[331] | 1 | /*
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| 2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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| 3 | *
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| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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| 8 | */
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| 9 |
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| 10 | #include <stdio.h>
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| 11 | #include <ctype.h>
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| 12 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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| 13 | #include <openssl/asn1.h>
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| 14 | #include <openssl/objects.h>
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| 15 | #include <openssl/x509.h>
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| 16 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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| 17 | #include "internal/x509_int.h"
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| 18 |
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| 19 | int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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| 20 | {
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| 21 | int i;
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| 22 | const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
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| 23 |
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| 24 | ai = &a->cert_info;
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| 25 | bi = &b->cert_info;
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| 26 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
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| 27 | if (i)
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| 28 | return (i);
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| 29 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
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| 30 | }
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| 31 |
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| 32 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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| 33 | unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
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| 34 | {
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| 35 | unsigned long ret = 0;
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| 36 | EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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| 37 | unsigned char md[16];
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| 38 | char *f;
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| 39 |
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| 40 | if (ctx == NULL)
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| 41 | goto err;
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| 42 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
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| 43 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
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| 44 | goto err;
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| 45 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
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| 46 | goto err;
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| 47 | OPENSSL_free(f);
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| 48 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
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| 49 | (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
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| 50 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
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| 51 | goto err;
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| 52 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
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| 53 | goto err;
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| 54 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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| 55 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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| 56 | ) & 0xffffffffL;
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| 57 | err:
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| 58 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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| 59 | return (ret);
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| 60 | }
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| 61 | #endif
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| 62 |
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| 63 | int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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| 64 | {
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| 65 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
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| 66 | }
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| 67 |
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| 68 | int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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| 69 | {
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| 70 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
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| 71 | }
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| 72 |
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| 73 | int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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| 74 | {
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| 75 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
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| 76 | }
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| 77 |
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| 78 | int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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| 79 | {
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| 80 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
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| 81 | }
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| 82 |
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| 83 | X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
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| 84 | {
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| 85 | return (a->cert_info.issuer);
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| 86 | }
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| 87 |
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| 88 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
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| 89 | {
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| 90 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
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| 91 | }
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| 92 |
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| 93 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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| 94 | unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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| 95 | {
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| 96 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
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| 97 | }
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| 98 | #endif
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| 99 |
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| 100 | X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
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| 101 | {
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| 102 | return (a->cert_info.subject);
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| 103 | }
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| 104 |
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| 105 | ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
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| 106 | {
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| 107 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
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| 108 | }
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| 109 |
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| 110 | const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
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| 111 | {
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| 112 | return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
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| 113 | }
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| 114 |
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| 115 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
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| 116 | {
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| 117 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
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| 118 | }
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| 119 |
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| 120 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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| 121 | unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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| 122 | {
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| 123 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
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| 124 | }
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| 125 | #endif
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| 126 |
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| 127 | /*
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| 128 | * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
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| 129 | * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
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| 130 | * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
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| 131 | * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
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| 132 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
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| 133 | * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
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| 134 | */
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| 135 | int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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| 136 | {
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| 137 | int rv;
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| 138 | /* ensure hash is valid */
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| 139 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
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| 140 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
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| 141 |
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| 142 | rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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| 143 | if (rv)
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| 144 | return rv;
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| 145 | /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
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| 146 | if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
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| 147 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
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| 148 | return -1;
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| 149 | if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
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| 150 | return 1;
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| 151 | return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
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| 152 | a->cert_info.enc.len);
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| 153 | }
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| 154 | return rv;
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| 155 | }
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| 156 |
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| 157 | int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
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| 158 | {
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| 159 | int ret;
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| 160 |
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| 161 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
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| 162 |
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| 163 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
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| 164 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
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| 165 | if (ret < 0)
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| 166 | return -2;
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| 167 | }
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| 168 |
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| 169 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
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| 170 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
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| 171 | if (ret < 0)
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| 172 | return -2;
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| 173 | }
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| 174 |
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| 175 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
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| 176 |
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| 177 | if (ret)
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| 178 | return ret;
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| 179 |
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| 180 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
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| 181 |
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| 182 | }
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| 183 |
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| 184 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
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| 185 | {
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| 186 | unsigned long ret = 0;
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| 187 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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| 188 |
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| 189 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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| 190 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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| 191 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
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| 192 | NULL))
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| 193 | return 0;
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| 194 |
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| 195 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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| 196 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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| 197 | ) & 0xffffffffL;
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| 198 | return (ret);
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| 199 | }
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| 200 |
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| 201 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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| 202 | /*
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| 203 | * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
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| 204 | * this is reasonably efficient.
