source: EcnlProtoTool/trunk/openssl-1.1.0e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c@ 331

Last change on this file since 331 was 331, checked in by coas-nagasima, 6 years ago

prototoolに関連するプロジェクトをnewlibからmuslを使うよう変更・更新
ntshellをnewlibの下位の実装から、muslのsyscallの実装に変更・更新
以下のOSSをアップデート
・mruby-1.3.0
・musl-1.1.18
・onigmo-6.1.3
・tcc-0.9.27
以下のOSSを追加
・openssl-1.1.0e
・curl-7.57.0
・zlib-1.2.11
以下のmrbgemsを追加
・iij/mruby-digest
・iij/mruby-env
・iij/mruby-errno
・iij/mruby-iijson
・iij/mruby-ipaddr
・iij/mruby-mock
・iij/mruby-require
・iij/mruby-tls-openssl
  • Property svn:eol-style set to native
  • Property svn:mime-type set to text/x-csrc
File size: 101.3 KB
Line 
1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <stdio.h>
11#include <time.h>
12#include <errno.h>
13#include <limits.h>
14
15#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16#include <openssl/crypto.h>
17#include <openssl/lhash.h>
18#include <openssl/buffer.h>
19#include <openssl/evp.h>
20#include <openssl/asn1.h>
21#include <openssl/x509.h>
22#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23#include <openssl/objects.h>
24#include <internal/dane.h>
25#include <internal/x509_int.h>
26#include "x509_lcl.h"
27
28/* CRL score values */
29
30/* No unhandled critical extensions */
31
32#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
33
34/* certificate is within CRL scope */
35
36#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
37
38/* CRL times valid */
39
40#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
41
42/* Issuer name matches certificate */
43
44#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
45
46/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
47
48#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
49
50/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
51
52#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
53
54/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
55
56#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
57
58/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
59
60#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
61
62/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
63
64#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
65
66static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
83
84static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
85 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
86static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
87 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
88static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
89 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
91static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
92 int *pcrl_score);
93static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
94 unsigned int *preasons);
95static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
96static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
97 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
99
100static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
101
102static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
103{
104 return ok;
105}
106
107/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
109{
110 /*
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
114 */
115 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
116 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
117 return 1;
118 else
119 return 0;
120}
121
122/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
123
124static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
125{
126 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
127 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
128 int i;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
131 if (certs == NULL)
132 return NULL;
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
135 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
137 break;
138 }
139 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
140 X509_up_ref(xtmp);
141 else
142 xtmp = NULL;
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
144 return xtmp;
145}
146
147/*-
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
150 * B<depth>.
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
153 *
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
155 */
156static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
157{
158 ctx->error_depth = depth;
159 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
160 if (err != X509_V_OK)
161 ctx->error = err;
162 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
163}
164
165/*-
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
168 * number.
169 *
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
171 */
172static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
173{
174 ctx->error = err;
175 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
176}
177
178static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
179{
180 int i;
181 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
182
183 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
184 return 1;
185
186 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
187 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
188
189 /*
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
192 */
193 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
195 return 0;
196 /*
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
199 */
200 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
202 return 0;
203 }
204 return 1;
205}
206
207static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
208{
209 int err;
210 int ok;
211
212 /*
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
215 */
216 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
217 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
220 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
221 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
222 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
223 return ok;
224
225 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
226 ctx->param->flags);
227 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
228 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
229 return ok;
230 }
231
232 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
234 if (!ok)
235 return ok;
236
237#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
238 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
239 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
240 return ok;
241 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
242 return ok;
243#endif
244
245 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
246 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
247 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
248 return ok;
249}
250
251int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
252{
253 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
254 int ret;
255
256 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
258 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
259 return -1;
260 }
261
262 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
263 /*
264 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
265 * cannot do another one.
266 */
267 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
268 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
269 return -1;
270 }
271
272 /*
273 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
274 * the first entry is in place
275 */
276 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
277 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
278 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
279 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
280 return -1;
281 }
282 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
283 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
284
285 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
286 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
287 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
288 return 0;
289
290 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
291 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
292 else
293 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
294
295 /*
296 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
297 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
298 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
299 */
300 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
301 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
302 return ret;
303}
304
305/*
306 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
307 */
308static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
309{
310 int i;
311 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
312
313 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
314 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
315 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
316 rv = issuer;
317 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
318 break;
319 }
320 }
321 return rv;
322}
323
324/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
325
326static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
327{
328 int ret;
329 if (x == issuer)
330 return cert_self_signed(x);
331 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
332 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
333 int i;
334 X509 *ch;
335 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
336 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
337 return 1;
338 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
339 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
340 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
341 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
342 break;
343 }
344 }
345 }
346
347 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
348}
349
350/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
351
352static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
353{
354 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
355 if (*issuer) {
356 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
357 return 1;
358 } else
359 return 0;
360}
361
362static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
363{
364 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
365 X509 *x;
366 int i;
367 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
368 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
369 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
370 if (sk == NULL)
371 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
372 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
373 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
374 return NULL;
375 }
376 X509_up_ref(x);
377 }
378 }
379 return sk;
380}
381
382/*
383 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
384 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
385 */
386static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
387 int must_be_ca)
388{
389 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
390
391 /*
392 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
393 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
394 *
395 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
396 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
397 * ctx->param->purpose!
398 *
399 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
400 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
401 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
402 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
403 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
404 *
405 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
406 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
407 * also set.
