[331] | 1 | /*
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| 2 | * Copyright 2013-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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| 3 | *
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| 4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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| 5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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| 6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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| 7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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| 8 | */
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| 9 |
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| 10 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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| 11 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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| 12 | #include <openssl/pem.h>
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| 13 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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| 14 | #include <openssl/err.h>
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| 15 | #include <openssl/cms.h>
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| 16 | #include <openssl/aes.h>
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| 17 | #include "cms_lcl.h"
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| 18 | #include "internal/asn1_int.h"
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| 19 |
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| 20 | /* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
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| 21 |
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| 22 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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| 23 | X509_ALGOR **palg,
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| 24 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
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| 25 | {
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| 26 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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| 27 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
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| 28 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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| 29 | return 0;
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| 30 | }
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| 31 | if (palg)
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| 32 | *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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| 33 | if (pukm)
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| 34 | *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
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| 35 | return 1;
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| 36 | }
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| 37 |
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| 38 | /* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
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| 39 |
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| 40 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
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| 41 | *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| 42 | {
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| 43 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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| 44 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
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| 45 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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| 46 | return NULL;
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| 47 | }
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| 48 | return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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| 49 | }
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| 50 |
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| 51 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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| 52 | X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
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| 53 | ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
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| 54 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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| 55 | X509_NAME **issuer,
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| 56 | ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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| 57 | {
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| 58 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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| 59 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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| 60 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
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| 61 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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| 62 | return 0;
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| 63 | }
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| 64 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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| 65 | if (issuer)
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| 66 | *issuer = NULL;
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| 67 | if (sno)
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| 68 | *sno = NULL;
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| 69 | if (keyid)
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| 70 | *keyid = NULL;
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| 71 | if (pubalg)
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| 72 | *pubalg = NULL;
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| 73 | if (pubkey)
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| 74 | *pubkey = NULL;
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| 75 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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| 76 | if (issuer)
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| 77 | *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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| 78 | if (sno)
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| 79 | *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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| 80 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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| 81 | if (keyid)
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| 82 | *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
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| 83 | } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
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| 84 | if (pubalg)
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| 85 | *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
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| 86 | if (pubkey)
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| 87 | *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
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| 88 | } else
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| 89 | return 0;
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| 90 | return 1;
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| 91 | }
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| 92 |
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| 93 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
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| 94 | {
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| 95 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
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| 96 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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| 97 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
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| 98 | CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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| 99 | return -2;
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| 100 | }
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| 101 | oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
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| 102 | if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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| 103 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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| 104 | else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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| 105 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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| 106 | return -1;
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| 107 | }
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| 108 |
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| 109 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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| 110 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
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| 111 | ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
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| 112 | CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
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| 113 | X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
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| 114 | {
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| 115 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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| 116 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
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| 117 | if (issuer)
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| 118 | *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
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| 119 | if (sno)
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| 120 | *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
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| 121 | if (keyid)
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| 122 | *keyid = NULL;
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| 123 | if (tm)
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| 124 | *tm = NULL;
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| 125 | if (other)
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| 126 | *other = NULL;
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| 127 | } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
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| 128 | if (keyid)
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| 129 | *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
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| 130 | if (tm)
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| 131 | *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
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| 132 | if (other)
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| 133 | *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
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| 134 | if (issuer)
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| 135 | *issuer = NULL;
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| 136 | if (sno)
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| 137 | *sno = NULL;
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| 138 | } else
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| 139 | return 0;
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| 140 | return 1;
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| 141 | }
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| 142 |
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| 143 | int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
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| 144 | X509 *cert)
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| 145 | {
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| 146 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
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| 147 | if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
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| 148 | return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
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| 149 | else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
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| 150 | return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
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| 151 | else
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| 152 | return -1;
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| 153 | }
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| 154 |
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| 155 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
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| 156 | {
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| 157 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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| 158 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
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| 159 |
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| 160 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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| 161 | kari->pctx = NULL;
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| 162 | if (!pk)
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| 163 | return 1;
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| 164 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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| 165 | if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
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| 166 | goto err;
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| 167 | kari->pctx = pctx;
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| 168 | return 1;
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| 169 | err:
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| 170 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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| 171 | return 0;
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| 172 | }
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| 173 |
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| 174 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| 175 | {
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| 176 | if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
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| 177 | return ri->d.kari->ctx;
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| 178 | return NULL;
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| 179 | }
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| 180 |
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| 181 | /*
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| 182 | * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
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| 183 | * or the encrypted CEK.
