
2950 |
|
---|
2951 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
|
---|
2952 | s->session->peer_chain = sk;
|
---|
2953 | /*
|
---|
2954 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
|
---|
2955 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
|
---|
2956 | */
|
---|
2957 | sk = NULL;
|
---|
2958 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
---|
2959 | goto done;
|
---|
2960 |
|
---|
2961 | f_err:
|
---|
2962 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
---|
2963 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2964 | done:
|
---|
2965 | X509_free(x);
|
---|
2966 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
---|
2967 | return ret;
|
---|
2968 | }
|
---|
2969 |
|
---|
2970 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
---|
2971 | {
|
---|
2972 | CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
---|
2973 |
|
---|
2974 | cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
---|
2975 | if (cpk == NULL) {
|
---|
2976 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2977 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2978 | return 0;
|
---|
2979 | }
|
---|
2980 |
|
---|
2981 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
|
---|
2982 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
2983 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
2984 | return 0;
|
---|
2985 | }
|
---|
2986 |
|
---|
2987 | return 1;
|
---|
2988 | }
|
---|
2989 |
|
---|
2990 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
---|
2991 | {
|
---|
2992 | unsigned char *senc = NULL;
|
---|
2993 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
---|
2994 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
|
---|
2995 | unsigned char *p, *macstart;
|
---|
2996 | const unsigned char *const_p;
|
---|
2997 | int len, slen_full, slen;
|
---|
2998 | SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
---|
2999 | unsigned int hlen;
|
---|
3000 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
|
---|
3001 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
---|
3002 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
|
---|
3003 | int iv_len;
|
---|
3004 |
|
---|
3005 | /* get session encoding length */
|
---|
3006 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
---|
3007 | /*
|
---|
3008 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
---|
3009 | * long
|
---|
3010 | */
|
---|
3011 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
|
---|
3012 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
3013 | return 0;
|
---|
3014 | }
|
---|
3015 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
|
---|
3016 | if (senc == NULL) {
|
---|
3017 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
3018 | return 0;
|
---|
3019 | }
|
---|
3020 |
|
---|
3021 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
---|
3022 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
---|
3023 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
|
---|
3024 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
3025 | goto err;
|
---|
3026 | }
|
---|
3027 |
|
---|
3028 | p = senc;
|
---|
3029 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
|
---|
3030 | goto err;
|
---|
3031 |
|
---|
3032 | /*
|
---|
3033 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
|
---|
3034 | */
|
---|
3035 | const_p = senc;
|
---|
3036 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
|
---|
3037 | if (sess == NULL)
|
---|
3038 | goto err;
|
---|
3039 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
|
---|
3040 |
|
---|
3041 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
---|
3042 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
|
---|
3043 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
3044 | goto err;
|
---|
3045 | }
|
---|
3046 | p = senc;
|
---|
3047 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
|
---|
3048 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
3049 | goto err;
|
---|
3050 | }
|
---|
3051 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
---|
3052 |
|
---|
3053 | /*-
|
---|
3054 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
---|
3055 | * follows handshake_header_length +
|
---|
3056 | * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
|
---|
3057 | * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
---|
3058 | * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
|
---|
3059 | * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
|
---|
3060 | */
|
---|
3061 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
---|
3062 | SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
|
---|
3063 | EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
|
---|
3064 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
---|
3065 | goto err;
|
---|
3066 |
|
---|
3067 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
3068 | /*
|
---|
3069 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
---|
3070 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
---|
3071 | */
|
---|
3072 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
---|
3073 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
|
---|
3074 | int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
|
---|
3075 | hctx, 1);
|
---|
3076 |
|
---|
3077 | if (ret == 0) {
|
---|
3078 | l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
|
---|
3079 | s2n(0, p); /* length */
|
---|
3080 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
|
---|
3081 | (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
|
---|
3082 | goto err;
|
---|
3083 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
3084 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
3085 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
3086 | return 1;
|
---|
3087 | }
|
---|
3088 | if (ret < 0)
|
---|
3089 | goto err;
|
---|
3090 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
|
---|
3091 | } else {
|
---|
3092 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
|
---|
3093 |
|
---|