408 */
409 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
410 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
411
412 switch (tr_ok) {
413 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
414 return 1;
415 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
416 break;
417 default:
418 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
419 case 1:
420 return 1;
421 case 0:
422 break;
423 default:
424 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
425 return 1;
426 }
427 break;
428 }
429
430 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
431}
432
433/*
434 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
435 * purpose
436 */
437
438static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
439{
440 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
441 X509 *x;
442 int proxy_path_length = 0;
443 int purpose;
444 int allow_proxy_certs;
445 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
446
447 /*-
448 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
449 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
450 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
451 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
452 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
453 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
454 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
455 */
456 must_be_ca = -1;
457
458 /* CRL path validation */
459 if (ctx->parent) {
460 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
461 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
462 } else {
463 allow_proxy_certs =
464 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
465 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
466 }
467
468 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
469 int ret;
470 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
471 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
472 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
473 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
474 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
475 return 0;
476 }
477 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
478 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
479 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
480 return 0;
481 }
482 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
483 switch (must_be_ca) {
484 case -1:
485 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
486 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
487 ret = 0;
488 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
489 } else
490 ret = 1;
491 break;
492 case 0:
493 if (ret != 0) {
494 ret = 0;
495 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
496 } else
497 ret = 1;
498 break;
499 default:
500 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
501 if ((ret == 0)
502 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
503 && (ret != 1))) {
504 ret = 0;
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
506 } else
507 ret = 1;
508 break;
509 }
510 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
511 return 0;
512 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
513 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
514 return 0;
515 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
516 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
517 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
518 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
519 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
520 return 0;
521 }
522 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
523 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
524 plen++;
525 /*
526 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
527 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
528 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
529 */
530 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
531 /*
532 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
533 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
534 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
535 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
536 *
537 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
538 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
539 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
540 * increment proxy_path_length.
541 */
542 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
543 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
544 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
545 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
546 return 0;
547 }
548 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
549 }
550 proxy_path_length++;
551 must_be_ca = 0;
552 } else
553 must_be_ca = 1;
554 }
555 return 1;
556}
557
558static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
559{
560 int i;
561
562 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
563 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
564 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
565 int j;
566
567 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
568 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
569 continue;
570
571 /*
572 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
573 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
574 * added.
575 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
576 */
577 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
578 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
579 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
580 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
581 int last_object_nid = 0;
582 int err = X509_V_OK;
583 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
584
585 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
586 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
587 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
588 goto proxy_name_done;
589 }
590
591 /*
592 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
593 * there is in issuer.
594 */
595 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
596 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
597 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
598 goto proxy_name_done;
599 }
600
601 /*
602 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
603 * multivalued RDN
604 */
605 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
606 last_object_loc))
607 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
608 last_object_loc - 1))) {
609 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
610 goto proxy_name_done;
611 }
612
613 /*
614 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
615 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
616 */
617 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
618 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
619 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
620 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
621 return 0;
622 }
623
624 tmpentry =
625 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
626 last_object_nid =
627 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
628
629 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
630 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
631 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
632 }
633
634 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
635 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
636
637 proxy_name_done:
638 if (err != X509_V_OK
639 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
640 return 0;
641 }
642
643 /*
644 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
645 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
646 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
647 * to be obeyed.
648 */
649 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
650 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
651
652 if (nc) {
653 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
654
655 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
656 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
657 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
658
659 switch (rv) {
660 case X509_V_OK:
661 break;
662 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
663 return 0;
664 default:
665 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
666 return 0;
667 break;
668 }
669 }
670 }
671 }
672 return 1;
673}
674
675static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
676{
677 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
678}
679
680static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
681{
682 int i;
683 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
684 char *name;
685
686 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
687 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
688 vpm->peername = NULL;
689 }
690 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
691 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
692 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
693 return 1;
694 }
695 return n == 0;
696}
697
698static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
699{
700 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
701 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
702 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
703 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
704 return 0;
705 }
706 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
707 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
708 return 0;
709 }
710 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
711 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
712 return 0;
713 }
714 return 1;
715}
716
717static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
718{
719 int i;
720 X509 *x = NULL;
721 X509 *mx;
722 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
723 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
724 int trust;
725
726 /*
727 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
728 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
729 */
730 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
731 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
732 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
733 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
734 return trust;
735 }
736 }
737
738 /*
739 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
740 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
741 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
742 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
743 */
744 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
745 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
746 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
747 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
748 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
749 goto trusted;
750 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
751 goto rejected;
752 }
753
754 /*
755 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
756 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
757 */
758 if (num_untrusted < num) {
759 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
760 goto trusted;
761 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
762 }
763
764 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
765 /*
766 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
767 * for a direct trust store match.
768 */
769 i = 0;
770 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
771 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
772 if (!mx)
773 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
774
775 /*
776 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
777 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
778 */
779 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
780 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
781 X509_free(mx);
782 goto rejected;
783 }
784
785 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
786 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
787 X509_free(x);
788 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
789 goto trusted;
790 }
791
792 /*
793 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
794 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
795 */
796 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
797
798 rejected:
799 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
800 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
801 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
802
803 trusted:
804 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
805 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
806 if (dane->pdpth < 0)
807 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
808 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
809 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
810 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
811 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
812}
813
814static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
815{
816 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
817 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
818 return 1;
819 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
820 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
821 else {
822 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
823 if (ctx->parent)
824 return 1;
825 last = 0;
826 }
827 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
828 ctx->error_depth = i;
829 ok = check_cert(ctx);
830 if (!ok)
831 return ok;
832 }
833 return 1;
834}
835
836static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
837{
838 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
839 int ok = 0;
840 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
841 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
842
843 ctx->current_cert = x;
844 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
845 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
846 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
847
848 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
849 return 1;
850
851 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
852 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
853
854 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
855 if (ctx->get_crl)
856 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
857 else
858 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
859 /*
860 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
861 */
862 if (!ok) {
863 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
864 goto done;
865 }
866 ctx->current_crl = crl;
867 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
868 if (!ok)
869 goto done;
870
871 if (dcrl) {
872 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
873 if (!ok)
874 goto done;
875 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
876 if (!ok)
877 goto done;
878 } else
879 ok = 1;
880
881 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
882 if (ok != 2) {
883 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
884 if (!ok)
885 goto done;
886 }
887
888 X509_CRL_free(crl);
889 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
890 crl = NULL;
891 dcrl = NULL;
892 /*
893 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
894 * so exit loop.