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| 205 | */
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| 206 |
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| 207 | unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
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| 208 | {
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| 209 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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| 210 | unsigned long ret = 0;
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| 211 | unsigned char md[16];
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| 212 |
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| 213 | if (md_ctx == NULL)
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| 214 | return ret;
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| 215 |
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| 216 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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| 217 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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| 218 | EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
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| 219 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
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| 220 | && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
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| 221 | && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
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| 222 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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| 223 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
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| 224 | ) & 0xffffffffL;
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| 225 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
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| 226 |
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| 227 | return (ret);
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| 228 | }
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| 229 | #endif
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| 230 |
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| 231 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
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| 232 | X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
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| 233 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
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| 234 | {
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| 235 | int i;
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| 236 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
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| 237 |
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| 238 | if (!sk)
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| 239 | return NULL;
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| 240 |
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| 241 | x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
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| 242 | x.cert_info.issuer = name;
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| 243 |
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| 244 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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| 245 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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| 246 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
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| 247 | return (x509);
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| 248 | }
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| 249 | return (NULL);
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| 250 | }
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| 251 |
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| 252 | X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
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| 253 | {
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| 254 | X509 *x509;
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| 255 | int i;
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| 256 |
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| 257 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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| 258 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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| 259 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
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| 260 | return (x509);
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| 261 | }
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| 262 | return (NULL);
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| 263 | }
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| 264 |
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| 265 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
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| 266 | {
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| 267 | if (x == NULL)
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| 268 | return NULL;
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| 269 | return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
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| 270 | }
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| 271 |
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| 272 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
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| 273 | {
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| 274 | if (x == NULL)
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| 275 | return NULL;
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| 276 | return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
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| 277 | }
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| 278 |
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| 279 | int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
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| 280 | {
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| 281 | const EVP_PKEY *xk;
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| 282 | int ret;
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| 283 |
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| 284 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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| 285 |
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| 286 | if (xk)
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| 287 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
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| 288 | else
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| 289 | ret = -2;
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| 290 |
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| 291 | switch (ret) {
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| 292 | case 1:
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| 293 | break;
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| 294 | case 0:
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| 295 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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| 296 | break;
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| 297 | case -1:
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| 298 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
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| 299 | break;
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| 300 | case -2:
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| 301 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
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| 302 | }
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| 303 | if (ret > 0)
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| 304 | return 1;
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| 305 | return 0;
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| 306 | }
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| 307 |
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| 308 | /*
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| 309 | * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
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| 310 | * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
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| 311 | * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
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| 312 | */
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| 313 |
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| 314 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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| 315 |
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| 316 | static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
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| 317 | {
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| 318 | const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
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| 319 | int curve_nid;
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| 320 | if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
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| 321 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
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| 322 | if (!grp)
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| 323 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
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| 324 | curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
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| 325 | /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
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| 326 | if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
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| 327 | /*
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| 328 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
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| 329 | */
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| 330 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
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| 331 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
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| 332 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
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| 333 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
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| 334 | /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
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| 335 | *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
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| 336 | } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
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| 337 | if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
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| 338 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
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| 339 | if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
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| 340 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
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| 341 | } else
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| 342 | return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
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| 343 |
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| 344 | return X509_V_OK;
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| 345 | }
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| 346 |
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| 347 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
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| 348 | unsigned long flags)
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| 349 | {
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| 350 | int rv, i, sign_nid;
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| 351 | EVP_PKEY *pk;
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| 352 | unsigned long tflags = flags;
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| 353 |
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| 354 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
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| 355 | return X509_V_OK;
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| 356 |
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| 357 | /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
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| 358 | if (x == NULL) {
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| 359 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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| 360 | i = 1;
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| 361 | } else
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| 362 | i = 0;
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| 363 |
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| 364 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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| 365 |
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| 366 | /*
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| 367 | * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
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| 368 | * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
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| 369 | * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
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| 370 | * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
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| 371 | */
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| 372 | if (chain == NULL)
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| 373 | return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
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| 374 |
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| 375 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
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| 376 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
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| 377 | /* Correct error depth */
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| 378 | i = 0;
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| 379 | goto end;
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| 380 | }
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| 381 |
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| 382 | /* Check EE key only */
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| 383 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
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| 384 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
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| 385 | /* Correct error depth */
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| 386 | i = 0;
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| 387 | goto end;
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| 388 | }
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| 389 | for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
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| 390 | sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
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| 391 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
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| 392 | if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
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| 393 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
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| 394 | goto end;
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| 395 | }
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| 396 | pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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| 397 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
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| 398 | if (rv != X509_V_OK)
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| 399 | goto end;
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| 400 | }
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| 401 |
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| 402 | /* Final check: root CA signature */
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| 403 | rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
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| 404 | end:
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| 405 | if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
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| 406 | /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
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| 407 | if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
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| 408 | || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
|
---|
| 409 | i--;
|
---|
| 410 | /*
|
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| 411 | * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
|
---|
| 412 | * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
|
---|
| 413 | */
|
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| 414 | if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
|
---|
| 415 | rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
|
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| 416 | if (perror_depth)
|
---|
| 417 | *perror_depth = i;
|
---|
| 418 | }
|
---|
| 419 | return rv;
|
---|
| 420 | }
|
---|
| 421 |
|
---|
| 422 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
|
---|
| 423 | {
|
---|
| 424 | int sign_nid;
|
---|
| 425 | if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
|
---|
| 426 | return X509_V_OK;
|
---|
| 427 | sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
|
---|
| 428 | return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
|
---|
| 429 | }
|
---|
| 430 |
|
---|
| 431 | #else
|
---|
| 432 | int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
|
---|
| 433 | unsigned long flags)
|
---|
| 434 | {
|
---|
| 435 | return 0;
|
---|
| 436 | }
|
---|
| 437 |
|
---|
| 438 | int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
|
---|
| 439 | {
|
---|
| 440 | return 0;
|
---|
| 441 | }
|
---|
| 442 |
|
---|
| 443 | #endif
|
---|
| 444 | /*
|
---|
| 445 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
|
---|
| 446 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
|
---|
| 447 | * each X509 structure.
|
---|
| 448 | */
|
---|
| 449 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
---|
| 450 | {
|
---|
| 451 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
|
---|
| 452 | int i;
|
---|
| 453 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
|
---|
| 454 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
|
---|
| 455 | X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
|
---|
| 456 | X509_up_ref(x);
|
---|
| 457 | }
|
---|
| 458 | return ret;
|
---|
| 459 | }
|
---|