3094 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
|
---|
3095 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
|
---|
3096 | goto err;
|
---|
3097 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
|
---|
3098 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
|
---|
3099 | goto err;
|
---|
3100 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
|
---|
3101 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
|
---|
3102 | EVP_sha256(), NULL))
|
---|
3103 | goto err;
|
---|
3104 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
|
---|
3105 | sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
|
---|
3106 | }
|
---|
3107 |
|
---|
3108 | /*
|
---|
3109 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
|
---|
3110 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
|
---|
3111 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
|
---|
3112 | */
|
---|
3113 | l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
|
---|
3114 |
|
---|
3115 | /* Skip ticket length for now */
|
---|
3116 | p += 2;
|
---|
3117 | /* Output key name */
|
---|
3118 | macstart = p;
|
---|
3119 | memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
|
---|
3120 | p += sizeof(key_name);
|
---|
3121 | /* output IV */
|
---|
3122 | memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
|
---|
3123 | p += iv_len;
|
---|
3124 | /* Encrypt session data */
|
---|
3125 | if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
|
---|
3126 | goto err;
|
---|
3127 | p += len;
|
---|
3128 | if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
|
---|
3129 | goto err;
|
---|
3130 | p += len;
|
---|
3131 |
|
---|
3132 | if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
|
---|
3133 | goto err;
|
---|
3134 | if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
|
---|
3135 | goto err;
|
---|
3136 |
|
---|
3137 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
3138 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
3139 | ctx = NULL;
|
---|
3140 | hctx = NULL;
|
---|
3141 |
|
---|
3142 | p += hlen;
|
---|
3143 | /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
---|
3144 | /* Total length */
|
---|
3145 | len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
3146 | /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
|
---|
3147 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
|
---|
3148 | s2n(len - 6, p);
|
---|
3149 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
|
---|
3150 | goto err;
|
---|
3151 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
3152 |
|
---|
3153 | return 1;
|
---|
3154 | err:
|
---|
3155 | OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
---|
3156 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
---|
3157 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
---|
3158 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
3159 | return 0;
|
---|
3160 | }
|
---|
3161 |
|
---|
3162 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
---|
3163 | {
|
---|
3164 | unsigned char *p;
|
---|
3165 | size_t msglen;
|
---|
3166 |
|
---|
3167 | /*-
|
---|
3168 | * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
---|
3169 | * follows handshake_header_length +
|
---|
3170 | * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
|
---|
3171 | * + (ocsp response)
|
---|
3172 | */
|
---|
3173 | msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
|
---|
3174 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
|
---|
3175 | goto err;
|
---|
3176 |
|
---|
3177 | p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
|
---|
3178 |
|
---|
3179 | /* status type */
|
---|
3180 | *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
|
---|
3181 | /* length of OCSP response */
|
---|
3182 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
|
---|
3183 | /* actual response */
|
---|
3184 | memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
|
---|
3185 |
|
---|
3186 | if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
|
---|
3187 | goto err;
|
---|
3188 |
|
---|
3189 | return 1;
|
---|
3190 |
|
---|
3191 | err:
|
---|
3192 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
3193 | return 0;
|
---|
3194 | }
|
---|
3195 |
|
---|
3196 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
---|
3197 | /*
|
---|
3198 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
|
---|
3199 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
|
---|
3200 | */
|
---|
3201 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
---|
3202 | {
|
---|
3203 | PACKET next_proto, padding;
|
---|
3204 | size_t next_proto_len;
|
---|
3205 |
|
---|
3206 | /*-
|
---|
3207 | * The payload looks like:
|
---|
3208 | * uint8 proto_len;
|
---|
3209 | * uint8 proto[proto_len];
|
---|
3210 | * uint8 padding_len;
|
---|
3211 | * uint8 padding[padding_len];
|
---|
3212 | */
|
---|
3213 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|
---|
3214 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|
---|
3215 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
---|
3216 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
---|
3217 | goto err;
|
---|
3218 | }
|
---|
3219 |
|
---|
3220 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
|
---|
3221 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
|
---|
3222 | goto err;
|
---|
3223 | }
|
---|
3224 |
|
---|
3225 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
|
---|
3226 |
|
---|
3227 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
---|
3228 | err:
|
---|
3229 | ossl_statem_set_error(s);
|
---|
3230 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
---|
3231 | }
|
---|
3232 | #endif
|
---|
3233 |
|
---|
3234 | #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
|
---|
3235 |
|
---|
3236 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
|
---|
3237 | PACKET *cipher_suites,
|
---|
3238 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
|
---|
3239 | int sslv2format, int *al)
|
---|
3240 | {
|
---|
3241 | const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
---|