895 */
896 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
897 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
898 goto done;
899 }
900 }
901 done:
902 X509_CRL_free(crl);
903 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
904
905 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
906 return ok;
907}
908
909/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
910
911static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
912{
913 time_t *ptime;
914 int i;
915
916 if (notify)
917 ctx->current_crl = crl;
918 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
919 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
920 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
921 return 1;
922 else
923 ptime = NULL;
924
925 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
926 if (i == 0) {
927 if (!notify)
928 return 0;
929 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
930 return 0;
931 }
932
933 if (i > 0) {
934 if (!notify)
935 return 0;
936 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
937 return 0;
938 }
939
940 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
941 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
942
943 if (i == 0) {
944 if (!notify)
945 return 0;
946 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
947 return 0;
948 }
949 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
950 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
951 if (!notify)
952 return 0;
953 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
954 return 0;
955 }
956 }
957
958 if (notify)
959 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
960
961 return 1;
962}
963
964static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
965 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
966 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
967{
968 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
969 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
970 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
971 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
972 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
973
974 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
975 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
976 reasons = *preasons;
977 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
978 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
979 continue;
980 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
981 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
982 int day, sec;
983 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
984 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
985 continue;
986 /*
987 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
988 * and |sec|.
989 */
990 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
991 continue;
992 }
993 best_crl = crl;
994 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
995 best_score = crl_score;
996 best_reasons = reasons;
997 }
998
999 if (best_crl) {
1000 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1001 *pcrl = best_crl;
1002 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1003 *pscore = best_score;
1004 *preasons = best_reasons;
1005 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1006 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1007 *pdcrl = NULL;
1008 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1009 }
1010
1011 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1012 return 1;
1013
1014 return 0;
1015}
1016
1017/*
1018 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1019 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1020 */
1021
1022static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1023{
1024 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1025 int i;
1026 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1027 if (i >= 0) {
1028 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1029 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1030 return 0;
1031 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1032 } else
1033 exta = NULL;
1034
1035 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1036
1037 if (i >= 0) {
1038
1039 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1040 return 0;
1041 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1042 } else
1043 extb = NULL;
1044
1045 if (!exta && !extb)
1046 return 1;
1047
1048 if (!exta || !extb)
1049 return 0;
1050
1051 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1052 return 0;
1053
1054 return 1;
1055}
1056
1057/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1058
1059static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1060{
1061 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1062 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1063 return 0;
1064 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1065 if (!base->crl_number)
1066 return 0;
1067 /* Issuer names must match */
1068 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1069 return 0;
1070 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1071 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1072 return 0;
1073 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1074 return 0;
1075 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1076 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1077 return 0;
1078 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1079 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1080 return 1;
1081 return 0;
1082}
1083
1084/*
1085 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1086 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1087 */
1088
1089static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1090 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1091{
1092 X509_CRL *delta;
1093 int i;
1094 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1095 return;
1096 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1097 return;
1098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1099 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1100 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1101 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1102 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1103 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1104 *dcrl = delta;
1105 return;
1106 }
1107 }
1108 *dcrl = NULL;
1109}
1110
1111/*
1112 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1113 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1114 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1115 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1116 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1117 */
1118
1119static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1120 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1121{
1122
1123 int crl_score = 0;
1124 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1125
1126 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1127
1128 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1129 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1130 return 0;
1131 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1132 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1133 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1134 return 0;
1135 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1136 /* If no new reasons reject */
1137 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1141 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1142 return 0;
1143 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1144 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1145 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1146 return 0;
1147 } else
1148 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1149
1150 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1151 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1152
1153 /* Check expiry */
1154 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1155 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1156
1157 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1158 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1159
1160 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1161
1162 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1163 return 0;
1164
1165 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1166
1167 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1168 /* If no new reasons reject */
1169 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1170 return 0;
1171 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1172 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1173 }
1174
1175 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1176
1177 return crl_score;
1178
1179}
1180
1181static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1182 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1183{
1184 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1185 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1186 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1187 int i;
1188
1189 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1190 cidx++;
1191
1192 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1193
1194 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1195 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1196 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1197 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1198 return;
1199 }
1200 }
1201
1202 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1203 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1204 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1205 continue;
1206 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1207 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1208 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1209 return;
1210 }
1211 }
1212
1213 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1214
1215 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1216 return;
1217
1218 /*
1219 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1220 * untrusted certificates.