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| 184 | */
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| 185 |
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| 186 | static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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| 187 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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| 188 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
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| 189 | {
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| 190 | /* Key encryption key */
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| 191 | unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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| 192 | size_t keklen;
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| 193 | int rv = 0;
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| 194 | unsigned char *out = NULL;
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| 195 | int outlen;
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| 196 | keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
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| 197 | if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
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| 198 | return 0;
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| 199 | /* Derive KEK */
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| 200 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
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| 201 | goto err;
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| 202 | /* Set KEK in context */
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| 203 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
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| 204 | goto err;
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| 205 | /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
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| 206 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
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| 207 | goto err;
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| 208 | out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
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| 209 | if (out == NULL)
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| 210 | goto err;
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| 211 | if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
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| 212 | goto err;
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| 213 | *pout = out;
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| 214 | *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
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| 215 | rv = 1;
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| 216 |
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| 217 | err:
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| 218 | OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
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| 219 | if (!rv)
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| 220 | OPENSSL_free(out);
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| 221 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
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| 222 | /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
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| 223 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
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| 224 | kari->pctx = NULL;
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| 225 | return rv;
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| 226 | }
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| 227 |
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| 228 | int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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| 229 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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| 230 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
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| 231 | {
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| 232 | int rv = 0;
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| 233 | unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
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| 234 | size_t enckeylen;
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| 235 | size_t ceklen;
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| 236 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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| 237 | enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
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| 238 | enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
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| 239 | /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
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| 240 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
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| 241 | goto err;
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| 242 | /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
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| 243 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
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| 244 | goto err;
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| 245 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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| 246 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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| 247 | ec->key = cek;
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| 248 | ec->keylen = ceklen;
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| 249 | cek = NULL;
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| 250 | rv = 1;
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| 251 | err:
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| 252 | OPENSSL_free(cek);
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| 253 | return rv;
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| 254 | }
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| 255 |
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| 256 | /* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
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| 257 | static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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| 258 | EVP_PKEY *pk)
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| 259 | {
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| 260 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
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| 261 | EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
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| 262 | int rv = 0;
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| 263 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
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| 264 | if (!pctx)
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| 265 | goto err;
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| 266 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
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| 267 | goto err;
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| 268 | if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
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| 269 | goto err;
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| 270 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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| 271 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
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| 272 | if (!pctx)
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| 273 | goto err;
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| 274 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
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| 275 | goto err;
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| 276 | kari->pctx = pctx;
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| 277 | rv = 1;
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| 278 | err:
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| 279 | if (!rv)
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| 280 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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| 281 | EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
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| 282 | return rv;
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| 283 | }
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| 284 |
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| 285 | /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
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| 286 |
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| 287 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
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| 288 | EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
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| 289 | {
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| 290 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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| 291 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
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| 292 |
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| 293 | ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
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| 294 | if (!ri->d.kari)
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| 295 | return 0;
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| 296 | ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
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| 297 |
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| 298 | kari = ri->d.kari;
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| 299 | kari->version = 3;
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| 300 |
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| 301 | rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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| 302 | if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
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| 303 | M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
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| 304 | return 0;
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| 305 | }
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| 306 |
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| 307 | if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
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| 308 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
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| 309 | rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
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| 310 | if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
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| 311 | return 0;
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| 312 | if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
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| 313 | return 0;
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| 314 | } else {
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| 315 | rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
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| 316 | if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
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| 317 | return 0;
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| 318 | }
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| 319 |
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| 320 | /* Create ephemeral key */
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| 321 | if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
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| 322 | return 0;
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| 323 |
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| 324 | EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
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| 325 | rek->pkey = pk;
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| 326 | return 1;
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| 327 | }
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| 328 |
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| 329 | static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
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| 330 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
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| 331 | {
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| 332 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
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| 333 | const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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| 334 | int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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| 335 | /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
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| 336 | kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
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| 337 |
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| 338 | if (kekcipher) {
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| 339 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
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| 340 | return 0;
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| 341 | return 1;
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| 342 | }
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| 343 | /*
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| 344 | * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
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| 345 | * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
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| 346 | */
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| 347 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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| 348 | if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
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| 349 | kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
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| 350 | else
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| 351 | #endif
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| 352 | if (keylen <= 16)
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| 353 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
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| 354 | else if (keylen <= 24)
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| 355 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
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| 356 | else
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| 357 | kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
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| 358 | return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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| 359 | }
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| 360 |
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| 361 | /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
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| 362 |
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| 363 | int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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| 364 | CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
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| 365 | {
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| 366 | CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
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| 367 | CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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| 368 | CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
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| 369 | STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
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| 370 | int i;
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| 371 |
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| 372 | if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
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| 373 | CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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| 374 | return 0;
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| 375 | }
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| 376 | kari = ri->d.kari;
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| 377 | reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
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| 378 | ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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| 379 | /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
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| 380 | if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
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| 381 | return 0;
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| 382 | /*
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| 383 | * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
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| 384 | * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
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| 385 | */
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| 386 | if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
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| 387 | CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
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| 388 | oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
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| 389 | oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
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| 390 | if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
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| 391 | return 0;
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| 392 | }
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| 393 | /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
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| 394 | if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
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| 395 | return 0;
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| 396 | /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
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| 397 | for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
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| 398 | unsigned char *enckey;
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| 399 | size_t enckeylen;
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| 400 | rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
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| 401 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
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| 402 | return 0;
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| 403 | if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
|
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| 404 | kari, 1))
|
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| 405 | return 0;
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| 406 | ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
|
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| 407 | }
|
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| 408 |
|
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| 409 | return 1;
|
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| 410 |
|
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| 411 | }
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