3242 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
---|
3243 | int n;
|
---|
3244 | /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
|
---|
3245 | unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
|
---|
3246 |
|
---|
3247 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
|
---|
3248 |
|
---|
3249 | n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
|
---|
3250 |
|
---|
3251 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
|
---|
3252 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
---|
3253 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
---|
3254 | return NULL;
|
---|
3255 | }
|
---|
3256 |
|
---|
3257 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
|
---|
3258 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
3259 | SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
---|
3260 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
---|
3261 | return NULL;
|
---|
3262 | }
|
---|
3263 |
|
---|
3264 | sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
---|
3265 | if (sk == NULL) {
|
---|
3266 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
3267 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3268 | return NULL;
|
---|
3269 | }
|
---|
3270 |
|
---|
3271 | if (sslv2format) {
|
---|
3272 | size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
|
---|
3273 | PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
|
---|
3274 | unsigned int leadbyte;
|
---|
3275 | unsigned char *raw;
|
---|
3276 |
|
---|
3277 | /*
|
---|
3278 | * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
|
---|
3279 | * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
|
---|
3280 | * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
|
---|
3281 | * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
|
---|
3282 | * problem.
|
---|
3283 | */
|
---|
3284 | raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
|
---|
3285 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
|
---|
3286 | if (raw == NULL) {
|
---|
3287 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3288 | goto err;
|
---|
3289 | }
|
---|
3290 | for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
|
---|
3291 | PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
|
---|
3292 | raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
|
---|
3293 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
|
---|
3294 | || (leadbyte == 0
|
---|
3295 | && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
|
---|
3296 | TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
|
---|
3297 | || (leadbyte != 0
|
---|
3298 | && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
|
---|
3299 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3300 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
|
---|
3301 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
|
---|
3302 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
|
---|
3303 | goto err;
|
---|
3304 | }
|
---|
3305 | if (leadbyte == 0)
|
---|
3306 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
|
---|
3307 | }
|
---|
3308 | } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
|
---|
3309 | &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
|
---|
3310 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3311 | goto err;
|
---|
3312 | }
|
---|
3313 |
|
---|
3314 | while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
|
---|
3315 | /*
|
---|
3316 | * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
|
---|
3317 | * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
|
---|
3318 | * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
|
---|
3319 | */
|
---|
3320 | if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
|
---|
3321 | continue;
|
---|
3322 |
|
---|
3323 | /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
|
---|
3324 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
---|
3325 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
---|
3326 | /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
|
---|
3327 | if (s->renegotiate) {
|
---|
3328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
3329 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
---|
3330 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
---|
3331 | goto err;
|
---|
3332 | }
|
---|
3333 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
---|
3334 | continue;
|
---|
3335 | }
|
---|
3336 |
|
---|
3337 | /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
|
---|
3338 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
---|
3339 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
|
---|
3340 | /*
|
---|
3341 | * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
|
---|
3342 | * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
|
---|
3343 | * downgrade.
|
---|
3344 | */
|
---|
3345 | if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
|
---|
3346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
|
---|
3347 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
---|
3348 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
|
---|
3349 | goto err;
|
---|
3350 | }
|
---|
3351 | continue;
|
---|
3352 | }
|
---|
3353 |
|
---|
3354 | /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
|
---|
3355 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
|
---|
3356 | if (c != NULL) {
|
---|
3357 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
|
---|
3358 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
---|
3359 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3360 | goto err;
|
---|
3361 | }
|
---|
3362 | }
|
---|
3363 | }
|
---|
3364 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
|
---|
3365 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
---|
3366 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
---|
3367 | goto err;
|
---|
3368 | }
|
---|
3369 |
|
---|
3370 | *skp = sk;
|
---|
3371 | return sk;
|
---|
3372 | err:
|
---|
3373 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
---|
3374 | return NULL;
|
---|
3375 | }
|
---|