1221 */
1222 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1223 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1224 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1225 continue;
1226 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1227 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1228 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1229 return;
1230 }
1231 }
1232}
1233
1234/*
1235 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1236 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1237 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1238 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1239 */
1240
1241static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1242{
1243 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1244 int ret;
1245
1246 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1247 if (ctx->parent)
1248 return 0;
1249 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1250 return -1;
1251
1252 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1253 /* Copy verify params across */
1254 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1255
1256 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1257 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1258
1259 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1260 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1261 if (ret <= 0)
1262 goto err;
1263
1264 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1265 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1266 err:
1267 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1268 return ret;
1269}
1270
1271/*
1272 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1273 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1274 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1275 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1276 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1277 * RFC5280 version
1278 */
1279
1280static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1281 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1282 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1283{
1284 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1285 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1286 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1287 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1288 return 1;
1289 return 0;
1290}
1291
1292/*-
1293 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1294 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1295 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1296 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1297 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1298 */
1299
1300static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1301{
1302 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1303 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1304 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1305 int i, j;
1306 if (!a || !b)
1307 return 1;
1308 if (a->type == 1) {
1309 if (!a->dpname)
1310 return 0;
1311 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1312 if (b->type == 1) {
1313 if (!b->dpname)
1314 return 0;
1315 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1316 return 1;
1317 else
1318 return 0;
1319 }
1320 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1321 nm = a->dpname;
1322 gens = b->name.fullname;
1323 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1324 if (!b->dpname)
1325 return 0;
1326 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1327 gens = a->name.fullname;
1328 nm = b->dpname;
1329 }
1330
1331 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1332 if (nm) {
1333 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1334 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1335 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1336 continue;
1337 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1338 return 1;
1339 }
1340 return 0;
1341 }
1342
1343 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1344
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1346 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1347 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1348 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1349 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1350 return 1;
1351 }
1352 }
1353
1354 return 0;
1355
1356}
1357
1358static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1359{
1360 int i;
1361 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1362 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1363 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1364 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1366 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1367 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1368 continue;
1369 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1370 return 1;
1371 }
1372 return 0;
1373}
1374
1375/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1376
1377static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1378 unsigned int *preasons)
1379{
1380 int i;
1381 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1382 return 0;
1383 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1384 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1385 return 0;
1386 } else {
1387 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1388 return 0;
1389 }
1390 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1391 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1392 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1393 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1394 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1395 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1396 return 1;
1397 }
1398 }
1399 }
1400 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1401 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1402 return 1;
1403 return 0;
1404}
1405
1406/*
1407 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1408 * to find a delta CRL too
1409 */
1410
1411static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1412 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1413{
1414 int ok;
1415 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1416 int crl_score = 0;
1417 unsigned int reasons;
1418 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1419 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1420 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1421
1422 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1423 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1424 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1425 if (ok)
1426 goto done;
1427
1428 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1429
1430 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1431
1432 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1433 if (!skcrl && crl)
1434 goto done;
1435
1436 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1437
1438 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1439
1440 done:
1441 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1442 if (crl) {
1443 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1444 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1445 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1446 *pcrl = crl;
1447 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1448 return 1;
1449 }
1450 return 0;
1451}
1452
1453/* Check CRL validity */
1454static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1455{
1456 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1457 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1458 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1459 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1460
1461 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1462 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1463 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1464 /*
1465 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1466 * certificate in chain.
1467 */
1468 else if (cnum < chnum)
1469 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1470 else {
1471 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1472 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1473 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1474 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1475 return 0;
1476 }
1477
1478 if (issuer == NULL)
1479 return 1;
1480
1481 /*
1482 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1483 */
1484 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1485 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1486 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1487 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1488 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1489 return 0;
1490
1491 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1492 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1493 return 0;
1494
1495 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1496 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1497 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1498 return 0;
1499
1500 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1501 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1502 return 0;
1503 }
1504
1505 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1506 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1507 return 0;
1508
1509 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1510 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1511
1512 if (!ikey &&
1513 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1514 return 0;
1515
1516 if (ikey) {
1517 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1518
1519 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1520 return 0;
1521 /* Verify CRL signature */
1522 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1523 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1524 return 0;
1525 }
1526 return 1;
1527}
1528
1529/* Check certificate against CRL */
1530static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1531{
1532 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1533
1534 /*
1535 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1536 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1537 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1538 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1539 */
1540 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1541 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1542 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1543 return 0;
1544 /*
1545 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1546 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1547 */
1548 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1549 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1550 return 2;
1551 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1552 return 0;
1553 }
1554
1555 return 1;
1556}
1557
1558static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1559{
1560 int ret;
1561
1562 if (ctx->parent)
1563 return 1;
1564 /*
1565 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1566 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1567 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1568 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1569 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1570 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1571 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1572 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1573 * X509_policy_check() call.
1574 */
1575 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1576 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1577 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1578 return 0;
1579 }
1580 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1581 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1582 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1583 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1584
1585 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1586 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1587 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1588 return 0;
1589 }
1590 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1591 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1592 int i;
1593
1594 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1595 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1596 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1597
1598 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1599 continue;
1600 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1601 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1602 return 0;
1603 }
1604 return 1;
1605 }
1606 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1607 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1609 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1610 }
1611 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1612 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 return 0;
1614 }
1615
1616 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1617 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1618 /*
1619 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1620 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1621 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1622 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1623 */
1624 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1625 return 0;
1626 }
1627
1628 return 1;
1629}
1630
1631/*-
1632 * Check certificate validity times.
1633 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1634 * the validation status.
1635 *
1636 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1637 */
1638int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1639{
1640 time_t *ptime;
1641 int i;
1642
1643 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1644 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1645 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1646 return 1;
1647 else
1648 ptime = NULL;
1649
1650 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1651 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1652 return 0;
1653 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1654 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1655 return 0;
1656 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1657 return 0;
1658
1659 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1660 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1661 return 0;
1662 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1663 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1664 return 0;
1665 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1666 return 0;
1667 return 1;
1668}
1669
1670static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1671{
1672 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1673 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1674 X509 *xs;
1675
1676 /*
1677 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1678 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1679 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1680 */
1681 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1682 xs = xi;
1683 xi = NULL;
1684 goto check_cert;
1685 }
1686
1687 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1688 xs = xi;
1689 else {
1690 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1691 xs = xi;
1692 goto check_cert;
1693 }
1694 if (n <= 0)
1695 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1696 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1697 n--;
1698 ctx->error_depth = n;
1699 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1700 }
1701
1702 /*
1703 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1704 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1705 */
1706 while (n >= 0) {
1707 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1708
1709 /*
1710 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1711 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1712 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1713 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1714 */
1715 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1716 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1717 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1718 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1719 return 0;
1720 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1721 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1722 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1723 return 0;
1724 }
1725 }
1726
1727 check_cert:
1728 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1729 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1730 return 0;
1731
1732 /*
1733 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1734 * is retained.
1735 */
1736 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1737 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1738 ctx->error_depth = n;
1739 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1740 return 0;
1741
1742 if (--n >= 0) {
1743 xi = xs;
1744 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1745 }
1746 }
1747 return 1;
1748}
1749
1750int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1751{
1752 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1753}
1754
1755int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1756{
1757 char *str;
1758 ASN1_TIME atm;
1759 long offset;
1760 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1761 int i, j, remaining;
1762
1763 p = buff1;
1764 remaining = ctm->length;
1765 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1766 /*
1767 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1768 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1769 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1770 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1771 */
1772 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1773 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1774 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1775 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1776 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1777 return 0;
1778 memcpy(p, str, 10);
1779 p += 10;
1780 str += 10;
1781 remaining -= 10;
1782 } else {
1783 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1784 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1785 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1786 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1787 return 0;
1788 memcpy(p, str, 12);
1789 p += 12;
1790 str += 12;
1791 remaining -= 12;
1792 }
1793
1794 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1795 *(p++) = '0';
1796 *(p++) = '0';
1797 } else {
1798 /* SS (seconds) */
1799 if (remaining < 2)
1800 return 0;
1801 *(p++) = *(str++);
1802 *(p++) = *(str++);
1803 remaining -= 2;
1804 /*
1805 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1806 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1807 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1808 */
1809 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1810 str++;
1811 remaining--;
1812 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1813 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1814 break;
1815 }
1816 }
1817
1818 }
1819 *(p++) = 'Z';
1820 *(p++) = '\0';
1821
1822 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1823 if (!remaining)
1824 return 0;
1825 if (*str == 'Z') {
1826 if (remaining != 1)
1827 return 0;
1828 offset = 0;
1829 } else {
1830 /* (+-)HHMM */
1831 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1832 return 0;
1833 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1834 if (remaining != 5)
1835 return 0;
1836 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1837 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1838 return 0;
1839 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1840 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1841 if (*str == '-')
1842 offset = -offset;
1843 }
1844 atm.type = ctm->type;
1845 atm.flags = 0;
1846 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1847 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1848
1849 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1850 return 0;
1851
1852 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1853 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1854 if (i < 50)
1855 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1856 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1857 if (j < 50)
1858 j += 100;
1859
1860 if (i < j)
1861 return -1;
1862 if (i > j)
1863 return 1;
1864 }
1865 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1866 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1867 return -1;
1868 else
1869 return i;
1870}
1871
1872ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1873{
1874 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1875}
1876
1877ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1878{
1879 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1880}
1881
1882ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1883 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1884{
1885 time_t t;
1886
1887 if (in_tm)
1888 t = *in_tm;
1889 else
1890 time(&t);
1891
1892 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1893 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1894 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1895 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1896 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1897 }
1898 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1899}
1900
1901int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1902{
1903 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1904 int i, j;
1905
1906 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1907 return 1;
1908
1909 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1910 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1911 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1912 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1913 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1914 return 0;
1915 }
1916 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1917 break;
1918 }
1919 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1920 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1921 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1922 return 0;
1923 }
1924
1925 /* first, populate the other certs */
1926 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1927 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1928 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1929 }
1930
1931 if (pkey != NULL)
1932 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1933 return 1;
1934}
1935
1936/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1937
1938X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1939 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1940{
1941 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1942 int i;
1943 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1944 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1945 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1947 return NULL;
1948 }
1949 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1950 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1951 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1952 return NULL;
1953 }
1954 /* Issuer names must match */
1955 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1956 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1957 return NULL;
1958 }
1959 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1960 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1961 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1962 return NULL;
1963 }
1964 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1965 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1966 return NULL;
1967 }
1968 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1969 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1970 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1971 return NULL;
1972 }
1973 /* CRLs must verify */
1974 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1975 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1977 return NULL;
1978 }
1979 /* Create new CRL */
1980 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1981 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1982 goto memerr;
1983 /* Set issuer name */
1984 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1985 goto memerr;
1986
1987 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
1988 goto memerr;
1989 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
1990 goto memerr;
1991
1992 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1993
1994 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1995 goto memerr;
1996
1997 /*
1998 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1999 * number to correct value too.
2000 */
2001
2002 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2003 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2004 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2005 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2006 goto memerr;
2007 }
2008
2009 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2010
2011 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2012
2013 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2014 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2015 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2016 /*
2017 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2018 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2019 */
2020 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2021 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2022 if (!rvtmp)
2023 goto memerr;
2024 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2025 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2026 goto memerr;
2027 }
2028 }
2029 }
2030 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2031
2032 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2033 goto memerr;
2034
2035 return crl;
2036
2037 memerr:
2038 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2039 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2040 return NULL;
2041}
2042
2043int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2044{
2045 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2046}
2047
2048void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2049{
2050 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2051}
2052
2053int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2054{
2055 return ctx->error;
2056}
2057
2058void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2059{
2060 ctx->error = err;
2061}
2062
2063int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2064{
2065 return ctx->error_depth;
2066}
2067
2068void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2069{
2070 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2071}
2072
2073X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2074{
2075 return ctx->current_cert;
2076}
2077
2078void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2079{
2080 ctx->current_cert = x;
2081}
2082
2083STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2084{
2085 return ctx->chain;
2086}
2087
2088STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2089{
2090 if (!ctx->chain)
2091 return NULL;
2092 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2093}
2094
2095X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2096{
2097 return ctx->current_issuer;
2098}
2099
2100X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2101{
2102 return ctx->current_crl;
2103}
2104
2105X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2106{
2107 return ctx->parent;
2108}
2109
2110void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2111{
2112 ctx->cert = x;
2113}
2114
2115void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2116{
2117 ctx->crls = sk;
2118}
2119
2120int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2121{
2122 /*
2123 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2124 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2125 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2126 */
2127 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2128}
2129
2130int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2131{
2132 /*
2133 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2134 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2135 */
2136 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2137}
2138
2139/*
2140 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2141 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2142 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2143 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2144 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2145 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2146 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2147 * client/server.
2148 */
2149
2150int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2151 int purpose, int trust)
2152{
2153 int idx;
2154 /* If purpose not set use default */
2155 if (!purpose)
2156 purpose = def_purpose;
2157 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2158 if (purpose) {
2159 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2160 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2161 if (idx == -1) {
2162 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2163 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2164 return 0;
2165 }
2166 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2167 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2168 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2169 /*
2170 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2171 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2172 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2173 */
2174 if (idx == -1) {
2175 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2176 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2177 return 0;
2178 }
2179 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2180 }
2181 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2182 if (!trust)
2183 trust = ptmp->trust;
2184 }
2185 if (trust) {
2186 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2187 if (idx == -1) {
2188 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2189 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2190 return 0;
2191 }
2192 }
2193
2194 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2195 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2196 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2197 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2198 return 1;
2199}
2200
2201X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2202{
2203 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2204
2205 if (ctx == NULL) {
2206 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2207 return NULL;
2208 }
2209 return ctx;
2210}
2211
2212void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2213{
2214 if (ctx == NULL)
2215 return;
2216
2217 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2218 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2219}
2220
2221int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2222 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2223{
2224 int ret = 1;
2225
2226 ctx->ctx = store;
2227 ctx->cert = x509;
2228 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2229 ctx->crls = NULL;
2230 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2231 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2232 ctx->valid = 0;
2233 ctx->chain = NULL;
2234 ctx->error = 0;
2235 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2236 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2237 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2238 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2239 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2240 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2241 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2242 ctx->tree = NULL;
2243 ctx->parent = NULL;
2244 ctx->dane = NULL;
2245 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2246 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2247 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2248
2249 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2250 if (store)
2251 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2252 else
2253 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2254
2255 if (store && store->check_issued)
2256 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2257 else
2258 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2259
2260 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2261 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2262 else
2263 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2264
2265 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2266 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2267 else
2268 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2269
2270 if (store && store->verify)
2271 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2272 else
2273 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2274
2275 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2276 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2277 else
2278 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2279
2280 if (store && store->get_crl)
2281 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2282 else
2283 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2284
2285 if (store && store->check_crl)
2286 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2287 else
2288 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2289
2290 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2291 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2292 else
2293 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2294
2295 if (store && store->check_policy)
2296 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2297 else
2298 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2299
2300 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2301 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2302 else
2303 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2304
2305 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2306 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2307 else
2308 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2309
2310 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2311 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2312 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2313 goto err;
2314 }
2315
2316 /*
2317 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2318 */
2319 if (store)
2320 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2321 else
2322 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2323
2324 if (ret)
2325 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2326 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2327
2328 if (ret == 0) {
2329 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2330 goto err;
2331 }
2332
2333 /*
2334 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2335 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2336 */
2337 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2338 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2339 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2340
2341 if (xp != NULL)
2342 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2343 }
2344
2345 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2346 &ctx->ex_data))
2347 return 1;
2348 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349
2350 err:
2351 /*
2352 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2353 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2354 */
2355 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2356 return 0;
2357}
2358
2359/*
2360 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2361 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2362 */
2363void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2364{
2365 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2366 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2367 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2368}
2369
2370void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2371{
2372 /*
2373 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2374 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2375 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2376 * pointers below after they're freed!
2377 */
2378 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2379 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2380 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2381 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2382 }
2383 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2384 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2385 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2386 ctx->param = NULL;
2387 }
2388 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2389 ctx->tree = NULL;
2390 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2391 ctx->chain = NULL;
2392 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2393 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2394}
2395
2396void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2397{
2398 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2399}
2400
2401void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2402{
2403 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2404}
2405
2406void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2407 time_t t)
2408{
2409 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2410}
2411
2412X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2413{
2414 return ctx->cert;
2415}
2416
2417STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2418{
2419 return ctx->untrusted;
2420}
2421
2422void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2423{
2424 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2425}
2426
2427void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2428{
2429 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2430 ctx->chain = sk;
2431}
2432
2433void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2434 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2435{
2436 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2437}
2438
2439X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440{
2441 return ctx->verify_cb;
2442}
2443
2444void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2445 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2446{
2447 ctx->verify = verify;
2448}
2449
2450X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2451{
2452 return ctx->verify;
2453}
2454
2455X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2456{
2457 return ctx->get_issuer;
2458}
2459
2460X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2461{
2462 return ctx->check_issued;
2463}
2464
2465X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2466{
2467 return ctx->check_revocation;
2468}
2469
2470X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2471{
2472 return ctx->get_crl;
2473}
2474
2475X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2476{
2477 return ctx->check_crl;
2478}
2479
2480X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2481{
2482 return ctx->cert_crl;
2483}
2484
2485X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2486{
2487 return ctx->check_policy;
2488}
2489
2490X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2491{
2492 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2493}
2494
2495X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2496{
2497 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2498}
2499
2500X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2501{
2502 return ctx->cleanup;
2503}
2504
2505X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2506{
2507 return ctx->tree;
2508}
2509
2510int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2511{
2512 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2513}
2514
2515int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2516{
2517 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2518}
2519
2520int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2521{
2522 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2523 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2524 if (!param)
2525 return 0;
2526 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2527}
2528
2529X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2530{
2531 return ctx->param;
2532}
2533
2534void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2535{
2536 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2537 ctx->param = param;
2538}
2539
2540void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2541{
2542 ctx->dane = dane;
2543}
2544
2545static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2546 X509 *cert,
2547 uint8_t selector,
2548 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2549{
2550 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2551 int len;
2552
2553 /*
2554 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2555 */
2556 switch (selector) {
2557 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2558 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2559 break;
2560 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2561 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2562 break;
2563 default:
2564 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2565 return NULL;
2566 }
2567
2568 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2569 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2570 return NULL;
2571 }
2572
2573 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2574 return buf;
2575}
2576
2577#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2578
2579static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2580{
2581 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2582 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2583 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2584 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2585 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2586 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2587 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2588 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2589 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2590 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2591 int i;
2592 int recnum;
2593 int matched = 0;
2594 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2595 uint32_t mask;
2596
2597 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2598
2599 /*
2600 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2601 */
2602 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2603 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2604
2605 /*
2606 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2607 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2608 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2609 */
2610 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2611 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2612
2613 /*-
2614 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2615 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2616 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2617 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2618 *
2619 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2620 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2621 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2622 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2623 *
2624 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2625 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2626 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2627 *
2628 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2629 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2630 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2631 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2632 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2633 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2634 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2635 *
2636 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2637 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2638 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2639 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2640 */
2641 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2642 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2643 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2644 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2645 continue;
2646 if (t->usage != usage) {
2647 usage = t->usage;
2648
2649 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2650 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2651 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2652 }
2653 if (t->selector != selector) {
2654 selector = t->selector;
2655
2656 /* Update per-selector state */
2657 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2658 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2659 if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2660 return -1;
2661
2662 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2663 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2664 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2665 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2666 /*-
2667 * Digest agility:
2668 *
2669 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2670 *
2671 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2672 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2673 * other than "Full".
2674 */
2675 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2676 continue;
2677 }
2678
2679 /*
2680 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2681 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2682 */
2683 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2684 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2685 cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2686 cmplen = i2dlen;
2687
2688 if (md != NULL) {
2689 cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2690 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2691 matched = -1;
2692 break;
2693 }
2694 }
2695 }
2696
2697 /*
2698 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2699 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2700 * full chain.
2701 */
2702 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2703 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2704 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2705 matched = 1;
2706 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2707 dane->mdpth = depth;
2708 dane->mtlsa = t;
2709 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2710 dane->mcert = cert;
2711 X509_up_ref(cert);
2712 }
2713 break;
2714 }
2715 }
2716
2717 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2718 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2719 return matched;
2720}
2721
2722static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2723{
2724 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2725 int matched = 0;
2726 X509 *cert;
2727
2728 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2729 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2730
2731 /*
2732 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2733 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2734 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2735 */
2736 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2737 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2738 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2739 if (matched > 0) {
2740 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2741 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2742 }
2743
2744 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2745}
2746
2747static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2748{
2749 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2750 danetls_record *t;
2751 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2752 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2753 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2754 int i;
2755
2756 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2757 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2758 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2759 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2760 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2761 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2762 continue;
2763
2764 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2765 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2766 dane->mcert = NULL;
2767
2768 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2769 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2770 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2771 dane->mtlsa = t;
2772
2773 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2774 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2775 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2776 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2777
2778 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2779 }
2780
2781 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2782}
2783
2784static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2785{
2786 /*
2787 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2788 */
2789 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2790 dane->mcert = NULL;
2791 dane->mtlsa = NULL;
2792 dane->mdpth = -1;
2793 dane->pdpth = -1;
2794}
2795
2796static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2797{
2798 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2799
2800 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2801 return 1;
2802 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2803}
2804
2805static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2806{
2807 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2808 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2809 int matched;
2810 int done;
2811
2812 dane_reset(dane);
2813
2814 /*-
2815 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2816 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2817 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2818 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2819 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2820 * if:
2821 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2822 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2823 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2824 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2825 */
2826 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2827 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2828
2829 if (done)
2830 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2831
2832 if (matched > 0) {
2833 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2834 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2835 return 0;
2836 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2837 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2838 !check_id(ctx))
2839 return 0;
2840 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2841 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2842 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2843 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2844 }
2845
2846 if (matched < 0) {
2847 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2848 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2849 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2850 return -1;
2851 }
2852
2853 if (done) {
2854 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2855 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2856 return 0;
2857 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2858 }
2859
2860 /*
2861 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2862 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2863 */
2864 return verify_chain(ctx);
2865}
2866
2867/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2868static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2869{
2870 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2871 int ok;
2872
2873 ctx->chain = NULL;
2874 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2875 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2876
2877 return ok;
2878}
2879
2880static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2881{
2882 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2883 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2884 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2885 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2886 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2887 unsigned int search;
2888 int may_trusted = 0;
2889 int may_alternate = 0;
2890 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2891 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2892 int depth;
2893 int ok = 0;
2894 int i;
2895
2896 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2897 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2898
2899#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2900#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2901#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2902 /*
2903 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2904 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2905 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2906 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2907 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2908 */
2909 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2910 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2911 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2912 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2913 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2914 may_alternate = 1;
2915 may_trusted = 1;
2916 }
2917
2918 /*
2919 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2920 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2921 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2922 */
2923 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2924 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2925 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2926 return 0;
2927 }
2928
2929 /*
2930 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2931 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2932 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2933 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2934 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2935 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2936 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2937 * this to change. ]
2938 */
2939 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2940 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2941 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2942 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2943 return 0;
2944 }
2945 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2946 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2947 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2948 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2949 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2950 return 0;
2951 }
2952 }
2953 }
2954
2955 /*
2956 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2957 * might be reasonable.
2958 */
2959 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2960 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2961
2962 /*
2963 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2964 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2965 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2966 */
2967 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2968
2969 while (search != 0) {
2970 X509 *x;
2971 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
2972
2973 /*
2974 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2975 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2976 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2977 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2978 *
2979 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2980 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2981 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2982 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2983 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2984 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2985 * would be a-priori too long.
2986 */
2987 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2988 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2989 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2990 /*
2991 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2992 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2993 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2994 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2995 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2996 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2997 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2998 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2999 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3000 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3001 *
3002 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3003 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3004 */
3005 i = alt_untrusted;
3006 }
3007 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
3008
3009 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
3010
3011 if (ok < 0) {
3012 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3013 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3014 search = 0;
3015 continue;
3016 }
3017
3018 if (ok > 0) {
3019 /*
3020 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3021 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3022 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3023 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3024 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3025 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3026 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3027 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3028 *
3029 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3030 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3031 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3032 */
3033 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3034 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
3035 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3036 for (; num > i; --num)
3037 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3038 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3039
3040 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3041 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3042 dane->mdpth = -1;
3043 X509_free(dane->mcert);
3044 dane->mcert = NULL;
3045 }
3046 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3047 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3048 dane->pdpth = -1;
3049 }
3050
3051 /*
3052 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3053 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3054 */
3055 if (ss == 0) {
3056 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3057 X509_free(xtmp);
3058 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3059 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3060 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3061 search = 0;
3062 continue;
3063 }
3064 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3065 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3066 /*
3067 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3068 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3069 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3070 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3071 */
3072 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3073 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3074 X509_free(xtmp);
3075 ok = 0;
3076 } else {
3077 X509_free(x);
3078 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3079 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3080 }
3081 }
3082
3083 /*
3084 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3085 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3086 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3087 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3088 *
3089 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3090 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3091 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3092 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3093 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3094 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3095 */
3096 if (ok) {
3097 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
3098 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3099 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3100 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3101 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3102 search = 0;
3103 continue;
3104 }
3105 if (ss == 0)
3106 continue;
3107 }
3108 }
3109
3110 /*
3111 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3112 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3113 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3114 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3115 */
3116 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3117 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3118 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3119 continue;
3120 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3121 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3122 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3123 break;
3124 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3125 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3126 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3127 ss = 0;
3128 }
3129 }
3130
3131 /*
3132 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3133 */
3134 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3135 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3136 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
3137 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3138
3139 /*
3140 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3141 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3142 */
3143 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3144 if (xtmp == NULL) {
3145 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3146 if (may_trusted)
3147 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3148 continue;
3149 }
3150
3151 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3152 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3153
3154 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3155 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3156 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3157 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3158 search = 0;
3159 continue;
3160 }
3161
3162 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3163 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3164 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3165
3166 /*
3167 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3168 */
3169 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3170 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3171 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3172 search = 0;
3173 continue;
3174 }
3175 }
3176 }
3177 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3178
3179 /*
3180 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3181 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3182 */
3183 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3184 if (num <= depth) {
3185 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3186 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3187 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3188 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3189 }
3190
3191 switch (trust) {
3192 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3193 return 1;
3194 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3195 /* Callback already issued */
3196 return 0;
3197 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3198 default:
3199 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3200 if (num > depth)
3201 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3202 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3203 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3204 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3205 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3206 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3207 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3208 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3209 if (ss)
3210 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3211 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3212 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3213 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3214 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3215 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3216 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3217 }
3218}
3219
3220static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3221static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3222
3223/*
3224 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3225 * ``ctx``.
3226 *
3227 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3228 */
3229static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3230{
3231 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3232 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3233
3234 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3235 if (pkey == NULL)
3236 return 0;
3237
3238 if (level <= 0)
3239 return 1;
3240 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3241 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3242
3243 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3244}
3245
3246/*
3247 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3248 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3249 * self-signed or otherwise).
3250 *
3251 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3252 */
3253static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3254{
3255 int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
3256 int mdnid = NID_undef;
3257 int secbits = -1;
3258 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3259
3260 if (level <= 0)
3261 return 1;
3262 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3263 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3264
3265 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3266 if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
3267 const EVP_MD *md;
3268
3269 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3270 if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
3271 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3272 }
3273
3274 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3275}
Note: See TracBrowser for help on using the repository browser.